

OSS Memo
JAPANESE
Psychological Warfare

Spence 14,502
Psychological Warfare
Location x Bureau

**From the Files of the Director
Phase Return**

JAPANESE PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

For convenience, this subject can be divided as follows:

I - Jap combat PW: attempts to spread anxiety and confusion among U.S. troops in combat zones.

II - Jap radio propaganda in English;

For Allied troops in Southwest Pacific camps.
For our servicemen's families at home.
For other special groups.

III - Jap P.W. Appeals to Other Asiatics;

Methods
P.W. Line addressed to respective groups.
Our possible counter P.W.

I

JAP COMBAT P.W.

Attempts to spread anxiety and confusion among U.S. troops in combat zones:-

- (1) Loudspeakers, broadcasting noise of firecrackers, etc., to deceive Allied troops as to location and number of Jap troops.
- (2) Shouts and commands to U.S. troops "Gas Attack", "Surrender!"
- (3) Leaflets and tickets with surrender directions.
- (4) Naked women bathers to distract U.S. troops.
- (5) Noisy weapons -- Shrieking bombs.
- (6) Strafing and Dive Bombing to disrupt morale of U.S. troops.
- (7) Camouflage -- including impersonation of natives.
- (8) Infiltration and attack from rear.
- (9) Sniping from trees.
- (10) Leaving unburied dead to raise a stench.

(B) Entertainment by War Prisoners, real and fictional

- "Yokohama Hot Shots in Japan for an extended engagement"
- Gruesome skits about jungle warfare, etc.
- Skits about mental telepathy between mothers and sons at the front
 Purpose: To get families to harass officials and to doubt all official information.
- Skit on Life with 14th U.S. Air Force
 - (i) Discontent with Shafu conditions
 - (ii) Cynicism about war aims
 - (iii) Contempt for Chinese
 - (iv) Despair of good medical care
 - (v) Respect for Jap planes, prowess, etc.

(C) Eye witness stories about pitiful straits of U.S. troops

- Cries of U.S. wounded "Mother, must I die so young?"

(3) Broadcasts for other Special Groups:

- (A) To students of Americans
 - Counterattack on student pilot training
- (B) Cultural broadcasts by returned scholars
 - "After the war we must know each other."
(Peace Themes)
- (C) To Japs in North America
- (D) To Japs in Latin America
- (E) To Filipinos in U.S.
 - American atrocities against Filipinos
 - Resentment in Philippines against
 Casino bombing
 - Jim Crow habits of U.S. whites
- (F) To Chinese in U.S.
 - Cooperation of Chinese and Japs
 - Asia for Asiatics

(4) Broadcasts for General Listeners:

(A) The "German Hour": pro-German news from Tokio

-- "This is Germany speaking to you
thru Tokio"

[Germany has a "Japanese Hour from Berlin"]

(B) Skits:-

"John & Sam" discuss the news
"This is the Story" about the Co-
Prosperity sphere

(C) News tidbits

"England expects every American to
do his duty"
"Comedy of Kiska"

III

JAP APPEALS TO OTHER ASIATICS

Methods --

- 1 - Agents and Spies (esp. women spies)
- 2 - Blackmail
- 3 - Bribery and subsidies
- 4 - Radio
- 5 - Newspapers, leaflets, etc.
- 6 - Rumors
- 7 - Lectures
- 8 - Entertainment of selected groups
- 9 - Infiltration of bogus religious persons
- 10 - Infiltration through large embassy staffs
- 11 - Colonization
- 12 - Puppet governments
- 13 - Youth movements
- 14 - Equipping national armies --
 e.g. "Burma Independence Army"
 "Indian National Army"
- 15 - Cultural groups
- 16 - Movies

General Jap Appeal for Co-prosperity

East Asia Charter v. Atlantic Charter

1. Cooperation for Greater East Asia
2. Mutual respect for sovereignty and independence
3. Cultural cooperation
4. Economic reciprocity
5. Cooperation with all countries of the world

COUNTER

1. Delusory GEA: Japan is all for one, not one for all.
2. Japan doesn't understand democracy: other countries will be colonies, not Jap partners.
3. Japs have been cruel to other Asiatics: so will they be to their new allies.
4. Japan deceives herself as well as everyone else about her prowess. She didn't conquer China in 1 year nor U.S. in 6 months as she boasted. Her defeat is certain.

Jap Appeal to Burma:

1. Japan respects Burmese independence
2. British exploitation is ended

COUNTER

1. Contrast Jap promises and performance re independence, prosperity, etc.
2. Burmese race is being violated and degraded by Jap soldiers
3. Japs have forced Burma to become a battlefield
4. Collapse of rice market
5. Shortage of consumer goods
6. Jap exploitation and theft

[Note--Burmese saboteurs are blowing up railways run by Japs, but will resist reconquest by British.]

Jap Appeal to China: Emphasis on 2 lines:-

1. Youth movements: students carry
GEA torch with conviction
2. Race consciousness: stirring up
latent anti-foreignism in China;
but Japs and Chinese are the same
family. /Jap movies for Chinese
audiences./

COUNTER

1. Occupied China tiring of Jap
carpetbaggers
2. Free China remembers Jap
atrocities and duplicity.
Chungking radio reminds
Burma and Thailand of
Korea's slavery.

Jap Appeal to French Indo-China:

1. This is a war to save all of Asia
2. All Asiatics must fight Anglo-American enemies
3. Independence of Annamites is guaranteed by Japan
4. Religious infiltration -- all Asiatics have a common deity

COUNTER

1. Japs are plundering your food supplies
-- Rat meat is passed off as chicken
2. Don't help to build ships that will haul your goods away to Japan
3. Japs are breaking up your families
4. You are becoming Jap slaves
5. Japs are sending you to work in jungles, filled with danger, disease and devils

[Note: MAN tribes are pro-French, useful "Partisans", informers and border patrols: ANNAMITES are intelligent but devil-conscious.]

Jap Appeal to India:

1. Build up of Bose and other pro-Jap leaders by entertainment, propaganda tours, etc.
2. Attacks on American imperialism in Philippines
3. Britain and U.S. responsible for famine in India: U.S. troops even eat the sacred cattle, leaving no draft animals for farmers who can't get in the crops.
4. Indian National Army is ready to march into India and plant the flag of Free India on Indian soil.

COUNTER

1. Duplicity of Japs.
2. Jap Buddhism is controlled by Japanese Government.
3. Jap defeat is inevitable.

Jap Appeal to Japanese

1. Blood purity -- Japs must not marry inferior natives: Japanese spirit can be fostered only at home
2. Japs are fighting aggressive U.S. and British
3. Russians are oriental and not so bad
4. White races don't belong in Asia: and that goes for Italians and Germans
5. This is a tough war: may be our last.

COUNTER

1. Japan was double-crossed by Germany in the anti-comintern pact
2. Present Jap leaders have misled their people, squandering resources in futile war
3. Peace will bring stability

Jap Appeal to Malaya-Sumatra

1. Common enemies of white race exploiters
2. Blood kinship of Japs
3. Religious ties
4. Cultural ties

COUNTER

1. Japs are plundering your resources
 - Save your food
 - Hoard your supplies
2. Japs have lowered your living standards
 - Shortage of rice, fish, textiles
 - Ruin of export/import trade
3. Exorbitant prices caused by Japs
 - \$50.00 for sarong and blouse
4. Disease is rampant because of war
5. Increase in deaths from starvation
6. Japs are forcing you into slavery

Jap Appeal to Philippines:

1. Jap recognition of Independent P.I. government
2. Jap honors to Filipino martyrs
3. Filipinos were victims of U.S. imperialism
4. " " " " " atrocities
5. " " " " " social discrimination
6. Japs deplore bombing of Cassino monastery

COUNTER

1. Japs are robbing Filipinos to feed and support armies, leaving Filipinos to starve
2. Japs have ruined Filipinos' fishing and shipping
3. U.S. victories show that real Filipino friends are coming back
4. Japs are hypocrites -- do not regard Filipinos as equals: have brutally maltreated other Asiatics

Jap Appeal to Thailand:

Japs say "Our ties must be not merely political and economic but cultural and religious as well." Japs send own Buddhist (90-day wonder) monks to penetrate local Buddhism via Thailand monasteries.

COUNTER

Chungking broadcasts remind Thai of --

1. China/Thai traditional friendship
(3,000,000 Chinese live in Thailand)
2. China supports Thai sovereignty and independence
3. Thailand is not enemy but occupied land
4. Japs subject men by hunger, opium, gas. (Remember Jap treatment of Chinese.)
5. United Nations' Victory is inevitable
6. Thailand is betrayed by her own Quislings
7. Jap Buddhism is far different from that of Thailand

POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION IN OCCUPIED ASIA

<u>Country</u>	<u>Regime</u>	<u>Puppet Leader</u>	<u>Native Force</u>
MANCHURIA	Kingdom, March 1, 1932	Henry Pu-yi, Emperor	Manchurian Army
OCCUPIED CHINA	Republic, March 30, 1940	Wang Ching-wei, Premier	National Army
PHILIPPINES	Republic, Oct. 14, 1943	Jose Laurel, President	Constabulary
DUTCH EAST INDIES	Military and Naval Admin. Native Council		Defense Corps (Java and Sumatra)
MALAYA	Military Admin. Native Council		
FRENCH INDO-CHINA	"French Dependency"	Gov.-Gen. Decoux	French Army
THAILAND	Kingdom	Pibul Songgram, Premier	National Army
BURMA	Republic, Aug. 1, 1943	Ba Maw, Premier	National Army
(FOR) INDIA	Prov. Govt. of Free India, Oct. 21, 1943	Subhas Chandra Bose	India Inde- pendence Army (in Singapore and Malaya)

SECRET

3 April 1944

Lt. Col. Richard Heppner,
American Mission,
New Delhi, India.

Dear Dick:

Here is the paper issued by the Air
Force, which I thought you should see.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

SECRET

SECRET

3 April 1944

Colonel John C. Coughlin,
c/o U. S. Military Mission,
Cauwking, China.

Dear John:

Here is the paper issued by the Air
Force, which I thought you should see.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director.

SECRET

935 Form 4-54

Date 1 April

To GENERAL DONOVAN

The attached was received
today from General Arnold's
office.

[Signature] Jr.

*This should
be sent to
Cynthia T
Hess*

Office of the Executive Officer

[Signature]

(10449)

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SECRET**SUGGESTIONS RE ESCAPE FROM JAPAN**

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by

Major Thomas L. Ash

* * *

A certain percentage of crew members are forced to bail out near the target on every bombing raid. Some land in congested areas and are quickly picked up; others land on open land and it is these men who may be rescued. The normal escape procedure is not applicable to Japan; where no disguise is practical and where bribery is hardly possible. (If an underground system can be made to work successfully, so much the better.) A new technique is indicated, based on the peculiar conditions existing, and the following is submitted with this idea in view.

Let every parachute be colored (mottled from bright green to dark brown, with a part bright yellow) so that when a man lands safely he can cover up under that part that blends best with the background -- the yellow portion to be used for ground signals.

When a man lands he cautiously, selects an open rice field suitable for a glider landing and during the daylight hours remains hidden under his chute. The yellow signal is placed in the open, and hidden when enemy planes obviously are overhead. This signal will be in the form of human numerals, and in the direction of the wind, showing the exact location of the grounded man, and their number.

A photographic plane will record this terrain where men may possibly be, and a rescue attempted at night, probably during another raid, when the enemy will be demoralized.

Using the photos as guides, the rescue party, consisting of a glider and tow plane, will approach. The glider will detach itself and land, further assisted by signals from the ground.

The glider may be detached at high altitude, and use evasive action on its descent. It should, however, pass directly over its land-

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By Authority of The Commanding General Army Air Forces	
24 March 1944	Initials
Date	

ing spot at a given altitude, to be able to spot land after one or two complete turns. It carries its own searching apparatus, which is set up and illuminated, to make identification easy for the tow plane which has flown away, and returns at the exact time designated. The glider being loaded, the tow plane comes in low and makes the pick-up. The flight back to the base must not be too long; the shorter the better.

The glider base should be a carrier, or the Bonin Islands, or Rabaul. The glider is adaptable to swamp landings and take-offs, with full load. The enemy will learn of this type of rescue, but will hardly be able to defend all rice fields on all raids, and any rice field will do. This plan is not considered perfect, but it will work, and something similar, but better, may be devised later. It can be adequately tested in the rice fields of the South, and probably materially improved upon. This plan could be used in Germany, also, and single scouts may be picked up on the fly, as well as a fully loaded glider.

Discussion

It is highly improbable that Americans can move about Japan undetected, therefore they must remain hidden as much as possible. It would be almost impossible to rescue men by submarine or PT boat, for the shores and waterways are so well-guarded. The only way is by air, and as the airports will be our targets, and heavily manned by enemy troops, airplane landings are not possible. There only remains the helicopter, the parachute, or the glider as described. The glider is the most practical. It could also be used carrying a bomb load or landing troops or supplies, and still represent no waste if this rescue idea proves unsuccessful. Tow plane and glider crews must be adequately trained for this particular job; the entire project has been discussed informally with officials at Wright Field, who endorse its feasibility.

The fact that air crews who are forced to bail out over Japan have a chance of rescue, despite the general opinion, will help to raise the morale of bomber crews and make them more anxious to hit Japan.

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280005-9

C O P Y

SECRETUnited States of America
Office of War InformationJanuary 15, 1944
Istanbul, Turkey

Memorandum:

The attached discussion of Japanese intelligence and propaganda in Turkey is based largely on information received from Germans officially connected with the German government service in Turkey. They have shown a desire to talk to OWI representatives here and to answer questions. Certain information previously received from them has been verified. I take no responsibility for the accuracy of this report, beyond my own personal care in trying to set it down as received. It is presented with this warning for the interest of those to whom it is sent. Of course it is highly confidential and no information should be given as to its source.

As a precaution, a copy of an earlier draft has been given to a British intelligence officer who very kindly read and criticized it, supplying additional items of his own information, and the copy has been changed in line with his suggestions. Anything which he recognized as inaccurate or doubtful has been eliminated.

It will be considered a great favor if anyone reading this who detects any errors will communicate them to me.

George W. H. Britt

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C O P Y

United States of America
Office of War Information

Istanbul, Turkey
January 15, 1944

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA IN TURKEY

A fact of significance about Istanbul is that it lies on the direct road now followed between Berlin and Tokyo. From Istanbul eastward the road leads through Baku, Leningrad and Tiflis, to the Trans-Siberian. Average time in transit is about six weeks. The various Japanese missions, delegations and experts pass through Turkey, stop for rest and entertainment, confer with Germany's American expert, Von Papen. The Germans, of course, cannot cross Russia and supposedly reach Japan by submarine.

Another fact of interest is that with the drying up of Lisbon as the best Japanese observation post facing America and the occidental United Nations, Istanbul has become more important for Japanese watchers. It is not so good as Lisbon. But with Portugal's distaste for Japanese conquest neighboring the Portuguese colonies and with her closer collaboration with the Allies, Istanbul is one of the best alternative posts still in sight.

This is believed to account for the arrival here from Portugal about six weeks ago of Shin Ichi Chiba, former Japanese minister at Paris. His prolonged stay is given out as due to Russian slowness in granting a visa. Meanwhile, he is busy collecting information about the situation in East and Turkey, and about the Americans. He formerly was a diplomat in the United States and is a specialist on America. He is considered important.

It should be recognized at the start that Japanese contact with the Turkish press is negligible, and that the job of Japanese newspaper correspondent is a mere cover for a secret intelligence agent.

Important Japanese personalities effecting information in Turkey and the Balkans include the following:

Mr. Uchida, First Secretary of the Japanese embassy in Berlin, is chief of the Japanese information service for the whole of Europe, including Turkey. His assistant, Third Secretary in Berlin, was Mr. Uchida who departed six weeks ago for Tokyo for a more important post in the Foreign Office and has not been replaced yet.

In Turkey the Acting Chief Information Officer is Mr. Aoki, Third Secretary of the Embassy. Turkey had been a second-rate post for the Japs until the war. There were neither personal links of any importance or established political relations. They had no publicity. About twenty months ago Mr. Aoki started his work. He is charged with reporting on the foreign policy of Turkey, on the United States, then England, the Middle East and India. He also maintains personal contacts with the Russians. He formerly held an important policy post in South China and was in France before coming here. Negotiations for the settlement of the Indo-China question with Vichy were conducted by him with such satisfaction to the Japanese Foreign Office that a cash grant of about \$2000 was made to him. The story is that he spent the money to buy

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United States of America
Office of War Information

Istanbul, Turkey
January 15, 1944

JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE AND PROPAGANDA IN TURKEY

A fact of significance about Istanbul is that it lies on the direct road as now followed between Berlin and Tokyo. From Istanbul eastward the road leads through Erzerum, Leninakan and Tiflis, to the Trans-Siberian. Average time in transit is about six weeks, Istanbul to Tokyo. The various Jap missions, delegations and experts pass through Turkey, stop for rest and entertainment, confer with Germany's American expert, Von Papen. The Germans, of course, cannot cross Russia and supposedly reach Japan by submarine.

Another fact of interest is that with the drying up of Lisbon as the best Jap observation post facing America and the occidental United Nations, Istanbul has become more important for Japanese watchers. It is not so good as Lisbon. But with Portugal's distaste for Japanese conquest neighboring the Portuguese colonies and with her closer collaboration with the Allies, Istanbul is one of the best alternative posts still in sight.

This is believed to account for the arrival here from Portugal about six weeks ago of Shin Ischi Chiba, former Japanese minister at Paris. His prolonged stay is given out as due to Russian slowness in granting a visa. Meanwhile, he is busy collecting information about the Middle East and Turkey, and about the Americans. He formerly was a diplomat in the United States and is a specialist on America. He is considered important.

It should be recognized at the start that Japanese contact with the Turkish press is negligible, and that the job of Japanese newspaper correspondent is a mere cover for a secret intelligence agent.

Important Japanese personalities affecting information in Turkey and the Balkans include the following:

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In Turkey the Acting Chief Information Officer is Marie Aoki, Third Secretary of the Embassy. Turkey had been a second-rate post for the Japs until the war. There were neither personal links of any importance or established political relations. They had no publicity. About twenty months ago Mr. Aoki started his work. He is charged with reporting on the foreign policy of Turkey, on the United States, then England, the Middle East and India. He also maintains personal contacts with the Russians. He formerly held an important policy post in South China and was in France before coming here. Negotiations for the settlement of the Indo China question with Vichy were conducted by him with such satisfaction to the Japanese Foreign Office that a cash grant of about \$200,000 was made to him. The rumor is that he spent the money to buy

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a bar in Paris and set up in business a French girl friend.

Mr. Mahog, another embassy secretary, is considered in Axis circles as one of their best informed agents on the subject of Turkey. He is about sixty, has spent much time in Russia but for the past twenty years, approximately, he has lived in Turkey. He became a Moslem, took a Turkish wife and speaks the language perfectly. He has many Turkish friends. He is close mouthed and keeps his knowledge for his reports.

Mr. Yamamoto is the Japanese specialist on the United States and on India. He is very young and this is his second post, his first having been Washington where he was interned after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Taito, who is the more important, and Mr. Shigemitsu are the experts in Ankara on Russian affairs. Both have lived in Russia and speak the language.

For the collection of military information there is an expert in Ankara, Lt. Col. Ota, assistant military attaché and liaison with Gen. Brig. Horie Tatsui in Istanbul.

In charge of the Japanese information office in Istanbul is Kase Iwami. He is considered one of the best informed Japs on Russian affairs. He has spent many years in Russia as a consul and in other jobs. His wife is a Soviet Russian who now is working in Stockholm on a job similar to his. He speaks Russian perfectly. Before coming to Istanbul in May 1943, he was First Secretary of Legation in Sofia and there he was on close terms with the Soviet Counsellor of Legation, Mr. Gusevkin.

Mr. Ota is the sole Japanese representative of the Demel Agency in Istanbul. He lives in Cihangir and has his office in his house. He has a secretary, Haru Fuka, who acts as a translator for Turkish, French and German. A small quantity of news and pictures are received at the Japanese embassy in Ankara and Mr. Ota sees to getting it out. It is sometimes distributed by German agencies, and assistance is given by a Turkish journalist who was secretary to Mr. Iwami, former Asahi correspondent here and now in Budapest.

In their propaganda the Japanese today are playing a double game, according to German opinion. The Germans themselves keep a suspicious watch on the Japs and their liaison men also act somewhat as spies on them. In official dealings with the Germans, the Japs continue their talk of common victory. At the same time the Germans are aware that wherever the Japs have diplomatic representatives, they try to influence men in military and high political circles in favor of their particular objectives, especially as concerns the Russians, regardless of their Axis partner.

German Ambassador von Papen is considered by the Japanese as definitely not their friend. The striking fact to them was that he failed to send a note or other such diplomatic compliments on the second anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack. The Japanese Ambassador waited anxiously until 4 o'clock in the afternoon, then telephoned asking if he might call. Von Papen, forgetting or ignoring the day, said, "I'm too busy now, call me back tomorrow".

Japs have only the most formal relationships with the Russians, according to British reports. Protocol requires the Russians at times to invite Japs to parties, but they make circumstances pointedly uncomfortable for their guests. The Russians also make a practice of throwing difficulties in the path of Jap

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officials wishing to travel across Russia, and such travellers are accompanied by an armed escort. Ito, secretary to General Tateishi remarked last week that it was only by bartering some rescued Russian seamen that they obtained transit visa for a party of seven officials. This, I believe was in November.

Thus far the Japanese have not shown a great attention to what the Turks are doing or thinking. They put out little publicity here. Their whole press staff consists only of Oda. They make only the slightest contact with the journalists. On the other hand, they spend enormous sums, according to German insiders, for information. An example of that was Homotore Kometo, former correspondent here for Nichi Nichi. He was very active here in gathering information from travellers and for that the Turkish police expelled him to Sofia. He was extremely active here and his budget was reported as about 40,000 Swiss francs, monthly.

Mr. Velikotny, that most dubious Spanish "Press-attache" had six thousand Turkish pounds only for the start of a certain link with Iran.

Mr. Maeda, now with the chief of staff of the Office in Tokyo, had an income of about five thousand Turkish pounds a month, when here in Turkey. He was Istanbul representative of Asahi Shimbun. Formerly he was in Rome, visited Ethiopia and helped mislead the people there in preparation for the Italian attache, for which service Italy decorated him. Recently these expenses have been lessened, but the Japs are still spending a maximum.

If they want a man, they must pay him more than he gets anywhere else. For instance Mr. Shamliyan was in the Europa Press service before he went over to the Japs. He had got some 250 TL a month. The Japs took him over, paying him about 800 TL a month. An average reporter is making about 400-600 a month with the Japs. Mr. Velikotny's salary reached an average of 200-300 TL when he was in Turkey. (This is only what he got from the Japs). Another Turkish informant, Mr. Selim, now confined in Anatolia, made about 1200-1500 a month.

Generally it can be said that there is virtually no limit on paying for the information that they get. Compared with the Germans, they still pay a maximum. A German first rank journalist - or any other person in charge of some importance - has an average income of between 1500-2500 TL, the expenses for propaganda and information purposes not included. As for this latter purpose, the German activities are ruled by the principle that it costs what it costs. This does not mean that they are wasting their money. It only means that, if some object has been found interesting and of value, the question of costs plays a very second part, money being always available. Not so with the Japs: they pay very often any amount demanded, only to get the business and keep it for themselves.

Mr. Hagi has probably through Hakag, two or three very good links to the Turkish authorities, especially the Foreign Office. Apart from this he says he is getting press cables directly from India by his own correspondent. About the situation in Iran, Iraq and Syria he is mainly informed by an Iranian source in Beyrouth. (An Allied intelligence officer comments that he doubts the value of this Iran, Iraq and Syrian information, as well as of the press reports from India). Mr. Janet from the Spanish Legation is in touch with him. About America he mainly is using the knowledge of some Turkish sources by Hakag. Besides, he gets all the American, English and Middle-East papers available.

Hakag has at his disposal the Armenian journalist Shamliyan, from Europa Press. Contact with different White Russian circles has also been established.

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Among the so-called Nishi Nishi correspondent has still a few links in this country. Shaniyan is his man, only put at the disposal of Mr. Isumi. Until Mr. Velikotny was dismissed and left the country, also he was directly depending on Isumi. Also a Hungarian, named Kovacs, was working for Isumi until he was expelled a couple of months ago. All these agents since they were expelled, still maintain their links from outside, either Sofia or Budapest.

The Office's branch in Bulgaria is headed by Mr. Nagayoshi, successor of Isumi at the legation in Sofia. This branch has not only to deal with Bulgarian affairs, but has also to be prepared for the possibility that diplomatic relations between Japan and Turkey may be broken. In this case they have to continue work and must replace the organization in Turkey without delay. The agents in charge of this special duty are mainly the above mentioned Isimoto and Mr. Honda.

Isimoto is now working in Berlin, Budapest and Sofia. He has different Bulgarian and Hungarian agents. Besides, he has engaged Velikotny, who is now in Budapest and will return to Sofia. Velikotny also in Sofia now, is a member of the White Russian organization of Col. Turku, who is still in Rome. Velikotny is in regular touch with Turku, getting material from him and giving this stuff to the Japs. As Turku's organization is widespread, the material is not uninteresting. It is to be said, that the Japs are gathering information not only about their enemies, but also about their own allies quite solid bloodedly.

Honda's information is mostly based on his excellent Polish and Ukrainian relations in Eastern Europe. He is doubly a spy. He was once a sort of press officer with the legation in Sofia and formerly was registered as correspondent for Asahi Shimbun as a cover. As for Turkey, he has a special agent named Kato who is a Bulgarian journalist and visits Turkey from time to time.

Among the leading people of the Office in Berlin, the following are chiefly interested in South-Eastern and Turkish affairs:

Mr. Honda was already mentioned as chief.

Mr. Kato, Nishi-Nishi's European chief, is one of the leading men.

Mr. Kato, Nishi's chief in Berlin, is using as a special agent a certain Mr. Kato who is an interesting type of agent. He is a Japanese dancer and appears from time to time in the different capitals of Europe, always being charged with special duties which he covers by his profession. He is one of the most clever agents they have. He comes here.

Altogether they have in Berlin for the time being about 300 agents of the most different professions, whom they make use of as required for various information purposes.

The following analysis of Japanese information and propaganda is altogether from an official German source:

Although the Jap war propaganda had been centralized already in 1941 under the direction of the so-called "Information Office" in Tokyo, it never has achieved really good results until now. This is probably, above all, due to the remarkable lack of adaptability of the Japanese character. Nevertheless the office has spread rather a close network all over the world and particularly in Europe. It must be pointed out that the methods employed by them differ from any western method. While western propaganda will always try to influence a certain public opinion in a whole and to the utmost, the Japs

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apparently are not able to do that. So one must not wonder, if Japan does not show a great publicity even in Germany, where the ground is most favorable for them. They consciously restrain their activities to a more selected circle of partners whom they think to be important for them. So the Information Office has become practically an instrument of policy in all of the official diplomacy. From this standpoint their work is not bad.

The Office is charged with two rather different duties: First, to gather information about the country concerned - and that means information of every kind - and second, to influence the leading or important circles of the country.

The first mentioned task brings the organization very close to espionage and, as a matter of fact, it is espionage. The second is secret diplomacy.

Therefore, the Information Office never appears in a foreign country officially under its name. The members are not to be known as members. On the contrary, they are usually employed as members of the diplomatic mission concerned.

Japanese information work in Turkey was launched on a larger scale in January 1943 at a conference in Berlin between Aoki and Uehida. The problems discussed were, I. putting their activities on a more important plan, II getting a certain publicity.

The organization listed above shows a considerable achievement as to the first point. It was decided, however, that no great importance be attached and that appears as a sound conclusion in view of the basic coldness of the Turkish press toward news from the Pacific. Their object remained the gathering of information and influencing select political circles. At that time and continuing until the Cairo and Mohrae conferences of Allied leaders in December 1943, their propaganda outline was about as follows:

The Japanese policy in Europe in the years 1942 and 1943 centered in the idea of bringing Russia and Germany to an arrangement or, if possible, even to an understanding. During the whole year of 1943 already they foresaw exactly the events we witness today. With all their influence they tried to convince the Germans. They several times offered themselves as intermediators. But already in January 1943 a certain turning point was apparently reached: Tokyo ordered secretly an inversion of propaganda. From then on they tried to get in better terms with Russians everywhere, also in Turkey. In August 1943 Mr. Aoki reported to his subordinator, when coming back from conference in Berlin, that Germany has virtually lost the war, the outcome being only a question of time.

From this moment on, the office in Turkey is obviously following a quite new and different line: They hope that Russia finally will go too far with her demands in Europe, and in doing so, will hurt after all the Anglo-Saxon's interests somewhere. They also have watched the development of General von Seydlitz's Free Germany Committee in Moscow very closely, because they hoped, that by the help of this committee Germany might be able to patch up a settlement with Russia and continue the war against the Western Powers. (This is stated by many conversations this writer had with the Japanese, even after the Moscow Conference). At any rate, the Japs do not believe that the Russians will keep any promises to the Allies. They still believe in the possibility of a perfect Russo-Japanese understanding relating to Chung-King, and in building up a mighty Asiatic bloc, overshadowing the whole of Europe. This is at least what they tell confidentially. Therefore they find today a closer coordination between the Japanese policy in Europe and Russia absolutely necessary. It was

SECRET

Isami's idea that Isami should go on this purpose to Moscow to establish a regular link between the Japanese organizations in Russia and in Germany, which means, Europe as has not existed until now. This has not been decided, Isami not yet having received Ambassador Ohama's consent.

Since Cairo and Teheran the Japanese line has veered still further. Japan is informed that Chiang Kai Chek in Cairo asked if Russia could not be induced to help China in some way, and that Stalin at Teheran said no, not now, not until after the final defeat of Germany; but after that he might let the Americans use its air bases in Siberia or otherwise have help in fighting the Japs.

Accordingly, for the moment the Japs are watching Russian policy and trying to avoid occasions for friction. They have ceased trying to influence either Russia or Germany toward a mutual arrangement. They consider that a vain hope. They are convinced that Germany will lose the war against Russia. Their hope now is pinned onto subsequent differences -- Russia versus England and America. They hope the British and Americans may consider that Russia is going too far and demanding too much in Europe, may try to oppose her, in which case they wish to assure themselves of closer cooperation with Russia.

(Istanbul CMI comment on the foregoing --

If our German source has reported accurately, one of the most striking points is the story's spotlighting of the intensely self-centered, shifty, suspicious attitude of the Japs, their remission of faith in Germany as a permanently helpful ally, their willingness now to play ball with Germany's enemy Russia, their open faced double dealing, and on the other hand, the utter lack of confidence by the Germans in the Japs. This lends a particularly hollow note to German propaganda attempting to reassure their own people, their satellites and the world as to the great benefits they will get from their Japanese alliance. I should think our propaganda toward Germany and the satellites might profit from working on this inherent German suspicion and pointing out that their build-up of Jap strength is mere whistling to keep up their courage. The Germans have both reason and precedent to make them fearful of the double cross from Japan, and that inescapable fact should be useful to us in undermining their morale. Propaganda directed to the Germans emphasizing the duplicity and untrustworthiness of the Japs should be effective in increasing their sense of despair and hopelessness.)

SECRET

Colonel Connely

J. P. Macaulay

Personnel Possibilities in War Relocation Camps

In reference to your memorandum to General Connely on the above subject, the General has the following comment to make regarding the last paragraph:

"I think this a good idea - please look into it."

J. P. Macaulay

11 May 1944
Philip P. Halper
x 10. 1. 1944. Attch 1

Colonel Connely

J. P. Macaulay

Personnel Possibilities in War Relocation Camps

With reference to your memorandum to General
Kenner on the above subject, the General has the fol-
lowing comment to make regarding the last paragraph:

"I think this a good idea - please look
into it."

J. P. Macaulay

Japanese-American 14,514
Intelligence
** Philip, F. Kelly*
11 May 1944
** War Relocation Authority*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General William J. Donovan
 FROM: Colonel E. F. Connely
 SUBJECT: Personnel Possibilities in War Relocation Camps

DATE: 9 May 1944

I have had some discussion with one of the solicitors for the War Relocation Authority who is of the opinion that we might find a limited number of desirable Neisai in War Relocation Camps. The WRA would assist us by making preliminary screening, first, from the standpoint of loyalty, and second, from the standpoint of education and ability, after which one of our own personnel officers could go to the camp in civilian clothes and work with the personnel officers of the camp.

OSS would not be mentioned at any time, even after a desirable list of candidates was located, until further check had been made on the candidate by our Security office.

I would be glad to have your opinion as to whether or not you agree with this or whether we should think only in terms of recruiting this type of personnel in the Hawaiian Islands.

EFC:js

E.F.C.

I think this is
 a good idea - Please
 look into it
 D.

CONFIDENTIAL

DH

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 4, 1944

MEMORANDUM



To: Director, OSS

From: Chief, Far Eastern Division, SI

Subject: Recruiting of Nisei
(memorandum from Col. Connely of 16 April 1944, attached)

1. Mr. Sheparden says you wish to have comment from this branch concerning attached memorandum. Comment, based on our experience, follows:

2. I agree with the contents of Col. Connely's memorandum attached. The problem of recruitment has reached a serious stage. The present situation is as follows:

(a) N.I.I. After months of negotiation with the Dutch, Dr. Nyland's recruiting trip to CURACAO and SURINAM resulted in our securing only twelve (12) Indonesians whom we had been led to believe originally that 200 to 300 might be available. It was only after protracted discussion, furthermore, that the Dutch agreed that these men should be permitted to be earmarked direct for OSS, upon their arrival in Colombo rather than being placed in a pool for common use by the British, Dutch and U.S.A. There is very little if any chance that further Indonesians can be obtained by OSS from Dutch sources other than from such a common pool either in COLUMBO or AUSTRALIA.

(b) NISEI. This question was approached optimistically by SI, Far East, six months ago. After considerable difficulty with the Army (who would not permit us to go near Camp Savage) we were permitted to recruit at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Out of 100 possible candidates, 41 were selected as worthy of experiment. Selection was made on a basis of fair language ability plus willingness to volunteer for a dangerous overseas mission. After considerable difficulty with "slats," twenty-four of this group were recruited and launched into an intensive training program. This program included a language "brush-up" at Camp Savage. Upon arrival

SECRET

- 1 -

there the group was screened for language aptitude and we were informed that only one of the group was considered capable of entering the advanced class there. Additional security checks had reduced this group by this time, incidentally, from 24 to 16.

The present prospect of recruiting further NISEI is furthermore practically nil. I accompanied Colonel Connelly on a call at G-2 on April 21, 1944, when we saw Colonel Neckerling, Deputy Chief of G-2. We were informed at this time that no further recruitment from Camp Shelby would be possible and that, in fact, G-2 had been forced to surrender over 130 of its NISEI from Camp Savage in order to provide replacement in the NISEI contingent in ITALY.

We have since heard informally from Colonel Rasmussen, Commandant at Camp Savage. He suggested, off the record, that we apply officially to the Army for permission to recruit among his more proficient graduates for our type of work. (This communication has been referred to Schools and Training.)

4. Our continuing search during recent weeks for individuals qualified in the Japanese language has revealed that those best qualified have long since been recruited by the Navy or the Army. Those departments furthermore have been adamant in refusing us access to such personnel.

5. The possibility of using NISEI or any other individuals of Japanese origin is seriously handicapped by the question of security. To be of real value in SI they must have language proficiency. The better Americans they are (and therefore the better their security) the less likely they are to have either language proficiency or even requisite knowledge of Japanese customs and local conditions, without which they have little potentiality for SI work. Those who have been best to Japan and therefore possess such knowledge (the KISEI) are practically all suspect.

6. Our remaining potential area for recruitment is the Hawaiian Islands where OSS has heretofore been barred. Although the Army and Navy have already done some recruiting there, it is possible that we might find a limited number of recruits there, especially OKINAWAN of whom we should like to train a group if possible.

7. Before we can supply personnel for training on the West Coast, therefore, we need:


- 3 -

SECRET

- (a) authority to recruit in Hawaii.
- (b) specific missions in the Pacific for which to train, and
- (c) requisite authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to procure desired personnel.

J. M. McHugh
J. M. McHugh
Colonel, USMC

Attachment



create the edges of
camera field

Even No. rolls

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]

Mr. Charles S. Cheston

15 April 1944

Colonel E. F. Connely
Chief, Personnel Procurement Branch
Recruiting of Asia.

In accordance with your instructions of last night, I will take immediate steps to explore the possibility of special recruiting desired by the General.

Before getting too deeply involved, however, there are several angles to this that should be given careful consideration.

1. A big difficulty will be experienced in recruiting Japanese in this country even though permission is granted to take some additional personnel out of the 441st Regiment at Camp Shelby. The problem of security and loyalty is extremely difficult and, on top of that, you have the problem of finding the right types physically who can be indoctrinated in a swimming program. G-3 has already advised me that it is most unlikely that we will get anyone out of Shelby.
2. We should know more about where the activities are to be. For example, if they are to be in the Philippines, it would be very much better to recruit Filipinos, and there are many in this country today in the Army. The attitude and reliability of the Filipino is a much better bet.
3. It appears quite likely that a better job of recruiting Japanese could be done in Hawaii. The Hawaiian-born Jap is regarded by some people as a better type. They could be employed as civilians, since they do not exercise the draft laws in Hawaii. There should be no problem of using them as civilians, thereby eliminating the problem of slots. The Hawaiian-Japanese is reputed to be a much better physical type, and more likely to have a basic knowledge of swimming.
4. If Formosa and other Japanese mandates or occupied areas are our objectives, thought should be given to the use of Chinese. The population of Formosa is 90% Chinese.

In view of the foregoing, it would seem proper to suggest the whole program be given careful thought from the standpoint of targets before an actual recruiting program is inaugurated.

cc: Col. Cheston

E.F.C.

WFC:2

SECRET

FORM

Col. McHugh

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	For'd.		
Mr. DeLoach					<i>Approved</i> <i>h7D</i>
1.					
2.					
3.					
4.					
5.					
6.					
7.					
8.					
9.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in To column.

When Officer cannot initial (short name insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

Form 1

SECRET

GPO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

May 4, 1944

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

To: Director, OSS

From: Chief, Far Eastern Division, SI

Subject: Personnel available in Japanese Evacuee Camps known as War Relocation Camps

Reference: Attached memorandum to Col. Burton from Col. Connolly of 18 April 1944

I agree with the recommendation made by Col. Connely in his last paragraph, but recommend that our Japan specialist, Dr. Daniel C. Buchanan, accompany the representatives of the Personnel Procurement Branch in the suggested survey. Dr. Buchanan has been intimately associated with our efforts to procure and train Nisei. He speaks Japanese fluently and will be able to assist materially in the suggested screening of possible candidates.

J. H. McLaugh
Colonel, USMC

Abstract

SECRET

to: General

Do you desire to make a
comment on the last paragraph of
the attached.

Macaulay

Director's Office

(3500)

... take the edges of
... fields

Even No. rolls

1/2 exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

LT. BANE

To:

Previous memos about
Mr. Glick and the Japanese-
Americans have been referred
to Mr. Cheston

MR CHESTON
SAVS NO ACTION
TO BE TAKEN
UNTIL VALID
RETURN.
RT
Director's Office

(3308)

...ate the edges of
camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel E. Edward Sexton

DATE: 1 April 1944

FROM: Colonel W. F. Connelly

SUBJECT: Personnel Available in Japanese Evacuee Camps known as War Relocation Camps

We have been studying recruiting possibilities in War Relocation Camps. Conference was held this morning with Mr. Wick, solicitor for the War Relocation Authority, who was quite optimistic about our ability to find desirable material for our purposes in nine of the ten War Relocation Camps. There is one camp, Fortney Lake, where they have had a good deal of trouble and where the definitely pro-Japanese are segregated. It was Mr. Wick's opinion that we could be assisted materially if our representative worked with their classification officer in a study of the camp records prior to actually interviewing any individuals. Mr. Wick stated that they had "affiliations" very thoroughly carded and that he was sure that his office could give us considerable guidance.

The ever present problem of security was discussed and it was decided that if this work was attempted that the O'S representative should appear at the camp in civilian clothes and keep his identity entirely unknown until the screening was finished and until arrangements have been made with the camp authorities to work out cover while transfer was being effected.

Mr. Wick was of the definite opinion that only by very careful and thorough examination of the candidates' qualifications could a proper job be done. He did not think any quick recruiting was possible.

It, therefore, becomes a question for your decision as to whether or not an attempt should be made to explore the possibilities of these camps. I feel that the Personnel Procurement Branch officers are sufficiently experienced so that they would know in a week or less as to whether or not it was worthwhile to carry on an exhaustive study. It seems to me that this investigation is worthwhile. If you agree, we will work out our plans with the WRA, brief our representative in exact detail and it would be my recommendation that he be accompanied by an equally well informed and briefed representative of the Security office.

-115-
SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 19 MARCH 1945

FROM

VICTOR, HONOLULU

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

IN: 7829

(FOR ACTION)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT.

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHERSECRET
SECRET

#897. 109 FROM HALLIWELL.

REPLY YOUR #3827 (OUT: 6466): POUCHING FAR FROM COMPLETE
FILE RUSSIAN SUBJECT MATTER INTERCEPTS. SUGGEST COMPLETE FBIS FILE
IN OMB, WASHINGTON, OR FOO HEADQUARTERS BE WORKED OVER. DETAILED
RECOMMENDATIONS FORWARDED.

TON: 2156 19 MAR 45

FILE COPY

SECRET

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE
WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

FORM 64 (Revised)

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 16 MARCH 1945

REC'D 1642 16 MAR 45

TO

VICTOR, HONOLULU

FROM

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

DEFERRED

OUT 6466

DISTRIBUTION

(CONFIRMATION TO ORIGINATOR)

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR

SECRETARIAT, FIELD SECTION

1

TRANSMITTED IN CODE OR CIPHER

SECRET

SECRET

#3027. HALLIBELL FROM 109.

PLEASE FORWARD HERE IMMEDIATELY FOIS INTERCEPTS REFERRED TO YOUR LETTER 2 MARCH TO CHESTON. AM INTERESTED IN ANALYZING OLVERSE PROPAGANDA LINES WHICH YOU INDICATED ARE BEING USED. NOT NECESSARY FOR YOU TO PROCESS MATERIAL AS WE WANT TO WORK IT IN WITH OTHER MATERIAL HERE. SUGGEST YOU CONTINUE TO SEND ANY FUTURE INTERCEPTS BEARING ON THE SUBJECT OF YOUR LETTER AS THEY ARE RECEIVED BY YOU.

SECRET

WJD/EJP

1001 1753

16 MAR 45

FILE COPY

INITIALS OF "RELEASING" OFFICER

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO COPY OR REPRODUCE THIS CABLE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA

To	Route No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		
1. <i>Saffman</i>		<i>21 MAR</i>		<i>H</i>	
2. <i>WAS AD</i>					
3.					
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10.					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
 Officer's designation should be used in To column.
 Each officer should initial (check work identified) before further routing.
 Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
 For other identification use separate sheet.


SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Suxton
FROM: Secretariat
SUBJECT:

DATE: 21 December 1943



There is attached a note which has come in for General Donovan, apparently from General Chennault. There was sent with the note two copies of a document on Japanese currency which the General had evidently requested while he was in the Far East.

It would seem that the best thing to do is to hold this until the General returns so that he may make a personal reply.

CAB

C. A. Bane

C. A. Bane
Lieut (jg) USNR

1 Incl

7 Dec 43
 Gen Donovan:

Herewith 2 cc
 of memo 29 Aug outlining
 purpose and method of use
 of enemy currency available.
 Apparently a local feud
 between members of OWI in
 China, together with some
 suspicion in Chongking as
 its operation under my direction
 has resulted in frustration
 at the moment.

It was a pleasure to meet
 you and I feel for us your
 trip will be extremely fruitful.
 My best wishes to Mr. Donovan.

W. H. C.

Gen. No. 11/15/

[1 up to 11 1/25 @ f.6.3]

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505
NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

D/JCW/THAO

29 August 1943.

TO: Chinese Currency.

FROM: Mr. W. P. Otto, Asst. A-2, Kweilin, China.

1. Chinese currency being available, it will be supplied you for use in developing the following commodities for delivery to O.E.W. as per my notation of 13 August 1943 with Mr. Max Polin.

2. Through sources now available and to be developed, this money will be distributed to be used in purchasing wolfram, fulminate of mercury, etc., and any other native commodities available which the U.S. requires for building, etc. The money will be covered in full by receipt and notation made later when deal is completed as to what and how much commodity was obtained, as well as disposition of same.

3. The purpose of this is three fold:

- a. Obtaining required materials.
- b. Turning same to enemy.
- c. Developing regular sources of contact and information.

4. It is envisaged that this will develop from relatively small beginning and may enlarge in scope, if all works out favorably, or may be entirely dropped or turned over to O.E.W. as may be dictated by developments.

5. Such commodities as accumulate will be held by you in Kweilin under U.S. establishing an office there or directing disposition.

6. Copy of this Memo is being furnished Mr. Polin.

JESSE C. WILLIAMS,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
A-2.

cc - Mr. Max Polin.

- 1 -

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH U. S. AIR FORCE
 P. O. #627, C/O POSTMASTER
 NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

D/JCW/smo

386.3

29 August 1943.

SUBJECT: Japanese Currency.

TO : Captain F. R. Otto, Ass't. A-2, Kweilin, China.

1. Japanese currency being available, it will be supplied you for use in developing the following commodities for delivery to O.E.W. as per conversation of 28 August 1943 with Mr. Max Polin.

2. Through sources now available and to be developed, this money will be distributed to be used in purchasing wolfram, fulminate of mercury, silk, wood oil, and any other native commodities available which the O.E.W. requires or the G.O.S. for building, etc. The money will be covered in full by receipt and notation made later when deal is completed as to what and how much commodity was obtained, as well as disposition of same.

3. The purpose of this is three fold:

- a. Obtaining required materials.
- b. Denying same to enemy.
- c. Developing regular sources of contact and information.

4. It is envisaged that this will develop from relatively small beginning and may enlarge in scope, if all works out favorably, or may be entirely dropped or turned over to O.E.W. as may be dictated by developments.

5. Such commodities as accumulate will be held by you in Kweilin pending O.E.W. establishing an office there or directing disposition.

6. Copy of this Memo is being furnished Mr. Polin.

JESSE C. WILLIAMS,
 Colonel, G. S. C.,
 A-2.

cc - Mr. Max Polin.

SECRET

Date 28 October 1943

To: General Donovan

Copies of the attached have been sent to Dr. Langer, Col. Forgan and Dr. Rogers with the request that the material be furnished in order to meet the deadline.

R. J. H., Jr.

See that this is done

CONFIDENTIAL

W. J. D.
Dr. Langer's Office
Office of the Secretary
will go out today

(1129)

See that this is done


15 @ f.6.3

MIF 007

HMJ:dao

Army Liaison Division, OSS, 115 North Building, 27 October 1943
TO: Major Loring, The Secretariat, 126 Administration Building.

Basic communication forwarded for submission to the
Planning Board.



H.R. James
H.R. JAMES,
Major, ASD
Army Liaison Division

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

**WAR DEPARTMENT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON**

MED 907

26 October 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR WAR DEPARTMENT LIAISON OFFICER WITH OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES:

Subject: Request for Short Economic Studies on Japan.

1. It will be of great assistance to this office if the Office of Strategic Services will prepare two short studies of three or four pages each on electric power in the Japanese Empire and Manchuria and motor vehicles in the Japanese Empire and Occupied Areas. The length of each study should be such that it could be discussed in a talk of some 15 or 20 minutes. The study on electric power should include requirements, available generating capacity (steam and hydro), distribution and transmission. The study on motor vehicles should summarize the current position of Japan and include, among others, the following points:

- a. Stocks on hand.
- b. Annual capacities for production.
- c. Annual requirements or consumption.
- d. Available supplies by source.
- e. Distribution of major production facilities by areas.
- f. Limiting factors.

2. The summaries requested above should reach this office on or before 2 November 1943.

Truman M. Martin

TRUMAN M. MARTIN,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Acting Chief, Pacific Unit.

NOTE: This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32 as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

SECRET

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

October 14, 1943.

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan
FROM: James R. Murphy

I have just received the attached British reports from London. Copies have been sent to G-2 and ONI. Possibly we should send a copy to the State Department.

SECRET

FOREIGN ESPIONAGE IN JAPAN

It is our considered opinion that in no country in the world are the activities of foreigners more closely observed than in Japan. Axis and non-axis nationals alike are all constantly subjected to the closest surveillance, as indeed are also all Japanese of any prominence. Before the arrest of Dr. Sorge and his associates in the summer of 1941 the Nazis enjoyed, by virtue of the Three-Power Pact, a certain measure of freedom from Police and Gendarmerie interference, but from December 8th 1941, the greatest precautions have been exercised against Nazis and neutrals alike, and new legislation designed to control still further the activities of all foreign residents in Japan was put into force early in 1942.

In order to grasp fully the Japanese genius for espionage and counter-espionage it is necessary to know something of Japan's history. During the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), when Japan was isolated from the rest of the world, the Shoguns in Edo (present-day Tokyo) found it necessary to keep the closest watch upon their feudatories, and they developed a system of internal espionage without parallel in history. Japan was literally a nation of spies, for every man was to inform on his neighbour, and every activity of every important person was fully reported to the authorities in Edo, who were thus enabled to suppress most deadly and disastrous for the whole Empire. This system of espionage survived the Meiji restoration of 1868, and even today the authorities have a fairly complete knowledge of the activities of every one of the thousands of spies who are employed by the Japanese Government to carry out their espionage work. The Japanese Government has a very complete system of espionage, and the Japanese people are very loyal to their Government, and they report to the authorities every activity of every one of the thousands of spies who are employed by the Japanese Government to carry out their espionage work.

under the particular jurisdiction.

The Japanese as a nation being extremely secretive in all matters, and having an ingrained distrust of foreigners, the task of collecting information about Japan is at all times one of extreme difficulty, and in recent years legislation has been enacted which makes the slightest attempt at collecting information on military, naval, economic, financial or political matters a major criminal offence, punishable by more than one year's penal servitude which means, in extreme cases, life imprisonment or even capital punishment. The three principal laws designed to prevent espionage are as follows:-

- (a) NATIONAL DEFENCE AND PEACE PRESERVATION LAW
- (b) MILITARY SECRETS LAW
- (c) NATIONAL SUBSIDIATION LAW

Under these laws the Police and Gendarmerie are empowered to arrest and imprison on mere suspicion any person whom they desire to interrogate, and they may hold him without trial for as many years as they wish.

The Japanese are, however, not content to possess such deterrent laws, but at the same time take the utmost precautions to prevent foreigners from acquiring any information on the matter referred to above except, of course,

- (1) Even newspaper cutting is a punishable offence, for while to read newspapers is lawful, any attempt to collect information from them systematically is illegal.

that contained in official statements issued by the Japanese Government.

Below is given a brief account of the methods followed by the Japanese Police in their surveillance of foreigners, and in this connection it is perhaps worth pointing out that only those activities which the Police themselves acknowledged during their examinations of a (an arrested British official) have been recorded here and that all other activities of which foreign residents in Japan suspect them have been ignored.

(a) All foreigners travelling outside of the cities in which they are domiciled are closely followed, and suspected foreigners are followed at all times. (During 1941 foreigners were for a time prohibited from travelling at all, or were allowed to travel only in restricted areas, and often were accompanied by detectives whenever they went, one detective handing the foreigner over to another detective every twenty miles or so. Since January 1942 all foreigners have been forbidden to travel without special permission, and this permission is not often granted; moreover, visits to most seaside resorts are absolutely prohibited, for Japan is now engaged in enlarging her fortified zones and in strengthening her coastal defences. Needless to say, this prohibition

applies to all Axis countries. In this connection it is of interest to note that, already from the beginning of 1941, Japanese firms have needed permits to travel in the great Japanese region of Manchuria - Yamaguchi ken, etc. - and that they are careful to keep relatives living there.

It is stated that all foreigners are carefully watched and reported after they have been

detained. It is also stated that the Japanese authorities are very careful to keep a watch on the movements of all foreigners, and that they are very careful to keep a watch on the movements of all foreigners, and that they are very careful to keep a watch on the movements of all foreigners.

all suspected persons sufficient room with which to hang themselves from the summer of 1941; however, a strict censorship has been enforced; still more strictly since the outbreak of hostilities).

(c) All telephone calls to and from diplomatic and consular establishments are carefully listened-in to, and attempts are made to tap all telephonic conversations carried out inside such establishments.

(d) All references in the press to foreigners and their activities are carefully studied, and are collated with the reports of the police as to the social news of the English-language newspapers published in Japan receives, of course, the same careful attention as the more serious columns do.

(e) A spy has his own dossier even cuttings of notes he has contributed to Japanese dialectological and archaeological journals published in the provinces.

(f) Private citizens are encouraged to submit to the police statements on the activities of foreigners whether they know them personally or not. They are asked to report on what they visit foreigners' houses, what cars wait before their doors, what Japanese or foreign friends they have, what books they buy their books from, what restaurants they frequent, etc., etc. (A spy has his own dossier some hundreds of

pages gathered during a period of eleven years, and he was

shown in detail to a number of Japanese officials. Further, he was shown in detail to a number of Japanese officials. Further, he was shown in detail to a number of Japanese officials.

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(This A was shown in February 1942, the dossier of Aiko Sato, former mistress of Dr. G. N. Spinks, in which the latest entry concerned the illness from which she was suffering in January 1942, although she had no relations with any foreigner after Dr. Spink's departure from Japan in April 1941.)

(1) The closest liaison is maintained between the Japanese Foreign Office and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Dept., all information obtained by the Police being exchanged for copies of all notes presented to the Foreign Office, minutes of conversations, etc. (A was shown by the Judicial Police whole volumes of Japanese translations of Sir Robert Craigie's communications to the Japanese Foreign Office, classified according to subjects, viz. (a) Political matters, (b) Department of Information, (c) British Library of Information (d) Protocol etc.)

(2) Japanese fear of foreign espionage is so great that attempts are even made to prevent what is called "historical espionage." (Thus, Dr. G. N. Spinks was held by the Gendarmerie for a day and severely cross-examined for some five or six hours in a lecture which he had delivered to the Asiatic Society of Japan on the development of Japanese public opinion on the Manchurian Incident since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

The Gendarmerie contended that it was contrary to the laws of the Empire for a foreigner to be deeply versed in the history of Japan.

It was also stated that the Japanese Gendarmerie

was very much interested in the activities of the

foreigners in Japan, and that they were very much

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was a small, dark, four-wheeled vehicle.

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economic situation in Japan, the attitude of the Japanese people towards the war, etc.)

(b) Needless to say, a danger exists for every foreign resident in Japan that it is worth noting here that two series of trials are in progress, one by the Metropolitan Board and one by the use of Police authorities in the district in which the foreigner is domiciled.

(c) For several years past the Japanese military and naval authorities, assisted by the Metropolitan Police Board, have systematically deceived the service attaches of foreign embassies and legations. (This is the anti-Jap measure of which the police are the most proud, and a's exultance resulted over the success they had achieved in deceiving in particular the air attaches of the British and American Embassies. Whether the air attaches were deceived or not, we are not in a position to judge; below is recorded what the Judicial Police told us.)

(1) Some 1,000 obsolete or obsolescent aeroplanes were specially set aside for the half yearly aerial reviews held over Tokyo; no new models ever took part in these reviews. Furthermore, steps were taken to see that the very limited group of Japanese with whom the Embassy officials came into contact publicly bewailed the weakness and inefficiency of their country's air force, so that the air attaches of embassies were led to imagine that Japan might be called to account for its security. The so-called peace treaties with the United States and China were now held to be a source of weakness and not a source of strength for Japan's security. (The Judicial Police told us that the air attaches of embassies were led to imagine that Japan might be called to account for its security.)

(ii) In the summer of 1941, the "Yomiuri", one of Tokyo's leading newspapers, organized an aircraft exhibition, in which H.M. Embassy, the German and Italian Embassies all participated, submitting material obtained from their respective countries. (However, the greater part of the exhibition being devoted to the illustration of Japan's own air force, the British Air Attache considered it advisable to make a special visit of inspection, in order to discover what progress Japanese aviation had made. All he found, however, was one or two obsolescent machines, and on his return to the Embassy he spoke most derisively, at a meeting at which A was present, of Japan's claims to be a first-class air power, and emphasized on the signs of inefficiency he had discovered everywhere.

(He A. M. T., of course, know whether he was expressing his real opinion or not.) The matter of the Air Attache's visit to the exhibition was raised by the Judicial Police during A's examination, and at one point they brought out a photograph and explained how the machine was built, the year it was built, etc.

A. M. T. then asked if the machine was built in Japan, and was told it was. A. M. T. then asked if the machine was built in Japan, and was told it was. A. M. T. then asked if the machine was built in Japan, and was told it was.

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Further light on the elaborate means which the Japanese military authorities take in order to hoodwink foreign observers is thrown by the following additional evidence.

At a dinner party given in the U.S. Embassy by Mr. Charles J. Hastine, Third Secretary, in the summer of 1941, at which I was one of the guests, a lieutenant of the American Army, a language student, described his experiences with the Japanese Army during the three-month attachment, from which he had just returned to Tokyo. The attachment took place at a time when the unit was undergoing field training in the Corps of Engineers, and under conditions approximating those for an enable to show of active service. The officer in question was not at first even told where the manoeuvres were to take place; the only orders he received were to report at a certain railway station at a certain time and date, where he would be met by an officer, who would accompany him. Upon joining the unit he was treated with the greatest friendliness and told that he might go anywhere and see anything he liked. He did not, however, live in the officers' mess but in a small adjacent hotel, since the commanding officer thought he would find it difficult for him to live on the frugal fare provided for the Japanese officers. It was pointed out in passing that an ordinary Japanese officer's monthly allowance was of some ten to twenty dollars, which covered the entire living expenses. The officer's description of the work of the unit to which he was attached was one of inefficiency, of field discipline which was not maintained, and of a procedure which was hopelessly defective. The unit was severely criticized by the staff of the American Embassy in Tokyo and a very much shorter range was suggested by the American staff, so that the machine gun unit was not so accurate. He said that the Japanese were extremely tough and would carry out

they dropped; but in his opinion they were badly led. He considered the chief fault of leadership was that junior officers particularly seemed to be lost without definite orders; they did nothing on their own initiative. He considered this would also be a fair criticism of senior officers. On account of the difficulties of the Japanese written language with its bearing upon the question of transmitting field messages he considered that it took considerably longer in the Japanese army for orders to filter down to units from higher commands (Brigade Headquarters etc.) than in any other army. For this reason he was of the opinion that any foreign army would always have the advantage of time over the Japanese army. He had come to the conclusion that, generally speaking, the American army had absolutely nothing to fear from the Japanese; its equipment and training were definitely very much inferior to anything in America. The foregoing opinions were confirmed by another American officer who was also present at the dinner party in question.

In view of the now proved inefficiency of the Japanese army in the present war, we are of the opinion that the above account describes still more of the methods employed for deceiving foreign observers, and it seems not improbable that the Japanese army would find it worth while to stage carefully inefficient maneuvers in order to deceive even a very senior officer.

The members of the Japanese Staff, Tokyo, had little contact with Japanese civilians. Their only acquaintance was very limited. The Police were exactly what they were, friendly and helpful. The Japanese Staff, Tokyo, had little contact with Japanese civilians. Their only acquaintance was very limited. The Police were exactly what they were, friendly and helpful. The Japanese Staff, Tokyo, had little contact with Japanese civilians. Their only acquaintance was very limited. The Police were exactly what they were, friendly and helpful.

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himself is convinced

the evidence which they brought forward during his examination,

and their assessment is substantially correct. To cite but

two examples of the thoroughness with which the Japanese

investigate all matters coming to their notice:

... by private Japanese citizens (vide (c)

... been carefully reviewed, and the results of the

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satisfaction of the Police, always taken very seriously,
by members of the Political and Japanese Chanceries of
the Embassy.

(From the foregoing account (a - p) some idea will have been gathered of the thoroughness with which the Japanese Police investigate the activities of foreigners, and endeavour to prevent foreign espionage. It is perhaps possible that the efficiency of the Japanese Police is not as great as they vaunted, but I myself am convinced, from the evidence which they brought forward during his examination, that the above account is substantially correct. To cite but a few instances of the thoroughness with which the Japanese Police investigate all matters coming to their notice: Every report sent in by private Japanese citizens, vide (e) above, was carefully verified, and the results of the verification were in every case attached to the original reports. Again, photographs of all the envelopes — and those presented to my Government as such daily, of mail matter received at the Embassy of Great Britain, Tokyo, Japan, are taken and filed regularly once ever, so that it is not difficult to ascertain exactly what articles have been received, and where. In fact, the Japanese Police are very efficient in their work, and I am confident that they will continue to be so in the future.)

[illegible]

is related to the fact that the
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the outbreak of hostilities no copy of this translation reached London. It is regrettable that the Japanese made very few such mistakes, and that there is very little material to intercept.

(2) There exists in Tokyo an organization known as the International Cultural Society (not to be confused with the Society for International Cultural Relations), which publishes a magazine consisting exclusively of translations of articles from Chinese journals in economics, politics, etc. The real object of the Society is, however, the statistical investigation of the economic strength of countries considered to be hostile to Japan, and to subject a series of secret reports has been issued which are not seen by the general public.

In recent years, with financial support from such financial houses as Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank, Ltd., Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, Ltd., etc., various economic research bureaus have been established in Japan. In the past, the Japanese had no economic research bureaus. The first of these was the Dai-ichi Kangyo Bank Economic Research Bureau, which was established in 1928. Since then, many other such bureaus have been established, and their research work is being carried on.

in question.

(4) Needless to say, both Japanese consular officials and private citizens have conducted successful Fifth Column activities in all these parts of both the British and the Netherlands colonies, wherever a native problem exists. This is merely an example of the thoroughness with which the Japanese conducted such activity in the territories they proposed to occupy. After the capture of Java, Japanese civilians who had been interned by the Dutch authorities on the outbreak of war were, of course, released by the victors; it was then made public that amongst them were many people of considerable importance who had been carrying out subversive propaganda for many years. Many of them assumed names and, in order to conceal their real activities, had been working in various remote capacities. The correctness of the above is vouched for by Dr. R. L. Van Gulik (Japanese Secretary, Netherlands Legation, Tokyo) and was personally verified, and compared with the records of the Netherlands Legation, the names published in the Japanese press.

SECRET

IMPACT OF LOSS OF SOUTHERN COMMUNITIES (Draft)

Summary: Should United Nations action result in the severing of Japan's communications with her conquests from the Philippine Islands south, her position with regard to a number of strategic commodities would be adversely affected. However, her requirements would be reduced as well. Japan's possibilities for war industry expansion would be checked but her military potential would be substantially impaired only in fuel oil, aluminum, and lead.

Economic Effects: Complete occupation of Burma would deprive Japan of an important source of lead and zinc. Occupation of Truk would deprive Japan of access to only relatively unimportant sources of phosphates and bauxite. Increased submarine action from new U.S. bases in the Pacific and increased air activity from Chinese bases with Burma road supplies would make possible increased interference with Japanese shipments from the Netherlands Indies and Southern Asia. However, such shipments will not be effectively blocked until we have reoccupied the Philippines or the producing areas themselves.

Raw Material Supply: If her communications to the Philippines and the South are cut, Japan will in 1945 and 1946 have to cut her consumption of the following commodities significantly below her 1943 consumption:

	1945 Supply (% of 1943 Consumption)	1946 Supply
Lead	60-65%	50%
Fuel Oil	75%	35%
Iron ores	100%	90%
Aluminum ores	70%	50%
Nickel	75%	40%
Cobalt	75%	10%

SECRET

-2-

Further, if the war continues into 1947, Japan's stocks of copper, zinc, lubricating oils and leather will reach the point of exhaustion and supply will be forced down to 60 per cent (of 1943 consumption) for copper, 70 per cent for zinc, an uncertain level for lubricants (depending on progress in hydrogenation) and 80 per cent for leather.

The effect on Japan's position in other commodities, e.g., rubber, gasoline, tin, iron, vegetable oils, and chromium would not be serious for 1 year or longer.

Reduction in Requirements: At the same time Japanese losses as assumed will reduce her requirements for oil, shipping, consumers goods, foodstuffs, and maintenance. The reduction in shipping requirements both for military and economic purposes would be considerable and might compensate for shipping losses in the process -- particularly as Japan's ship building capacity would be very little affected. Reduction in the size and necessary operations of the Japanese fleet would compensate in part for reduction in the supply of fuel oil.

Bombing Range: Occupation of the Philippines would permit bombing of the Japanese main islands (Manila to Osaka about 1700 miles) but would not bring them within range for effective large-scale attack. Occupation of Formosa would bring the heavy industrial area of North Kyushu within a range of 300 miles.

*Prepared in Quebec on June 1, 1944
by Mr. J. Robinson & Dr. Mason*

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No. ... 19120-516

Date Rec'd SA ... MAY 31 1948

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd.	Fwd'd.		
Col. Huntington	3141			<i>[Signature]</i>	RDH: The General wants SO staff to read. This means Capt Hoffman first I imagine. <i>[Signature]</i>
RDH		6/1	6/1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
COH		6/5	6/5	<i>[Signature]</i>	
General Donovan					So will withdraw from Gen D's file for SO Area operating officers when appointed for the New Theatres where this info will be relevant

1. This sheet should be numbered in accordance with number in To column.
2. A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
3. Officer receiving should be marked in To column.
4. Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
5. Action taken or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
6. This sheet should always be returned to Registry.
7. See Officer's Handbook for separate sheet.

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ROUTING AND RECORDING SHEET

Accession No. 19120-518

Date Rec'd SA MAY 31 1948

No.	Date	Officer's Initials	Comments
Col Harrington 2/4/1			
RDH	6/1	RDH	RDH: The General wants SO staff to read. This means Capt Hoffman first & imagine.
COH	6/5	COH	
General Donovan			SO will withdraw from Gen D's file for SO Area operations officers when appointed for the New Theatres where this info will be relevant.

1. Comments should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
 2. Date should be given across sheet under each comment.
 3. Officer Designation should be given in To column.
 4. Each Officer should be checked mark insufficient before further routing.
 5. Action required or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
 6. Each check mark should always be returned to Registry.
 7. For Officer Designation use separate sheet.

CONFIDENTIAL

CALIFORNIA OFFICE
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Japanese 7,627-A
Prisoner of War
Suppl. Del
S.F. Office
CONFIDENTIAL S O

INTEROFFICE MEMO

San Francisco, Calif.

DATE: May 18, 1948

TO: Brig. General William H. Donovan, *PM 1 57*
FROM: Lt. Col. Robert E. Hall *REH*
SUBJECT: Transmittal of MIS Reports

By coincidence, our neighbors across the hall, San Francisco Office MIS, were also preparing a report on the problems of taking Japanese prisoners. I am forwarding herewith a copy of their report which, in fact, supplements the California Office report sent you a few days ago.

I am also enclosing a rather interesting report of the San Francisco Office MIS entitled "Leadership of our Officers at the Front".

Very sincerely,

Col. Huntington -

*See that the attached
is made to suit your
people.
J.*

CONFIDENTIAL

** Guadalcanal
* San Francisco Lfca*

GUADALCANAL

DE JAPAN: HOLDING JAP PRISONERS

OF 1941-1945

1573

MAY 10, 1943

ROBERT WILLER, U. P. correspondent, on Guadalcanal
September 1942 to March 1943.
Reliability: C-2

The effects of such a policy as "this platoon takes no
prisoners". Now this policy gradually changed. Methods used
to get prisoners. Our informant's estimate of the readiness
of the Japs to answer any question. His suggestion for the
treatment of prisoners in the future.

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Our informant stated the following:

PROBLEMS OF TAKING JAP PRISONERS

1. WHY NO PRISONERS?

We could have taken Guadalcanal with much less loss of life to our forces if our people had just had the intelligence to realize that by getting the Japs to come in and surrender, they would be saving the lives of many of our men who would be killed trying to dislodge the enemy and take the objective.

The rumor got around that the Japanese were tricky and that when they came in with their hands up they threw hand grenades. There were a few isolated instances reported but these were very exceptional. I knew of only one instance. We brought in six Japanese. One had a hand grenade. He had ample opportunity to throw it, but he merely took the hand grenade out, pulled the pin, and rolled over on it and killed himself. He made no attempt to kill our people.

2. BROADCASTS AND LEAFLETS

We made several attempts to take prisoners. In fact, Colonel Brown worked out a plan which I think was an innovation. We made broadcasts to the Japanese in Japanese and dropped leaflets over their lines. These broadcasts were set up when the front was more or less static; and they were given by an army captain in intelligence who spoke Japanese. He was very good, and in these broadcasts we kept telling the Japanese that if they came in with their hands up they would be taken prisoner unharmed, given food and rest, and could be treated well.

3. RESULTS OF BROADCASTS

But the way the Japs worked it, they would send one man in first. One man would walk in with his hands up and the others would watch to see what would happen to him. But five chances out of seven an "itchy trigger" fellow would get excited and plug him. Then the other Japs would dig in and fight to the death.

We tried to tell our own men of what we were trying to accomplish. We tried to prove that the rumor that the Japanese do not surrender was poppycock.

We did capture several men that way. In interrogating prisoners one fellow said they heard our broadcast and that they held a meeting to decide whether or not to come in. They had been under terrific bombardment. There were several who were favorably inclined to surrender but the problem was that they had some wounded men who were so weak they would not be able to come in. So they decided to stay in and fight until killed. The next day, however, the bombardment was so heavy that they decided to come in and give themselves up, and we captured quite a few prisoners.

4. COLLIER LABORERS

They had, as you know, in the early stages about six or seven hundred laborers (which you would classify as 4-F) who were unfit for military service but were used as laborers. When the bombing started these people immediately ran into the jungle and hid in the bush. They were scared to death. A plan was worked out in which one, or two, or three of these laborers volunteered to go back into the jungle and contact the rest of the laborers and bring them in. They were equipped with white flags and instructions as to what was to go on, and we earned everything just what they were doing.

ST OFFICE 418
Report No. 1578

P 3

5/10/43

These fellows had food (they were fed quite well) and they went out and they performed their mission exactly. They contacted the rest of the platoon and within a week we had droves of them coming in.

5. "PRISON ALLEY"

We had one place we called "Prison Alley" which was a large field with high grass in it. Sentries stationed at the edge of this field watched and when a Jap showed up the sentry would wave his hand and 10 or 15 filed right in. We took in the vicinity of four or five hundred prisoners that way.

6. FREE DINNER FOR BRINGING IN A PRISONER

We were so short on intelligence that General Curtis (?) offered a free dinner at his mess to any Marine who would bring in a prisoner.

7. ANSWER TO WHY NO PRISONERS WERE TAKEN

There is a decided military liability putting troops into action with the motto, "this platoon doesn't take any prisoners."

The difficulty is this. Before the war started we ridiculed the Japanese -- they were a push-over. And then when they swept over Malaya, Java and Burma we got these reports out that the British troops and the Australian troops were excellent but that they could not stop these people -- they were like a plague. There were unfavorable stories of the Japanese being great jungle fighters and taking no prisoners. Many of our men were so fear-stricken before they ever saw a Jap that they were just scared to death. The truth was that our people were not any good in Malaya, Java and Luzon when the war began. They didn't have the equipment; they were not experienced; they were not well-trained; and they were scared. If we had only admitted at the time that the Japanese were better prepared than we, it is hard to get these people to realize that the Japanese soldier, as far as a military man goes, is inferior. The Japanese is a good fighter but he is a poor soldier.

You have to rid these people of the idea that the Japanese don't take any prisoners and that we don't take any prisoners.

One day in the latter part of January some prisoners were brought in, and they were so emaciated they weren't able to stand. They had to be put in blankets and on stretchers. Those Japs had certainly taken a beating on Guadalcanal. Well, some big blustering chap came up and said: "Let me at those dirty so-and-soes. I'll give them something--." I was the only one there who looked like an officer, so I just jumped down his throat. He was all for wading right in on these people.

I talked with one lieutenant colonel at the front and he was telling me one prisoner came in and one of our men shot him. He said "To tell you the truth if I had been there at the time I would have shot the man who did it. It was just plain murder. The general had given his word that they wouldn't be harmed."

8. CHAIRMAN ON FEELING ON TAKING PRISONERS

The Japanese make wonderful prisoners. They will tell you anything you want to know. They are valuable but you have a hard time trying to convince your men of the value of prisoners.

It may have been found that some of the field officers were reticent to take prisoners in the early part of the fighting, but later on when they realized the circumstances they were all for taking prisoners. Back at the command post you do not have contact with those in the jungles. The feeling was that "I am not going to risk my men." General Patch (?) issued an order that all prisoners were to be taken as far as possible. Majors, captains and lieutenant colonels -- as soon as they got the word and realized they were on a sector in which they were confronted with unknown obstacles and that the prisoners could help them, they did everything they could to capture prisoners.

When one came in, others would follow. One man is sent forward as an emissary. He comes out and if he gets in the others give themselves up. But if he gets bumped off then we would have to drive out pocket after pocket and we lost lots of men that way.

We found one officer, a lieutenant. He was told to hold the rear, but he came in. "Why should I hold the rear. The rest are getting out. I'm not going to be a sucker. I'm left holding the bag." And he gave himself up. Many got in without being killed.

9. ATTITUDE OF MARINES

The attitude of the Marines was that of not taking prisoners. Unfortunately that word had gotten out. That was the reputation they had overseas in the last war. They were endeavoring to live up to the past performance of those previous units and felt that they just had to keep it up. But they were finding out that it doesn't pay.

10. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

The dropping of leaflets showing pictures of Japanese prisoners being well treated may be effective in the capturing of more of them. In the time you take in such an effort, you have everything to gain and nothing to lose. Even if you get a few prisoners in this way, you are giving the others something to think about, and anything you can do to upset the morale of the enemy is effective. He may not believe it and you may only get one in a hundred but it is really worth attempting.

The oriental mode of warfare is if you are taken prisoner you die. We asked these people and they all said that they expected to be killed. "Do your officers tell you that the Americans would commit atrocities on you?" "No, not that at all. We just expected it as part of the warfare." No reference has been made to the fact that the Chinese killed their Japanese prisoners, but we know that to be true. Having talked to several people who were present. We heard about the Japanese atrocities but the Chinese do not take a back seat on that score. The Chinese executed the Japanese. Chinese show death is used if they refuse to give information. Their idea of what they fight for is the looting of the objective, the raping of women, and the killing of men.

It is pretty difficult to get to them except where you have them in a tight spot.

In the first battle at Tenaru the Japanese came out waving their flag that they were through. We found out in later reports that when Colonel Ishi came in he was leading these troops expecting to be victorious but when they found out that they were trapped they pulled fire and burned their papers and he, and his executive officer, killed themselves. The fellows who had been through it a few days were out to save their skins. The best time is when you have

Report No. 1573

conducted a war of attrition in
to doubt.

II. SUB TREATMENT AND

We were out on one side of the
River, and we captured these prisoners
first day -- three of them. We
and we were going to be out all
the next morning, so the prisoners
held a consultation. There was
the prisoners. That was the only
taken back. There were very few
they have been received.

At Tanaru, where the Japanese
the battle was over, at 4 p.m.
to one side of the sand bar and
They were really two execution
ill-treated. It was rather harsh.

Those prisoners who suffered from malaria were taken right into
the hospital. You set out there and you begin to feel sorry for this
fellow because he is in pain and suffering. No matter how much you
hate the Japanese when you see that bundle of flesh and bones in a
pitiful condition you cannot help but feel sorry for them. I have
seen soldiers and marines carrying in these wounded and sick little
fellows in their arms. The Japanese never whimpered nor asked what
was going to be done.

Captain Moran (?) who had lived in Japan 20 years interrogated
the prisoners. We caught a Japanese general and he said that as far
as he was concerned the war was over. He refused to give more than
his name at first, but when Captain Moran began to ask him where he
had come from and they began talking the prisoner began to let down
and it was no time at all before we had gained his confidence.

"You can torture me -- do anything to me -- but I won't tell
you a thing. But if you treat me kindly then I will tell you anything
you want to know."

Proper interrogation by our marines and soldiers along practical
lines and training in the handling of prisoners would pay huge
dividends. That should be started right here before they are sent
overboard.

WARREN J. CLEAR
Lieut. Colonel, G.S.C.
Officer in Charge

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan
FROM: Edward L. Taylor
SUBJECT:

DATE: May 8, 1943

As an afterthought in regard to the agenda with General Stilwell I am attaching a suggestion for black propaganda which I have turned over to Fred Oechsner. I doubt seriously, however, that Stilwell is the man with whom we should discuss this project.

Attachment

227

file

Prepared
for Radio Station
X-1
SECRET

SECRET

Mr. Frederick Seohamer

May 8, 1943

Edmond L. Taylor

On behalf of the Planning Staff I submit the following informal suggestion for your consideration:

That OSS organize somewhere in the Asiatic area a black radio station staffed by Japanese and broadcasting regularly in Japanese advance revolutionary themes all built around this central idea: that the station is manned by Japanese officers, loyal to the Emperor, who escaped from Japan and either succeeded in establishing themselves upon an unoccupied island in the Pacific or in allied non-controlled territory for the purpose of revealing to the Japanese Army the plot against the Emperor. Depending upon what experts think the story might be either that the Emperor has been assassinated or kidnapped and replaced by a double or that the real Emperor is being held quite literally a prisoner by the militarist clique who force him by physical threats to go through the motions of approving their policy.

The Japanese officers manning the freedom station would as I see it purport to speak in the name of the Emperor and with his consent. They would conceal rather than emphasize any connection with the United States and would not appeal for cessation of the war but would urge Japanese soldiers and officers to liberate or avenge the Emperor before continuing it. Programs would consist I should imagine partly in supplying details to build up the plausibility of the main theme and partly in introducing in disguised form secondary propaganda themes suitable to our purposes at the moment.

I have not made any systematic study either of the suitability or feasibility of this plan because both seem obvious to me. The general line is consonant with our open propaganda policy and merely dramatizes it a bit. As to

SECRET

- 2 -

feasibility I should think only a very small low-powered transmitter would be necessary with two or three Japanese to write the scripts, one Japanese-speaking American to supervise them and perhaps a Whistlerian or two. The station could be mobile and moved around from one theater to another in the Far East. It is not likely that it would ever have any considerable audience but should be very valuable in launching rumors which should spread by word-of-mouth. If Japanese listeners did not suspect it was an American propaganda trick that would be all to the good but even if they did suspect I don't think it would destroy the effectiveness of the scheme. It would almost certainly arouse curiosity and would draw their attention to the position of the Emperor and the violation of the Imperial Rescripts by the Japanese militarists. After all the real situation is not so different from the imaginary one which we dramatize by this station. The biggest single tactical problem as I see it is to work up a substantial and convincing story of how the Japanese officers got their mission from the Emperor and how they escaped and in general to make them sound like plausible and authoritative personalities. After the station has been operating for some time it might be well to call the attention of the American press to the mystery station in the Pacific and encourage speculation as to whether the plot against the Emperor might not be the real thing. The only question in my mind outside of the jurisdictional one is whether a station of this sort is the most useful type of freedom station which might be organized by OSS at this moment. That of course depends upon your other plans.

If you are interested in the idea and there are any problems in connection with it you would like to have us study I will be delighted to have my staff help you.

11,460 A

Japan

Proposals

Buchanan

May 29 5 30 PM '45

26 May 1945

Colonel G. Edward Burton
Assistant Director
Office of Strategic Services.

x Taylor & Ed

x Salinger

x Fox Legend

Dear Colonel Burton:

Your letter of 24 May enclosing the material prepared by Dr. Daniel C. Buchanan dated 18 May 1945 has been received.

I have read the enclosure with great interest and I am in entire accord with the basic idea outlined therein.

Dr. Buchanan should be advised that on VE Day, 8 May 1945 I began a series of broadcasts to Japan in both Japanese and English along the general lines outlined in his letter. Some of the details of the first broadcast, as released from the Office of War Information, were covered in the 9 May edition of the New York Herald-Tribune, and should be of interest to Dr. Buchanan if he has not already seen it. This broadcast will indicate that it, and subsequent ones, of which four in all have been made, are carried on in the highest level and with a dignity calculated to be most effective in presenting facts to the Japanese High Command and the Japanese people.

The matter of using the contents of these broadcasts in leaflets has been given the proper consideration and employment by the Office of War Information.

In view of the above there appears to be nothing that Dr. Buchanan can add to the present project, but his ideas and energy in preparing the document transmitted to me are greatly appreciated.

In view of the publicity given to the activity, I have placed no classification on this letter.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

W. M. Zacharias
W. M. Zacharias

Captain, U.S. Navy

Encl. May 29 1945

Gen Maguire Jhr
Mr. Charlton CSE
Mr. Pittell CSE
H. H. Burton

11,460
Japan
✓ Empire
X PW & MO
✓ Salinger
23 November 1944.
X Surfer

Mr. Edgar Salinger
125 East 72 Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Salinger:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 3. I have read the clipping entitled "Japs do Surrender", which you enclosed, and have turned it over to Colonel Mann for his use.

As you know, I am quite familiar with the experiments and preliminary tests which were made with your cooperation at Sandy Hook sometime ago, and I realize how much thought and imagination was devoted to this work. We are continuing to devote considerable thought, time and effort to the techniques which we must be constantly prepared to employ against the Japanese. The ideas and suggestions which you generated have been most helpful and certainly are not being overlooked. We are continuing to exploit this important work.

I want you to realize that the decision to terminate your active association was made on purely impersonal grounds, based upon the constantly advancing program and shift of personnel to the field.

I will always be happy to receive any specific suggestions or ideas which you may have, and will look forward to seeing you again when this is mutually possible.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan
Director.

CONFIDENTIAL**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.**23 November 1944 *Salinger*

TO: The Director
FROM: Chief, MO
SUBJECT: Letter from Edgar Salinger, dated November 3.

Returned herewith is the above letter addressed to you, and the clipping which was attached, apparently from Newsweek Magazine, entitled "JAPS DO SURRENDER". The clipping comments on the use of loud speakers, over which messages were broadcast in Japanese near Myitkyina, July 13 to August 5, 1944.

Attached is a suggested letter of reply which you may care to send to Mr. Salinger.

Kenneth D. Mann
KENNETH D. MANN
Colonel, AUS
Chief, MO

Attachments

CONFIDENTIAL

To
Col. Mearns
for comment

Gen. William Donovan
 Office of Strategic Service
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Gen. Donovan:

The enclosed article will, I believe, be of interest to you.

As you know, I started work along this line in June 1943 with preliminary tests at Fort Monmouth. Further experiments were made last summer over M.O. These experiments were conducted in the area but unfortunately took place at a time when I was unable to be present personally. The experiments were tentative and were designed to be the first of a program which was later approved by the G-2 and several other people. After work was done on all these efforts were ordered discontinued because we had insufficient personnel and materials.

To judge from the illustrations and the text of the article, I believe that what we actually worked out at O.S.S. is far superior to the material reproduced, and in the general interest I think that what was done and planned should be reviewed and revised.

It seems to me that this work is exactly in line with what I consider your eminently imaginative approach to the function of O.S.S., and I consider our past decision to stop the work an error of judgement. What I am writing you, therefore, is strictly confidential and personal. I will be very happy to discuss it with you privately when you again come to New York.

I am at present helping out at the C.I.A.A. on some broadcasts to South America on Japanese matters. It is quite

interesting work but does not preclude my helping out at
O.S.S. as in the past.

And I need hardly tell you that I will be most happy to
assist in any manner within my power.

With very cordial regards.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar Salinger
Edgar Salinger.

May

How to Use

Pan was gazed on the familiar, richly-embroidered cap. The insignia had been designed by the general himself. It was not the insignia of a general or that of the United States Army. It was the insignia of a Field Marshal of the Philippines Army. And it was a Philippines, not a "Colon" as it is Douglas MacArthur would have in Leyte Island.

Three MacArthur kept his promise of two years ago: "I shall return." To some it but sounded like bombast, but the general is a man who believes in his own clichés. The promise represented something that he intended to do, however long it took, and so up from Australia, to Port Moresby, across the Owen Stanley Mountains to Buna, along the northern shores of New Guinea to Hollandia, he fought his way. He never doubted that this was the road back.

"Now as the landing barge took him around the shore, he asked what was probably the closest thing to skepticism he'd ever had in more than two years. 'Well,' he said, 'believe it or not, we're here.' And as he reached shore, he answered, 'I will stay for the duration.'"

After that day, Sam was telling how when Mike Arthurs struts up to a Signal Corps truck and took a microphone in his hands. But it wasn't raining rain to the general. It was raining Lead at Hope and Cherry. For he had composed a proclamation that sounded a new justice in the big style of address he had made in Kansas in the Southwest Office. That was what he said.

This is the Voice of Freedom, Ourselves, Our Arthur, our English people of the Philippines: I have returned. By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand united in Philippine soil, consecrated to the blood of our five perished. The hour of redemption is here. Rally to me. Let the noblest spirit of humanity and Christianity meet in England and America. Let every soul be reborn. The guidance of Divine Providence, the very Father of the universe, the Father God of righteous charity. I have come later in another incarnation from the earth, embodied all law except laws that cannot meet the rule of love, given in President Lincoln's government. Without aid or effort, the Christian will by their own teachings and actions show their true intent.

The Duke-Knife Army

The first newspaper after the revolution had
 been organized. But the ignorance still
 in that regard was all the greater. Still
 looking on the population as a few numbers
 of the people, the Government reported
 that the "highly educated" population
 was a depressing number. It was
 necessary to take steps to
 improve the population. The
 Government had been "lax."
 The Government had neglected them and it was
 necessary to take steps to improve them.



Grant Tarnoch, Philippines defender

pine Islands. Thus by their own admissions, the Japs never did succeed in suppressing the guerrilla in the Philippines. Now for the first time in the Pacific, the Allied forces could count on the assistance of a well-organized movement of local resistance.

On Loyte, General MacArthur, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Resident Commissioner Big. Con. Carlos P. Garcia urged the Filipinos to rise against the Japs and help the Americans as soon as fighting ceases their towns. General MacArthur said the newly returned government's first task would be to get in touch with the guerrillas, who will provide invaluable information, plus fighting strength for the Americans.

Way to the Hills Even before the Japanese conquered Batang and Congcong, Zamboanga and Philippine on Luzon and other islands had had to be the instead of surrendering. Later the Japs kept most of their strength on Luzon, in the Davao area, of Mindanao; and at ports elsewhere. But they had no control over parts of Batang and huge areas of Mindanao and the Visayas, the central group

which includes Leyte, Cebu, Negros, Samar, Panay, Bohol, and Masbate.

Both Americans and Filipinos led the guerrillas, who even set up their own free government, complete with postal service, in some provinces. They issued "typewriter" pesos which became worth double the Japanese "printing press" pesos. The guerrillas seized arms by raiding the Japanese, and the irrepressible Moros of Mindanao and Sulu swore on the Koran to fight the invader without mercy. Even the Filipino farmer, or *tan*, joined in by using his long sharp bolo for farming in the daytime but for slitting Jap throats at night.

The Japanese, who have given most details of the guerrillas' specific accomplishments, complained that in the Visayas "outlaws" destroyed railroad bridges, communication lines, and highways, and that on Cebu the Japanese had to build bamboo fences to protect the "pacified areas." On Panay the guerrillas suspended railway traffic briefly. On Leyte the Jap radio reported that Americans and Filipino "remnants" razed cities and towns and that the civilians "instead of fighting against the real enemy" gave arms and assistance to the guerrillas.

ops Do Surrender

From the secret headquarters of the American psychological warfare organization somewhere in the China-Burma-India theater, Roland C. Gaak, Newsweek war correspondent, sends the following story of one of the hardest battles in the Far East war—the struggle to break through the Japanese mentality.

"Soldier of Japan, when did you last hear from home? How are your loved ones faring? Do they know you are here waiting for death on this forgotten battlefield?"

"Saklier of Japan, can you remember how good it feels to be with a woman? Can you remember in this stinking place of death the pleasure of a night at home with your wife? Saklier, would you like a chance to start your life over again?"

"Soldier, would you like a cigarette, not mean things of sticking tobacco rolled up in leaf, no—a real cigarette? Your comrades in rest camps behind our lines get a daily ration of cigarettes."

Over no man's land near Myitkyina in Northern Burma, messages such as these blared in Japanese from loudspeakers. Mournful music was interspersed—a broken-hearted Japanese girl singing about her absent war lover or three stringed Japanese instruments something like a Japanese voice.

"Live, come over to our side, we will not reveal your name."

Mind Softener. For 25 days, from July 10 to Aug. 5, the killings were mingled with the roar of battle. They

22 FIGHTING FRONTS

came from a front-line public-address system operating constantly under fire. Broadcasts were reinforced by showers of surrender passes offering safe conduct into the Allied lines. By the time the battle ended, small numbers of Japanese had been induced to surrender.

That was one of the highlights of the American psychological-warfare campaign now being waged against the Japs in Northern Burma. The broadcasters belonged to an extraordinary psychological-warfare outfit—a bunch of Chinese, Burmese, Shan, Kachin, and Japanese-speaking experts. Operating from a single jungle hideout, they ranged from American newspaper artists to amateurs with twenty-eight years in the jungle; from men who lived for years in Japan to native Burmese officers.

The PW team was organized last November as work as Gen. Joseph Stilwell's CBI theater. These propagandists in the field were put under the authority of the military and given a straight non-political job of aiding the Burma campaign by every available combat propaganda means: leaflets, radio, loudspeakers—in

close tactical cooperation with the Chinese, American, and British armies.

Cracking the morale of the Jap soldier, with his deep-seated myth of invincibility, Bushido code, and Gyokusai (glorious death) is a vastly different job from PW campaigns in Europe. Beginning last March, the propagandists tackled it with a generalized "strategic" propaganda—chiefly straight news aimed at convincing the Japanese that they are losing the war—and hard-hitting "tactical" propaganda that is intended to undermine morale.

Using the B-25 bombers of the Tenth Air Force, the Allied experts began peppering the Japs with tens of thousands of copies of *Shin Niyuza* (Battlefront News), a four-page Japanese-language newspaper. With pictures and maps it recited off the Allied triumphs, including the invasion and liberation of France and the conquest of the Marianas.

The Full Bowls For the tactical job, aimed at inducing the Japs to surrender by exploiting every known battlefield hardship grievance, the PW team estab-

lished liaison with C-52 (intelligence) and forward combat headquarters.

Then it began to bombard the Japs with accounts of supply shortages and officer incompetence. Leaflets showed how Allied planes hit Jap communication lines all the way to Japan from Burma. Others fluttered down by the thousands on Japs known to be near starvation. In alluring colors they showed a brimming bowl of rice, fish, tomatoes, and cucumbers—a sample of the succulent meal the Japs would get if they surrendered.

When Major General Mizukami, commander of the 56th Division, deserted his troops at Myitkyina a week before the town fell, showers of leaflets told the besieged Japs about it; and when Col. Fusayama Maruyama, commander of the 114th Regiment, fled a few hours later with a couple of "comfort girls," the Japs were told about that too. To prove the Allies actually held contented Jap prisoners of war, fighters dropped photographs of smiling POW's eating from full rice bowls, playing baseball, and listening to the radio.



While Japan has shown the Allies in the China Burma India theater wage psychological warfare against the Japs, above, a new poster says below, the Jap soldier is told what happens in the regions he doesn't get in the jungle.

the Japs in the right frame of mind to surrender. The next step was to douse them with surrender passes when their position was desperate—when food and ammunition were low, or when a unit was cut off or surrounded. The surrender message read: "Soldiers of the Imperial Army, you already have lost the battle. You face annihilation, but death is not the only road left. Instead of dying like a dog you can join your comrades across our lines. We will protect your life with honor."

The pass contained instructions in English and Chinese as well as Japanese, telling a Jap how to surrender: "Strip off your shirt, approach singly by day, do not carry arms, raise hands above head, and wave pass." To prevent "accidents" all Allied soldiers were familiarized with the

pass and told where it would be dropped. At the same time propagandists also carried on the subsidiary job of winning the natives over to the Allies, concentrating chiefly on the Burmese Shans, many of whom are known to be pro-Japanese or loyal Kachin tribesmen. Here again Allied victories, particularly in Burma itself, are used to convince the natives the Japs are on the way out.

Robots for Japan?

Robot bombs, with American trade-marks, may be used in the campaign against Japan. Last summer, Wright Field engineers pieced together fragments of the German V-1. This fall, at least ten major aviation plants were given the task of manufacturing the doodle-

bugs. Now, with Ford jet-propulsion engines, Army Ordnance war heads, Jack & Helutz gyro control, and Republic Aviation assembly, the robots are being tested in defense practice. A buzz-bomb offensive in the Pacific may come next.

Shrine

The GI's had the last word last week in the war of words between Hollywood touring performers and the China-Burma-India theater, where an Army paper had charged them with shirking their duties. Ann Sheridan, in particular had complained that when it came "litter-girl's room time" she had to wait while a men's toilet was cleared. In one of the places thus cleared for Ann, the GI's posted a placard: "Sheridan sat here."

edges of green
the edges of
field

Even No. rolls!

1/2 exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

spending shifts up the line. Allied bombers continued to take the fight into Germany day and night. In attacks designed to paralyze the rail system leading to the front, fleets of more than 1,000 battered bombers, Duisburg, Bonn, Kassel, Mainz, Ludwigshafen, Mannheim, and Stuttgart Cologne, only 47 miles east of captured Aachen, got one of the most concentrated poundings any German city has ever received.

Clearing the Scheldt

The Allies this week finally completed half the job of freeing the approaches to the invulnerable port of Antwerp. The Canadian Army, after weeks of the toughest kind of fighting in the muddy fields and along the exposed causeway-like roads on the south bank of the

from the main road above, and they launched other drives farther east against German communications.

End of a City

Col. Gerhard Wilk—gray-haired, precise, and slightly supercilious after 28 years in the German Army—mounted an American jeep and sadly addressed his men: "Dear German soldiers, I am speaking to you at a painful moment. I was forced to surrender because we ran out of ammunition, food, and water. I saw future fighting was useless. I was acting against orders. I was supposed to fight to the last cartridge. . . . American authorities refused to let us give the Sieg Heil and the Heil Hitler but we can still do it in our minds." Then he and his soldiers took off their hats, bowed their

Another symbol of the battle was the burning of the city's main market place by night. Elements of the German army, the leading Croatica and out of the city—relieve the garrison. But they were smothered with artillery fire. In one operation the Americans laid down 500 shells on a German concentration within five seconds. The city itself was reduced with a methodical thoroughness. Taking small sections at a time, killing or capturing a few hundred or so men a day, the Yanks first sent tanks and mobile guns down the streets to drive the Germans from the roofs and upper stories of buildings into the cellars. The infantrymen then mopped them up with rifles, bayonets, and grenades.

Many of the Nazi soldiers, including a

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FIGHTING

[illegible]

...broadcasts were received by the Japanese. The Japanese surrender passes offering to the Allied lines. By the time the war ended, small numbers of Japanese had been induced to surrender. This was one of the highlights of the psychological warfare campaign waged against the Japanese. The broadcasters believed that the Japanese, Burmese, and

The PW team was organized last month to work in Gen. Joseph Stilwell's new 13th Air Force. These propagandists will be sent to the front lines to work for the troops.

The PW team was ordered to work in Gen. CBI theater. These propaganda efforts were put under a straight non-political Burma campaign by military and given a lot of aid, the Burma combat every available combat boot, rifle, bayonet, and bayonet—in

March, the propaganda campaign was aimed chiefly at convincing the Japanese that they are the aggressors in the war—and hard-hitting tactics are intended to

Using the B-25 bombers of the Tenth Air Force, the Allied experts began preparing the Japs with tens of thousands of copies of a four-page Japanese-language newspaper. With pictures and maps it related of the Allied triumphs, including the invasion and liberation of France and the conquest of the Marianas.

The Full Bowl: For the tactical job, need at inducing the Japs to surrender, admitting every known battlefield advantage, the PW team estab-

mandate
his troops
his town folk
besieged Japs about it
Fusayasu Murayama, commander
114th Regiment, fled a few hours
with a couple of "comfort girls," prove
Japs were told about their contented Jap
The Allies actually held contented photo-
prisoners of war, fighters dropped from full
graphs of smiling POW's eating from full
rice bowls, playing baseball, and listen-
ing to the radio.

AMERICAN TROOPS

The troops of the 1st Cavalry Division are in the process of being retrained by the 1st Infantry Division. The troops are being retrained by the 1st Infantry Division. The troops are being retrained by the 1st Infantry Division.

BY ORDER OF
THE COMMANDER



SECRET

1 m O.
Salinger, Tolson
PunfiliMEMORANDUM

DATE: May 1st, 1943.

TO : General Donovan
FROM : U. S. Harkson *WAT*
SUBJECT : Transmission of Memorandum from Mr. Salinger,
dated April 29, 1943 re Suggestions for
Psychological Warfare.

While in New York, Mr. Salinger handed me the
attached memo - and asked that I transmit it to you.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. U. S. Harkson, Captain M. I. Gurfein
 From: Edgar Salinger
 Subject: Further suggestions in re Psychological Warfare

Date: April 29, 1943

SECRET

1. PREMISE: The picture of the Japanese Emperor is a symbol of his person and his sovereignty. As such, it becomes a sacred object in all Japanese offices, schools, etc.

Whenever there is a fire or in moments of other danger, it is the invariable custom for someone to attempt a rescue of the Emperor's picture, even at the cost of life. It is unthinkable for any Japanese to willfully destroy or mutilate the Emperor's picture.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended as a part of our psychological warfare that large reproductions of the Emperor's actual features be painted or placed in any manner which may recommend itself upon any airplane, ship, or other weapon of war which the Japanese may be forced to attack.

This will, of course, somewhat parallel the idea of the tigers used by General Chennault, but is much more direct. Pictures of the Emperor should be accurate reproductions of his actual features and unmistakable.

* * * * *


2. The Tori is the name of the gate leading to a Japanese shrine or temple. It is a sign of extremely bad omen for one of the legs of a tori to collapse. Toris are made of wood and easily constructed. Broken toris placed strategically should be easily utilized. The base of the broken tori could have fox odors impregnated in the ground, even fox leaflets scattered around to add to the portent.

.ES.



Date March 8, 1943To: COLONEL DONOVAN

I do not think that action
on our part is called for at the
present time. Colonel Burton
agrees with this.



Office of the Secretariat

(13)

Even No. rolls

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.


February 24, 1945

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel G. Edward Suxton
From: R. Davis Halliwell
Subject: Colonel Richards' memorandum to Colonel
Donovan re potential use of Japanese Troops.

1. I return the following memorandum to Colonel Donovan from Lt. Colonel Richards, your memorandum to Colonel Donovan and a memorandum to me from Major Devlin, all on the above subject.

2. I agree with Paragraph #2 of Major Devlin's memorandum. I think it would be far better to use these troops with combat forces in Europe than for duty on the Japanese Islands.


R. Davis Halliwell
Lt. Commander, USNR
Deputy Chief - SO

SECRET

SECRET

February 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM

To: Lt. Commander R. Davis Halliwell
From: Major Francis T. Devlin
Subject: Colonel Buxton's memorandum to Colonel Donovan

1. Colonel Buxton's idea is with "combat forces in Europe", which would appear much more feasible than exposing a possible weak link to the enemy Jap forces in the Far East and the Philippine Islands.

2. Japanese-Americans fighting Germans would be far safer than Japanese-Americans versus the Jap. The latter, as mentioned above, might, in some weak individuals, leave us vulnerable - and also expose us to easier mass penetration than Colonel Buxton's idea.

Francis T. Devlin
Francis T. Devlin
Major, Inf.

Col. Buxton

SECRET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd RA

Callaway 2/18

No.	Name	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Month	Day		
1	John L. Callaway	12	18	[Signature]	lets consider this report. FE + Philippine etc problems attachment
2	Major Devlin				
3	Col. Callaway				
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

Each record should be numbered to correspond with number in 7c column.
 1. Use should be given across sheet under each comment.
 2. Officer's designation should be used in 7c column.
 3. Officer should initial (check area insufficient) before further routing.
 4. Areas listed as action taken should be indicated in 7c column.
 5. Areas listed as action taken should be returned to Registry.
 6. Officer's designation should be repeated across sheet.

SECRET

February 11, 1943

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
FROM: S. Edward Buxton

Potential use of American citizens
of Japanese Ancestry serving in
the United States Armed Forces

While I think the idea of some
contingents of military police composed of loyal
Japanese-Americans for duty in the Japanese
Islands is good, I feel it is even more important
that there should be at least a division of
Japanese-Americans with combat forces in Europe.

Nothing will more stimulate
Japanese-American loyalty than the feeling that
they were trusted and allowed the privilege of
fighting. Such evidence would emphasize in the
American mind a distinction between the Japanese
agent and the Japanese-American who has completely
transferred his allegiance to this country.
All of this would be of great help in post-war
relations with Japanese-Americans.

I am satisfied that these troops
would be excellent troops because they would have
powerful psychological reasons for demonstrating
both their loyalty and the inherent virtues of
their racial stock. They would wish, above all,

Pose

to establish the fact that there are good and bad
Japanese.

Ad -

to: Colonel Buxton

Referred from Colonel
Donovan.

Mini

Director's Office

Scale the edges of
camera field

[Even No. rolls]

[Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3]

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Brig. Gen. W. S. Donovan

DATE: June 1, 1943

FROM: Brig. Gen. B. F. Pellers

SUBJECT:

I cannot recall whether or not I have burdened you with these Notes on "The Psychology of the Japanese Soldier."

Since this study has stood the test of time fairly well, I have a feeling that a portion of it could be combined with up-to-date G-2 information and worked into a Psychological Warfare bible for Strategic Services to present to the Army and Navy.

More and more the European Theater will be dominated by political rather than military interests. Moreover, it is predominately British and Russian and Strategic Services of necessity will face certain restrictions.

But in the Pacific your organization has virgin territory with a possibility of achieving overwhelming success. Psychologically the Japanese are vulnerable. You will recall that in 1878 upon the occasion of the restoration of the Emperor, the local war lords, Dynamos, forfeited their military domination without a struggle.

After a few military disasters, which soon will come, it may be possible to show the Japanese people that their present war lord leadership has deceived and betrayed the Emperor and his people. Once the war lords realize they have led their sacred Emperor to disaster, their recourse probably will be hara-kiri.

Your organization can assist materially in presenting this situation to the Japanese people, and it would be a magnificent contribution to the war effort.

B. F. P.

Attachment

Japanese 10,160
 x Magazines
 x Microfilm
 x R + A

January 20, 1943

MEMORANDUM RE JAPANESE PERIODICALS

We have received from China on microfilm the November 1942 issues of Kaizo (Reconstruction) and Chuo Koron (Central Review), two semi-popular Japanese periodicals. These are the first magazines of this kind received here from Japan since the fall of 1941.

The two magazines reproduced are both monthlies, of much the same nature and range of subject matter as Harpers and the Atlantic Monthly. They have large circulations in Japan and should be good indicators of current domestic propaganda trends. It is important for our work on Psychological Warfare that further material of this sort be secured. If, in addition, issues of other Japanese journals of a more specialized economic or political nature could be obtained, they would prove even more useful to this Division.

The three November 1942 articles which have thus far been examined show a marked difference in the tone of domestic propaganda from that encountered in Japanese broadcasts which are monitored here. Apparently efforts are being made to combat domestic over-confidence, which are not reflected in foreign broadcasts. The emphasis on redoubled productive efforts is also striking. In these numbers there are repeated warnings that a long-term war is certain, and that the productive power of Britain and the U.S. makes them formidable opponents. The need for developing Japanese economy to a comparable state is stressed many times.

The first article scanned is a discussion of Japanese economic strategy by Kiyoshi Tsuchiya in Chuo Koron (p.4)

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The author accurately quotes an article by Hanson Baldwin in the New York Times for October 7th, 1942, to the effect that the war has passed from the blitz stage to the attrition stage, a development favorable to the Allies. Tsuchiya emphasizes the vital necessity for an increase in Japanese production. He doubts, however, that such an expansion can be achieved by continued reliance on the profit motive. Slight production jumps may be obtained, but no matter how willing management may be to cooperate, really sweeping results will not follow until ownership and management are separated. Japan is as yet unable to import and exploit foreign labor as is Germany, and has available only limited supplies of woman-power. Therefore, a high degree of mechanization will be required for large-scale increases in production. Tsuchiya concludes with a warning against hopes of early victory. "We stand at the gateway of a long-term war of productive capacities. We must take a long-range view and plan our economic strategy without mistake."

An editorial, captioned, "How are we doing" appears on page 24 of the issue of Kaizo. It cautions its readers that set-backs as well as successes must be expected in war, and cites the example of Germany, which scored repeated victories during four years in the first World War but was ultimately defeated. "The military strength of Britain and America has not been decisively weakened in spite of their initial wounds. The existence of the Empire is at stake in this war of life and death."

The third article, "National Resolution, in the Face of a Long Conflict," written by Mr. Saka, Chief of the Economic Bureau of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, is also in Kaizo (p.93). It attacks unrealistic individuals who still cling to hopes for a speedy restoration of peace, and gives (correctly) statistics showing the scale of the American war effort. The utilization of American women in American industry is regarded as particularly

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significant. "The magnitude of America's war effort shows an intention to overwhelm Japanese military prowess through sheer productive power. The conventional methods of increasing production will not suffice in this situation. A more solid policy, one directed at increasing efficiency and advancing scientific techniques, must be adopted."

8689
Japan
X Handbook
X Trainor Ed. C.

October 22, 1942

Mr. Edward C. Trainor
150 East 73rd Street
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Trainor:


Colonel Donovan has turned over to me your letter of October 12th enclosing the booklet entitled "Handy Guide to Japan". We are very glad to receive this material and your courtesy in sending it is deeply appreciated.

With regard to your generous offer to send us a number of the N.Y.K. Line official guides which you have in your possession, I have discussed this matter with Mr. William A. Kimbel, Liaison Officer for this organization. Mr. Kimbel informs me that these guides would be of considerable value as an addition to a Transportation Library which his office is building up and he would be very glad to receive them.

Sincerely yours,

William L. Langer
Acting Director, Branch
Research and Analysis

cc/Colonel Donovan
Mr. Kimbel



Handwritten:
H. A. Barker
J. Edgar Hoover

October 14, 1942

MEMORANDUM

TO : Mr. Ladd

FROM : Mr. Murphy

Re: A booklet and letter which came to the
attention of Mr. Ladd. I am also attaching copy of Colonel
Morgan's reply.

October 14, 1942

Mr. Edward C. Trainor
150 East 73rd Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Trainor:

Many thanks for your letter of October 12, and I
am especially grateful for the booklet on Japan.
This will be useful in our work, and I should like to
take advantage of your offer to be of assistance if
occasion arises.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

Japan 8210w
X Treasury
X State
X Navy

September 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Major Bruce

FROM: JRM

The attached material has been acknowledged.
I should think that it would be of interest to SAB
and SAH, and that copies of it also should be fur-
nished R and A and the Supporting Committee on
Psychological Warfare, of which Commander Vanderbilt
is Chairman.

Japan 8210 a
x Treasury
x Scott
x Daley

September 7, 1942

Honorable Herbert E. Gaston
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gaston:

Many thanks for your letter of September 3rd, enclosing copy of report made to the Commissioner of Customs by Martin G. Scott and E. W. Daley, former Treasury Attaches at Kobe and Shanghai. This material is most interesting and useful in our work and I appreciate very much your making it available to us.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director.

COMMUNITY FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 2, 1942.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you very much for furnishing
me a photostatic copy of the Japanese propaganda
magazine Freedom.

Most of the prisoners pictured therein
looked pretty grim, and none too comfortable in
the cold climate.

Sincerely yours
E. J. King
E. J. KING

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

COMMON FILE

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

September 2, 1942.

My dear Colonel Donovan:

Thank you very much for furnishing
me a photostatic copy of the Japanese propaganda
magazine Freedom.

Most of the prisoners pictured therein
looked pretty grim, and none too comfortable in
the cold climate.

Sincerely,

E. J. KING.

Colonel William J. Donovan
Director, Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

Japan 8171
X King
(2) agency, 1202 agency

September 1, 1942

Chief Ernest King,
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral King:

I am sending to you a photostatic copy of a Japanese magazine which I think was issued on April 1st. You will note that they obviously have a propaganda purpose. I am sending it to you, however, because I thought you would be interested in the pictures of our officers and men which they print.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

WID 441 Japan

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
20th & N Sts., N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

It has come to the attention of this office that the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S. is in possession of the Japanese-Soviet Yearbook (Nichi-So Nenkan, 1941). The information in this book is vital to both the Eastern European Section and the Eastern Branch of the M.I.S. at this time. It is requested that the book be loaned this office for photostatic reproduction and translation.

Sincerely yours,

T. M. BODWICK,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Executive Officer, M.I.S.

MID 441 Japan

August 20, 1943.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Director, Office of Strategic Services,
2514 A St., N. W.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

It has come to the attention of this office that the Far Eastern Section of O.S.S. is in possession of the 1941 Japanese-Soviet Yearbook (Nichi-Ro Nenkan, 1941). The information in this book is vital to both the Eastern European Section and Far Eastern Branch of the M.I.S. at this time. It is requested that the book be loaned this office for photostatic reproduction and translation.

Sincerely yours,

T. M. RODENICK,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Executive Officer, M.I.S.

Japan Plan 859
Basic Estimate
Plan
Plan

October 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: James G. Rogers

From: W. J. L.

I have gone over your basic estimate for psychological warfare against Japan and the Far East. I suggest that in its present form it be turned over to the Committee immediately, as I understand the British already had their plan approved by their Joint Chiefs and MI is not ready to submit its plan. I think we should have them all on hand at the same time.

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan

Subject: BASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST
JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST.

The attached paper was prepared in the Psychology Division of R. & A. and submitted by Dr. Tryon on October 4, 1942. It has not yet come up for discussion before the Committee but, if approved, will form the Secret Operations Portion of the Japan Plan, which is to be amalgamated with the propaganda plan to be submitted by the OWI.

The plan has been written in the terms of the Basic Estimate on Psychological Warfare and is to act as an illustration of this type of outline. (Ref: J.P.W. Subcommittee, September 15, 1942)

The Subcommittee:

- a. Reaffirmed its decision to submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval an integrated plan of psychological warfare of all types for the Pacific Southwest Theater.
- b. Requested the O.S.S. to work on the portion of such a plan not included in propaganda.

Alice B. Whelen

SECRET

BASIC ESTIMATE FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST

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1

BASIC STRATEGY FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN IN THE FAR EAST

I. THE OBJECTIVE

A. Assigned Objective

To develop for use against Japan in the Far East overall strategic plans for "subversive operations including the integrated use of sabotage and demolition work, organization and direction of underground political groups, whispering campaigns and other forms of fifth column activity within the target area, supported by appropriate secret activities in other areas likely to have direct influence upon the target area."

B. Appreciation of the Assigned Objective

The assigned objective concerns one aspect of total psychological warfare. It does not directly encompass general propaganda activities by radio, press, and film; or combat psychological warfare services. The very topography of the area invites subversive operations; its almost complete inaccessibility by way of the ordinary media virtually excludes general propaganda.

The basic aim of psychological warfare against Japan must be the destruction of the Japanese will to resist. Since there are insurmountable obstacles to reaching Japan directly, the order of objectives must

of necessity be: first, the undermining and ultimate elimination of her control in the conquered and occupied territories of southeast Asia and the southwest Pacific; second, from these territories as bases of operation, the attack upon Japan itself.

If we are to destroy the Japanese will to resist, her prestige and control in the occupied territories must be effectively undermined and the sympathetic support of the conquered or occupied peoples won. Confusion must be created in the minds of her people and leaders at home, group must be set against group, the confidence of people in their leaders must be violently shaken.

But the warfare must not all be destructive. One essential part of our psychological strategy must be the selection and support of those groups in Japan and the areas she controls who are sympathetic to our cause, who may contribute to the overthrow of the present Japanese government, and who may form the basis of a post-war Far East.

C. The Mission.

The immediate and special mission of psychological warfare in the Far East is to prepare the ground for the approach of American troops wherever and whenever they may attack by weakening the will to resist of the defending Japanese and by strengthening the will to revolt of the native peoples.

The principal vehicle of this aspect of psychological warfare must be agents operating in the field. Such agents will, when successful in establishing themselves in the area, carry on three kinds of activities:

1. Intelligence. Information for the military services, and for other Government information services will be secured and by secret short-wave radio or other means communicated to appropriate bases.

2. Sabotage. Enemy communications and installations will be destroyed in such fashion as to induce confusion, uncertainty, and fear in the Japanese forces of authority and control.

3. Propaganda. The propaganda activities of agents in the field, particularly in an area which is for the most part closed to the ordinary media of general propaganda, is of the utmost import. In function they will be:

a. Incitive. They will be directed toward encouraging guerrilla resistance and sabotage on the part of the native peoples.

b. Disorienting. They will be aimed at misleading or confusing the enemy. Rumor can be a particularly effective weapon of warfare in the Far East.

c. Informational and Persuasive. Agents will spread among the native peoples information concerning

the United States and the United Nations and their war aims; they will attempt to build up anti-Japanese sentiment; they will lend stimulation and encouragement to groups already sympathetic to our cause.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

A. Divisions of the Theater

1. Japanese controlled areas:

Japan Proper
Formosa

Philippines

China -- occupied
Korea
Manchuria

French Indo-China
Malaya
Thailand
Burma

Netherlands East Indies
Islands of Melanesia
Islands of Micronesia

2. Pertinent United Nations areas:

China -- unoccupied
Eastern Siberia and Outer Mongolia
Australia and New Zealand

B. The Theater Commands

Three United States theater commanders divide responsibility in the Far East.

General MacArthur commands most of the vast island areas of Micronesia, Melanesia, Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines.

General Stilwell commands the principal mainland areas of China, Korea, French Indo-China, Thailand, and Burma.

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Admiral Nimitz commands the fleet operations in the Southwest Pacific.

C. Pertinent Characteristics of the Area

Nowhere are the enemies of the United States so vulnerable to espionage and sabotage as in the Japanese conquered areas of Southeast Asia, and more particularly the islands of the Southwest Pacific. The very nature of the terrain, as contrasted, for example, with that of Germany, creates a vulnerability to the infiltration and operation of agents which is unexcelled.

Although the population is dense in some regions, its sparsity in others contributed to the ease of concealment and subversive operation.

Five major groups of people must be dealt with (throughout the area: the enemy Japanese and their European collaborators; the large half-caste groups whose resentment of their treatment under British, Dutch, and French control led them to welcome the Japanese; the great variety of native peoples, including an enormous number of relatively friendly Chinese; the small groups of native "intellectuals" who formed the bases of nationalist movements in some regions and severely resent their suppression and bad treatment by the European rulers of the area; the few remaining Europeans who may be carrying on guerrilla activities in the more remote interior regions.

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In the area resides a great variety of peoples, speaking many languages (250 major language groups in the Netherlands East Indies alone), following many religious beliefs and observances, and displaying a great variety of customs and manners.

D. Past and Present "Pressures" upon the Area

1. All the islands and parts of the mainland which are now controlled by the Japanese have at some time in the past been under European control -- British, Dutch, French, and United States. These controls have varied in their degrees of enlightenment and have left upon the native peoples corresponding favorable or unfavorable impressions. It is probably safe to say that in most regions they have not been favorable.

2. Among some of the peoples, notably the Burmese, Indonesians, Filipinos, and Chinese, nationalist movements of varying degrees of vigor existed prior to Japanese conquest.

3. Japanese psychological warfare in Southeast Asia based upon early studies of the social attitudes of the native peoples has been extremely effective. It paid her big dividends in her southward drive and is, no doubt, continuing to do so. It has been based principally upon the appeal of "Asia for the Asiatics", with freedom of

the native peoples from "white imperialism", and upon the lure of the "Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere".

4. Japan's conquest has been followed by a draining of the area's resources which has tended to precipitate economic crises.

B. Current Opinions and Attitudes Pertinent to Psychological Warfare

1. Widespread Anti-Japanese Sentiment in Occupied Areas. It is highly significant that those areas where the Japanization policy has been longest at work are those where anti-Japanese sentiment is strongest--especially in Formosa and Korea. The island peoples, except in the Philippines, have little political consciousness and no military potential. None of the peoples of Japanese-occupied areas appear to have any love for their rulers and collaborate, when they do, out of fear or hope for personal gain rather than from any genuine loyalty to the Japanese Emperor.

While the populations of Japanese-occupied areas are by and large passive and indifferent, and while there are only small minorities of politically conscious "collaborators" at one extreme and of active saboteurs and underground workers at the other, the masses could readily be swung over to the side of the United Nations by a skillful combination of political commitments and military exploits.

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2. Pro-Japanese Factions. The most active "collaborationists" are:

Pro-Japanese	Koreans and Chinese in Manchuria
" "	Chinese in Occupied China
" "	Burmese in Burma
" "	Thai in Thailand

There is no evidence that any of these pro-Japanese factions has any real power in its own right. They are essentially "puppet" groups which, for the time being, enjoy special privileges of power and income because they are supported by the occupation authorities.

3. Pro-United Nations Groups. Finally there are important groups representing every one of the territories occupied by Japan, either now in existence or ready to be formed, who would willingly collaborate with United Nations forces in ousting the Japanese. The strength of these potential allies of the United Nations would be greatly increased if they could reassure their followers on the future policy of the Western Powers toward the peoples of Asia. While many of these down-trodden peoples would fight merely to eliminate the Japanese, many others would hesitate to do so, only to return to some other form of oppressive rule thereafter.

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III. SURVEY OF THE SITUATION

A. Summary of the Situation

1. Effect desired. Ideally, it is desired to place trained agents in each of the Japanese and Japanese occupied territories, such agents to accomplish:

a. Intelligence agents to carry on espionage and, having established communications, to report, first, enemy military and naval operations and, secondly information concerning the peoples of the area -- their attitudes, their strengths and weaknesses, and the probabilities of their cooperation with raiding or invading United States armed forces.

b. Operative agents to engage in nerve-racking sabotage aimed at disrupting enemy communications, at assisting native guerrillas, and at preparing the ground for commando raids or more extensive armed invasion.

c. Current U.S. psychological warfare activities.
(exclusive of general propaganda services)

a. Organizational.

G-2, A-4, ONI--focused primarily upon military and naval intelligence.

State Department--focused on political observations.

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BSW--focused on economic observations.

OSS/NA--training and directing of agents for general espionage and sabotage.

Conducts training schools in the United States for both intelligence and operative agents.

Has formulated plans which envisage bases in Australia and India.

Maintains close liaison with G-2, A-6, and OSI, and with OSS/RAA and OSS/FW as intelligence sources.

b. Operational

(1) Operations in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific have not yet been instituted.

(2) Plans for such operations are in the process of formulation. Such plans encompass:

(a) Extensive cooperation with the Chinese. This is of the utmost importance. Not only can the Chinese be of inestimable assistance in operational activities in Southeast Asia, but their cooperation can also be very useful in the islands of the Southwest Pacific. In the former sphere, and in many of the latter islands, only Chinese agents can feebly be used. Moreover, the freedom with which the Chinese continue to move back and forth between occupied and unoccupied areas facilitates their infiltration as agents throughout enemy zones.

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(b) Relatively independent action by the U.S. in the Japanese mandated islands. Here access is more readily achieved from Australia or from the east, and coordination with Chinese efforts need not be so complete.

(3) Specific preliminary plans already under way provide for operations in:

Thailand	} already approved by theater commander
Burma	
Philippines	
Bali	
New Guinea	

3. Current problems

a. Approval of the theater commander for operations in the southwest Pacific islands has not yet been obtained.

b. Sufficient freedom and flexibility in the issuance of passports has not yet been granted by the State Department. (This is perhaps less cogent in the Far East since the personnel being sent there is mostly military).

3. Factors Available--United States Strengths and Weaknesses in the Pacific

1. The large number of the southwest Pacific islands and the vast area over which they extend, together with the sparsity of population in many parts of

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them, afford unusual opportunity for the entry and concealment of subversive agents.

2. The proximity of Australia and New Zealand to the areas provides adequate bases for training and the direction of operations.

3. The advantageous position of unoccupied China affords extensive opportunity for the infiltration of agents throughout the Japanese occupied areas of the mainland. In certain regions Chinese circulate freely between occupied and unoccupied areas.

4. The rather generally favorable attitude of most of the peoples of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific toward the United States, as contrasted with their attitude toward the British, the Dutch, and the French.

5. The existence in many areas, notably Korea and Formosa, of a long tradition of dislike for the Japanese.

6. Japan's bad behavior since her conquests. Her arrogance, her brutality, her oppression of native peoples seem to be winning her accumulated hatred wherever she has gained control. Those peoples who were, at first, inclined to welcome the Japanese as liberators, appear now to be growing equally anxious to be free from the Japanese yoke.

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7. Our alliance with China. There are several million Chinese throughout the area who wish to see Japan defeated.

8. The existence of native groups resisting the Japanese in many parts of the area.

C. Factors Opposed—United States Vulnerability and Japanese Strengths.

1. America's distance from the field of operations.

2. Japan is in control of the area and is currently strengthening her foothold both militarily and psychologically.

3. The Japanese have for centuries been subjected to a "thought control" which has implanted in them those attitudes upon which the government of Japan is capitalizing today.

4. The peoples of the area outside Japan Proper have long been subjected to Japanese propaganda, proferring them independence and the benefits of a "Greater Asia Co-Prospersity Sphere".

5. The area is inaccessible by medium-wave radio from the United States. Short-wave broadcasts will reach only the government radio monitors. The peoples of the area, therefore, are for the most part excluded as a target for general propaganda.

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6. The widespread resentment in Southeast Asia of the white man as ruler and exploiter.

7. The loss of prestige the United Nations have suffered by virtue of their rapid succession of defeats in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

8. The ignorance which prevails among large numbers of the people of some of the islands and parts of the mainland concerning the United States, and among those of most of the area concerning the war aims of the United Nations. For many of the natives the approach of American forces would mean little more than the attempt of some new white people to drive out the yellow people who had but recently driven out the other whites.

9. The United States alliance with Great Britain. During her years of domination in certain regions of the Far East Britain has succeeded in arousing the wrath of many of the peoples. Friendliness toward us, therefore, has to some extent been confused by the widely heralded Anglo-American accord.

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IV. COORDINATED COURSE OF ACTIONA. General

1. To prepare the way for future military operations in the Far East by the immediate extension of psychological warfare in the form of espionage and other appropriate subversive operations to those particular regions of the Far East theater deemed most strategic.

2. Such psychological warfare operations to comprise the selection, training, and direction of:

a. Intelligence agents who will so establish themselves in the area as to enable their securing and reporting:

(1) military, naval, and air intelligence--dispositions and movements of troops, ships, and planes,

(2) psychological intelligence--disposition and eliciting of favorable and unfavorable attitudes and behavior among the peoples of the area.

b. Operative agents who will engage in sabotage, demolition, rumor-spreading, and subversive propaganda (cf. Sections I.C. and III.A.1., above).

3. Such psychological warfare operations to form an integral part of military plans and operations. (Active revolts successfully instigated by agents in the field, but occurring prematurely, could seriously damage future operations. Dislike of the Japanese is increasing

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throughout the areas she controls, but as a result of her repressive measures those who would resist are also increasingly hesitant to risk life unless there is certainty of sufficient United Nation forces in the offing.)

4. Such psychological warfare operations to be conducted by OSS representatives acting in collaboration with and under the supervision of the theater commander.

5. Subversive propaganda conducted by agents in the field to be supplemented and reinforced by the general propaganda services of radio, press, film, etc.

6. All U.S. psychological warfare activities in the Far East to be closely coordinated, and in some cases jointly executed, with the Chinese. (The Chinese know and understand the area; all parts of the area have large Chinese populations; our own subversive operations will of necessity work with and through Chinese residents. To ignore or neglect the authority and interests of the Chinese generalissimo and his intelligence services might render all U.S. subversive operations in the areas ineffectual.)

7. All U.S. psychological warfare activities in certain regions of the Far East to be closely coordinated, so far as is possible, and in some cases jointly executed, with the Russians. (The Soviet intelligence services are no doubt operating extensively in Manchuria. Mongols appear to move rather freely between Russian and Japanese territories.)

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6. Adequate consideration to be given to the constructive aspect of psychological warfare should not be neglected. (Native groups throughout the Far East to be looked upon, not only as a potential stab in the back to Japan, but also as groups upon which to build future friendly democratic governments. The fundamental humanity of the majority of the Japanese to be recognized, and psychological warfare directed toward developing those aspects of democratic life which exist in Japanese culture, such as the democracy which prevails in local village life, the Japanese admiration for a man who rises to high place from lowly origins.

7. In view of the fact that the United States is everywhere in the Far East looked upon more favorably than is any of her allies, subversive operations to be planned under the assumption that subsequent military and naval operations will be initiated by United States armed forces.

8. Specifics

1. Subjacent

a. To be directed towards:

- (1) destruction of Japanese military, naval, and air installations and communications;
- (2) disruption of Japanese economy, both at home and in the areas she controls;

- (3) creating confusion, fear, demoralization among Japanese armed forces, Japanese civilians, and those natives or Europeans who are her collaborators.

(Destruction of local record offices in Japanese towns and villages would represent an effective concentration of activities. In such offices are kept all community vital statistics--records of residence, of conscription, police records, etc. The destruction of such an office would so disrupt official control in the region as to cause widespread confusion, and, if accompanied by appropriate rumors, even panic.)

b. To exploit Japanese superstitions and symbols--the effectiveness of violent acts of sabotage is likely to be greatly enhanced if they occur upon certain days, or are related to certain symbols; advantage must be taken of the superstition concerning the northeast as the "devil's direction."

8. Subversive propaganda, inclusive of rumor, to be directed at demoralizing the Japanese and undermining their control, encouraging resistance to their rule, and creating belief in a United Nations' victory. Certain particularly potent points of attack to be used:

Japanese promises of liberation to the peoples of the Far East, contrasted with her acts of conquest and exploitation.

United States' record of enlightened rule and faithfully fulfilled promises of independence in the Philippines.

Japanese attitudes toward the U.S. and the Koreans, as contrasted with her propagandizing for "Asia for the Asians."

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Japanese use of narcotics and organized vice as a weapon of demoralization against the people she has conquered.

Japanese cooperation with Germany, whose avowed racial doctrines proclaim such a friendship to be only opportunistic.

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V. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the JFAC recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners that OSS immediately expand and expedite its selection, training and directing of special agents for the purpose of waging psychological warfare in the Far East by means of espionage, sabotage, and extensive propaganda, under directives from the JFAC supplemented by advice from G-2, A-5, and ONI.

2. That the JFAC recommend to the JCS through the JSP that OSS representatives be attached, as military personnel, to the staffs of the theater commanders, such representatives be act in collaboration with and under the orders of said theater commanders; and that, inasmuch as the functions of secret intelligence and operations often exceed the scope of those of the theater commander, such OSS representatives be permitted, with the cognizance of the theater commander, to communicate with their headquarters in Washington.

3. That the JFAC submit through the Joint Staff Planners to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their approval, and for their urgent recommendation to the Far East theater commanders for approval, the above proposed general and specific courses of action.

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4. That the JFEC recommend to the JCS through the JCP that psychological warfare strategy in the Far East be integrated with military, naval, and air strategy in the area.

5. That the JFEC, on behalf of the JCS, request JCI to consult with OSS in the interests of supplementing the sabotage and subversive propaganda activities of OSS agents in the field by appropriate general propaganda.

September 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM

For: Dr. Mason

From: Mr. J. R. Murphy

This is in reply to a letter which C. P. Kandelberger wrote and Colonel Donovan signed to General Arnold on August 21. In this connection you might be interested in the attached letter and memorandum from General Wedemeyer both of which I wish you would return as soon as you have finished them, as Colonel Donovan has not yet seen them.

WAR DEPARTMENT
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

SEP 8 1942

*Copy 8/11 to
Mason*

Director of Strategic Services

Washington, D. C.


Dear Colonel Donovan:

In answer to your letter of August 21, 1942 with respect to estimates of a residual figure of Japanese firstline air strength, your attention is invited to the fact that the function of preparing estimates of enemy air strength has been made a responsibility of the G-2 Division of the War Department General Staff. There is a considerable Air Force representation of officers in that division. All data with respect to enemy air losses are gathered by the G-2 Division. Estimates of the losses of airplanes due to all causes other than those known to have been destroyed in the air are also made by that division.

Considerable confusion has developed in high places at various times as a result of several agencies evaluating basic data and presenting estimates which are not in agreement. For that principal reason we do not attempt, in this office, to arrive at an evaluation of enemy air strength but depend upon that produced by the G-2 Division to answer our purposes.

It is recommended that your office follow the same procedure by securing information of enemy air strength from the G-2 Division of the General Staff rather than to attempt an independent evaluation based upon rules and factors which must, of necessity, be empirical in nature. It is believed that by this means we will avoid the possibility of diverse estimates reaching higher authority, and of possibly causing confusion.

Sincerely yours,



H. H. ARNOLD,
Lieutenant General, U.S.A.,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces.



R 145

air strength
Losses
Wastage - Air Corps
Statistical Control Div

August 21, 1942.

Chief of the Air Corps
Munitions Building
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Arnold:

In order to evaluate intelligence data on Japanese air strength, the Office of Strategic Services finds it necessary to examine Japanese air losses. Combat losses are, of course, available but an estimate must be made of total airplane wastage in order to derive a residual figure of Japanese first-line strength on the basis of its airplane production.

Since it is impossible to obtain direct information on Japanese losses, other than the number of planes shot down in actual combat, the Office of Strategic Services is anxious to obtain information on the experience of other air forces operating in Southeast Asia and Australasia, in order that we may derive, after proper adjustments, the most probable relationship between Japanese aircraft shot down in combat and other Japanese plane losses.

We are informed that the Statistical Control Division of the Army Air Corps has the material on which most of the ratios which we need can be built up, but that Major C. B. Thornton, Director of that Division, would require authorization from you before making these ratios available to us. I should appreciate it very much, therefore, if you would so authorize him.

I am fully aware of the secret nature of this information. However, since our interest in the matter is exclusively one of estimating the strength of the enemy, we have no need for actual figures on American losses. It would therefore be possible, I

General Arnold

- 2 -

August 21, 1942

think, to make the material available to us as a series of percentage relationships which disguise the magnitude of the absolute figure on which they are based. These ratios, of course, would still be treated as secret.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan

JW:bb

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan December 11, 1942
FROM: John D. Wilson

Attached are some papers on Political Warfare Plans for the Far East. These were recently sent to us by Bowes Lyon of PWE. We have made photostat copies available to Central Information Division and other appropriate individuals within OSS and are turning the originals over to you.

JDW
John D. Wilson
Special Assistant to Director,
Research & Analysis Branch

O.P.O. MAL:2
16.11.42.

This document is to be used by the Political Warfare (Japan) Committee with the approval of the Colonial Office, India Office and Chiefs of Staff Organisation.

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION AND POLITICAL WARFARE EXECUTIVE

PLAN OF POLITICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN

GENERAL PLAN

SCOPE

In the planning of political warfare against Japan, Burma was one of the first territories to be considered, firstly because it is in direct land contact with India, and secondly because the recovery of communications with China is a vital factor in winning China's assistance and her readiness to continue the struggle against Japan.

In the following plan for Malaya the circumstances are somewhat different. It is necessary in the first instance to plan political warfare to meet conditions of the present situation which may persist for some time. Our object is, with the Malay peoples, to maintain the hope that we shall return, and to induce them to insist in those who have been coerced into co-operation with Japan that their return would lead to their punishment. Until it is possible to lay an alternative strategy we must, in fact, concentrate upon the "wait and see" policy. It is for this reason that the plan is confined, for the present, to the preliminary stage. Further stages will be developed when there are prospects of a change in the general strategic situation.

As with the Burma plan, this plan will be implemented by means of directives, which will amplify the arguments contained in it according to prevailing circumstances. The scope of the preliminary stage will naturally depend upon the general situation of all fronts.

I. PURPOSES AND SCOPE. See Appendix.

II. TARGETS.

1. The Local Populations of Malaya.

2. The Japanese, both members of the fighting services and civilians.

3. The Japanese and plans of Malaya.

III. METHODS.

The first object of our propaganda to the local populations must be to ensure that they are able to derive as little advantage as possible from their occupation of the country, particularly through the co-operation of the people. We should, therefore, still concentrate our efforts against incitement to premature revolt, and against any action which might lead to severe reprisals, urged upon every inhabitant the necessity of co-operating with the enemy, though we recognise that this may be forced upon them.

Our propaganda should be directed, in fact, at the individual races should be:

A. The Malays:-

1. "The British are coming back."

This should form the constant background to our propaganda, though it should not at this stage be developed too far. e.g., we should not attempt to make local accusations of the United Nations appear more important than their really are, or commit ourselves to any definite promises which would raise premature expectations. The main object here must be to prevent the Malays from regarding the Japanese as their permanent masters with whom they must accommodate themselves for good.

2. "We will be deceived by Japanese blackishmen. Remember that they are going to subject populations elsewhere."

R 1712
J

Intelligence information is available concerning Japanese treatment of the Malays. It is necessary to concentrate on describing Japanese treatment of subject peoples, the principal ones of whom are Malays and Moslems (though not of Chinese) in the East. The Far East, especially M.E.A., with whom Malays have close relations. It is probable that in the early stages the Japanese will try to exploit the Malays, it is probable that this policy will be of the nature of exploitation. Special stress should be placed on the Japanese policy regarding forced labor, and on Japanese policy regarding the Malays in the rice develop, the blame should be placed on the Japanese.

2.4) "However, the country is enlarged from the British".

Under the conditions under the Japanese we should recall the Japanese military service (particularly medical services) and the Japanese military service, engaged before the invasion. Popular district military service would have been used to the Malays might be used to recall the Japanese military service. Supplying the details of help afforded to Malays under the Japanese service (including stranded at Mecca).

2. "The... in the Telephoto Port no mention of Isler".

...the Japanese claims to be Protectors
...by Italy (now the ally of Japan)
...Shintoism, with its Emperor-worship and
...is wholly inconsistent with the teachings
...the Japanese is to stamp out all

...with the Headquarters, reminding the ...
...praying for them.

1. THE MESSAGE - 1. "Help and the British Empire fight on for your freedom
in the East and West."

...the bitter years of fighting which their
...to the Jap nose; the example of
...in Manchuria, Formosa and Occupied China;
...in China (murder,
...villages, etc., particularly in

... and keep them in touch with news
... and problems, and is particularly, emphasizing
... to the Japanese Army.

"I will do what I can to enable you to be prosperous once again in this life, as you wish to live."

... "I think your critics are looking after your relatives."

... being given to families in China who looked after the hermits. The hermits of both the Chinese and British ... refugees. Mention wives and children

12. The Bureau is to study some of our Malay and European propaganda material and to determine what new channels to the press and public are available.

... "no one will be defected",

and the Indian and British authorities, their preparations for the time when they should be able to take the freedom of the Indians caught by on

...the ...
...the ...
...the ...

...the ...

...the ...

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SECRET

O.P.C. N.I.C.
16.11.42

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION & POLITICAL WARFARE
EXECUTIVE
PLAN OF POLITICAL WARFARE AGAINST JAPAN
MALAYA PLAN - APPENDIX.

CHANNELS AVAILABLE.

- a) Radio Broadcasts: India is best placed for serving by radio the local populations in Malaya. The B.B.C. and stations in the U.S.A. have better equipment than India, but are at a geographical disadvantage, and hampered by difficult conditions of propagation. China lacks sufficient equipment and Australia is not well placed for serving territories west of the M.E.I. There is a possibility that American equipment may be installed in Australia which will greatly improve service from there.

b) Present services of work may be summarised as follows:-

- i) India. Broadcasts in all Indian languages, principally Tamil and Malay, as well as in Malay. Also in Amoy dialect (probably Hokkien) Cantonese, Kuoyu, Mandarin, English and Arabic. A.I.R. also broadcasts messages to Prisoners-of-War in Tamil and Hindi; and Japanese news and talks.
- ii) U.S.A. A daily service is broadcast to the Far East. Languages used are Kuoyu, Cantonese, Malay, Bengali, Tamil, Hindustani.
- iii) Australia. Melbourne and Perth broadcast in Malay to S.E. Asia.
- iv) U.S.A. Broadcasts to the Far East in Chinese, English, Dutch, French and Malay.
- v) China. Broadcasts in Mandarin and Chinese dialects but not apparently in Malay.

Details of the services are as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>N.I.C.</u>	<u>Service</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Wavelength</u>	<u>Destination</u>	<u>Language.</u>
INDIA	11.30	News	New Delhi	19.62	Malaya and	
	12.00			31.3	Far East	Tamil
				25.45		
	11.15		" "	31.3	Burma and	Tamil, Hindu-
	11.30		" "	19.62	Malaya	stani & English.
	12.00		" "	25.45	Far East	Kuoyu
	12.15		" "	19.62		
	12.30		" "	25.45	Far East	Malay
	12.45		" "			
	1.5-2.1		" "	31.3, 25.36	Malaya & Far	Tamil
	12.15		" "	29.45	East.	Amoy
	12.30		" "		Malaya	
	12.45		" "	25.45	Malaya	Cantonese
	12.15		" "			
	12.30		" "	25.45	Far East	Japanese
	12.45		" "			
	12.15-12.30		" "	41.27	Malaya and	Tamil
	12.30-12.45		" "		Far East.	
	12.45		" "	31.28	Malaya	Arabic
	12.15-12.30		" "	25.36	Malaya and	Tamil
	12.30-12.45		" "	31.3	Far East	
	12.45		" "	25.45		

संस्कृत-भाषा-शब्द-कोश-प्र. १. १. १.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840.

(10-11-68) For The East
 (10-11-68) For The East
 (10-11-68) For The East

14 1. 1. 1. (1941) for India, Burma and Malaya
15 1. 1. 1. (1941) for India, Burma and Malaya
16 1. 1. 1. (1941) for India, Burma and Malaya

of 1944 (to 1945) for India, Burma and Malaya.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/10/17 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100280005-9

$\frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) e^{-x^2} dx = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) e^{-x^2} dx$

[illegible]

There is no doubt that the only reason for
the present international tensions
is that people are misguided. Good
education then makes it self-evident
that both good and evil exist.

1. The first step is to identify the main components of the system. This involves understanding the hardware and software involved, as well as the data flow and processing requirements.

The first part of the book, which the reviewer found
 in the first two chapters, is devoted to the
 study of the properties of the function $f(x)$. The
 second part, which is devoted to the study of the
 function $f(x)$, is divided into two parts. The first
 part is devoted to the study of the function $f(x)$ in
 the case of a continuous function, and the second
 part is devoted to the study of the function $f(x)$ in
 the case of a discontinuous function.

[illegible]

(b) The following are the conditions for the existence of a solution to the problem:

[illegible][illegible]

B. Strategic Importance in the Future to Britain and the United Nations.

Assuming the ultimate reconquest of Malaya and defeat of Japan in the Far East, it is clear that Malaya will play an even more important part than in the past in any joint security scheme evolved by the United Nations; and that its strategic and political importance will once again become a factor of major importance both to Britain and the United Nations as a whole.

C. LEGAL STATUS OF MALAYA.

If the provisions covered by this plan, the Straits Settlements are a British Crown Colony. The Malay States are bound to Britain by special treaty relations. In both cases, their legal status lies not merely in their strategic position and their geographical situation, but in their long association with Britain and the responsibilities thus involving upon Britain for the social and political development of the inhabitants of Malaya. In this task, temporarily interrupted by the Japanese invasion, Britain has an obligation to return after the expulsion of the Japanese to the status ante bellum that the interests of the peoples of Malaya themselves and of the world demand over all other considerations.

At the same time it is recognised that, as an essential pivot of Far Eastern security and a source of vital raw materials, Malaya is a territory whose future stability and development must be a matter of close concern not only to Britain but to the U.S.A., China, India, Australia and the N.E.I. It will therefore continue to have political importance in the future as a focus of cooperation, both military and economic, amongst the United Nations in the Far East.

D. ETHNIC GROUPS, COMMUNITIES, LANGUAGES, ETC.

1. Population.

The total population was approximately 5½ millions of whom 2.26 millions were Malays, 1.1 million Indians and ½ million Chinese. Europeans (25,000), Siamese (10,000), Burmese (10,000), Japanese (6,000) and Aborigines (30,000) were other minorities.

2. Communities.

I. Chinese. The Chinese are the strongest single group in Malaya, comprising one-third of the population. The majority do not spend all their lives in Malaya; many return to their native land. The extent of their political control of Malaya is indicated in Section III.

II. The Malays. Second in population and economic importance, but neither in political power nor in social status they compare with the Chinese. Their importance lies in their control of the country in their own right. Their sovereigns rule the States of Malaya, and although a Chinese may be, he cannot become a citizen of Malaya.

III. The Indian population is the third largest body. They are chiefly labourers and petty traders, but also include police, merchants and civil servants. They are predominantly from the South Indian States of Madras, Bombay and Punjab. From the point of view of their political status, they tend to be considered as migratory.

4. Languages. Languages spoken by populations in Malaya fall into the following groups:

| <u>Area</u> | <u>Origin</u> | <u>Language</u> | <u>2nd Language</u> |
|-------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Malay | Native | Malay | Malay |
| Chinese | Chinese | Chinese | Malay |
| Indians | Indian | Indian | Malay |
| Europeans | European | European | " |
| Chinese | Chinese | Chinese | " |
| Indians | Indian | Indian | " |
| Europeans | European | European | Malay/English |

| First Language | | Second Language |
|----------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Malay | Malays | English |
| Indian | South India | Malay/English |
| Indians | Bombay | Malay/English |
| Indians | Hind | Malay |
| Indians | High territory | English |
| Indians | Str. is born | Malay/English |
| Indians | Str. is born | Chinese dialect |
| Indians | Str. is born | Indian dialect |
| Indians | Str. is born | English/Malay |
| Indians | Str. is born | Malay/Sinhalese |
| Indians | Str. is born | English/Malay |

1. English. 2. Tamil. 3. Malayalam. 4. Telugu.

~~1. The [illegible] of [illegible] in [illegible] of [illegible].~~

1. English. 4. Romanized Malay/Jawi. 5. Urdu.

by it and the British Government in their treaties with
The link with the Hadramout is strong, as is the
In the M.O.S. each year in normal times hundreds of
Each town in a far themselves the respected title of Hajjis.
Each has its own Mosque and its own Imam (teacher),
A continual interchange of Moslem teachers between
A flourishing Missionary Society is maintained
Christians and idolaters alike. Each Friday all
In certain states Thursday afternoon
The chief holidays celebrated in the
The Koran first hand.
Islam is the only religion taught. Some of
use the Moslem calendar. Besides the
a very few Chinese acknowledge Islam.

1. ~~Chinese~~ ~~very few~~ Chinese acknowledge Islam. The Chinese, coming from China, still cling to many of their old beliefs, superstitions, and Taoism, with a whole Pantheon of local deities. Fortune-tellers, personal diviners and occultists are everywhere. The Chinese have a great superstition of "religion", in which the use of divination of lucky days and fortunes by the use of dice is common. In addition, the old Chinese residents of the United States, of which Ted Kiang (probably born in Peking, two centuries ago) is one of the

is the list, being practiced by Chinese, Indians, Siamese and
other people in many fine temples spread throughout the land.
This list of influential people in Malaya should not be

17. ~~There are~~ many rich Indian temples in Malaya to which the Hindus go
to pay their devotion. The Chettiar (money-lending class) have temples famous for
their wealth. The Sikhs also have their own temples.

the Catholic faith alive, aided by an

... (wholly Indians) have a fine church at Singapore.

SECRET

Many large firms of foreign owners and industry is in Chinese hands. They own rubber estates, tin mines, banks, palm-oil plantations and canning factories, and they control most of the retail outlets of the country. Out of the money earned from these sources, the Chinese send considerable sums to their families in China. In the month prior to September, 1939, private remittances averaged \$3 million monthly. In March, 1941, they had risen to 7 1/2 million, while in October of that year they had fallen to 1 1/2 million. Over and above these sums the China Relief Fund has received \$50,000 monthly from September, 1939, to March, 1941 and \$75,000 from April to November, 1941. In the last mentioned month an extra sum of \$100,000 was received.

... at 11.5%; Straits Settlements, 11.5%. Of Singapore itself they formed 11.5% of the population - a indication of their urban tendencies.

... the ... of ... China ... Canton and ...
... the ... of the ... In the Chinese ...
... since 1920 has been ... with the ...
... to some degree by most of ...
... English is more commonly ...
... Chinese speak some English. All the ...
... Recently when it was ...
... in support of the war effort, over ...
... a conference was ...
... of the ... (e.g. the ...
... and others represented ...

3. 1950 年 10 月 1 日

The Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra consist of the people of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra are the main sources of the Malay population in the Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra. The Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra are the main sources of the Malay population in the Malay Peninsula and the island of Sumatra.

Their language is Malay, which is written in two ways - Jawi, which uses an Arabic alphabet; and Romanised Malay, a phonetic form using the Roman alphabet. They are courageous: they provided several battalions, both regular and 'volunteer', which fought well in the battle for Malaya, and they formed a Malay section of the Royal Navy responsible for coastal patrol in Malayan waters. They are kindly and generous. Loyalty is one of their chief virtues, exhibited in a marked degree towards their chieftains and sultans. They seem to be "Children of the Sun", willing to work no more than is needed to provide them with clothes and food. In short, they are a happy, kindly people, less concerned with the future and the past than with the immediate problem of living for the present, who are generally looking further into the jungle in face of the energy and the energy of the Chinese and the money-lending activities of the Indians.

He also remembered that a large number of men of the Indian Army were amongst the prisoners taken by the Japanese. In addition to them, there were also British and Punjabi.

...the fact that the British Raj will make them willing helpers in the fight against the J. I. ...

in some bordering the Japanese population now in Malaya it must be
as the as far as thousands of troops from Britain and Australia as well
as millions of the Japanese troops.

Siamese. Apart from political refugees, most of these folk live near the Thai border. Having close connections on both sides of the line. It must be remembered that prior to the transfer of suzerainty in 1909 of 4 states of Northern Malaya by Siam to the British-protected people who were born as Siamese; they were of Siamese and Malay and read Siamese, unless they have become Moslems when they moved South.

Aborigines (Sakais). Dwelling in the Interior of the Peninsula and protected by the British, these primitive people remain content with their tribal code and traditional life. They take the white man's medicine when epidemics and a few other things such as, with them at one and the same time. Their chief claim is to be the owners of the jungle paths.

IV. THE STRAITS SETTLEMENTS UNDER BRITISH RULE.

In the early years the only trading centres of any importance were Singapore, Penang and Malacca, which were linked by sea alone. At the time of the British occupation Singapore had rail, road and, in some cases, air communication with the other states. Such as, Johore Bahru, Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Taiping, Seremban, etc. The other states were virtually all land and most of the states had large financial resources. The fluctuations in the international prices of tin and rubber had a great effect on the prosperity that came to the Peninsula with the British occupation. With the rule and protection has increased steadily and rapidly; and the states have developed from its virgin jungle state. All the states have benefited from this progress, the Malays perhaps most of all, for their land has been preserved to them by Treaty. Only Malays can be full citizens of the Straits Settlements, ruled by their own Sultans, and thus their land, language, customs, etc., are preserved to them.

Of the total area of 51,310 square miles, at the end of 1936 9,750 was reserved for the Malays; 26,000 acres had been alienated for mining and 5,952,000 acres for rubber and agriculture; and rubber plantations covered 3,302,000 acres. The area under rice was 900,000 acres in average holdings of 2½ acres. This was about 36 per cent of Malaya's home consumption.

British capital investment in Malaya is high, for it was responsible in the first place for the building of harbours, roads and railways and in the establishment of rubber plantations and of the entrepot trade. The Chinese also have a very considerable financial interest in the country, for they too have extended much wealth in primary and secondary industry.

Politically the different units in the peninsula can be grouped under two main heads:-

- a) The Straits Settlements, consisting of Singapore, Penang and Malacca, to which are added for administrative convenience the outlying small islands of Labuan (off Penang) and Christmas Island with the Cocon-Kooling group (south of Java).

The Straits Settlements is a Crown Colony, with administration in the hands of a Governor appointed by an Executive and Legislative Council, and Local Administration is conducted by the Colonial Secretary in Singapore and the Resident Counsellors assisted by District Officers in Penang and Malacca. Persons born in the Colony are British subjects.

- b) The Federated States. These are divided into the two categories of Federated (Perak, Selangor, F. M. S. and Pahang) and Unfederated (Johore, Kedah, Perlis, Terengganu and Kelantan with Brunei in Borneo) States, but are all alike in being federated with their own traditions of some antiquity. British influence was first established in the States now forming the Federation. In the seventeenth century, the rulers of these territories were faced with internal strife, and appealed for the co-operation of the British authorities who had previously maintained a strict policy of non-intervention. The Treaties then entered into force in 1824, but each provided for British protection and for assistance in the administration by the appointment of a British Officer by the Governor of the Straits Settlements to reside in each State. The advice of that officer was to be asked for and acted upon in all matters other than those touching Muslim religion and customs. The Federation was constituted by a Treaty signed by the rulers in 1895.

Protectorates and the Unfederated States were established later, particularly after the transfer of Malacca, Penang, Kelantan and Trengganu from the Siamese to the British sphere in 1909. Relations rested on treaties similar in effect to the original ones with the States in the Federation.

It has been frequently stated on behalf of His Majesty's Government that British relations with the States rest on the original treaties of "protection" and therefore have not in any way modified the fundamental principle that the primary object of British share in the administration of the States must be the well-being of the indigenous Malay inhabitants. This policy has had repercussions on relations with nationalities other than Malay residents in States. There has been no question of nationality as such in any of the States, but the Rulers have frequently said it clear that they would not admit to citizenship in their States non-Malay subjects in the administration other Asiatics who were not of the Muslim faith in Malay race. There has been no particular desire on the part of such subjects to be recognized as subjects of any particular Malay Ruler (those born in the Malay States were in practice recognized as British protected Persons); though in fact both Asiatics and Europeans have been nominated to the Federal Council and to the State Councils in those States in which their communities are an important part of the general population.

In general the Malay population has shown little sign of dissatisfaction with the British connexion or desire for a more representative form of Government. The bulk of the population have little political consciousness, and they have played little part in the economic development of the territory; but they have benefited first through the security given by the establishment of a stable system of Government and secondly through the general increase in state revenues, living standards, and social services.

The Chinese population, whether resident or immigrant, have never developed any political consciousness and have usually remained under the influence of local level plants in their homeland. The reactions of this on local politics have presented several problems to Malayan Government, notably in relation to the Kuomintang; in the Larsson-Wang agreement of 1931, however, a formal understanding was reached whereby the Chinese authorities undertook not to form branches of the Kuomintang in Malaya, though it was recognised that there was no objection to individual Chinese in Malaya belonging to the Kuomintang of China. The Chinese Government has since then withdrawn its repercussions in Malaya. Prior to the German attack in 1941 in Malaya there were a series of strikes under Communist auspices in Malaya connected with the war effort. After Russia's entry into the war, the Communists have changed their policy, but it can be fairly said that there has been no real rapprochement with the Malayan Governments until the Japanese attack in 1942, when the Chinese community in Singapore formed a "united front" with the Malayan Government. All parties cooperated in the last stages of the campaign, but even then there were signs of jealousy between the Communists and the Government.

The Indian community were not politically conscious until recently when, again in connection with events in their homeland, they began to show greater cohesion and interest in the leadership of local Indian politicians with Congress Party affiliations. Indian politicians have always protested against the position of "second class citizens" in the Malay States.

The following account consists of a number of extracts from "British Rule in Malaya", by P. S. A. L. Mills of the University of Minnesota. The book, first published in 1942, was issued under the auspices of the Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

It is a document that this account, written by an impartial and scholarly writer, presents a trustworthy survey of the field).

The building of roads, railways, and harbour works followed hard upon the establishment of British control, and by 1914 remarkable progress had been made in the Federated Malay States. The work in curative and preventive medicine and research was also outstanding; but the adequacy of the other social services left much to be desired. Nothing could be done until the end of the war, but during the last twenty years there has been remarkable expansion, particularly in

..... In fact, there was one principal reason for the
the abolition of the milage, but since their capacity to pay
at the heavy cost of improvement the rate of
insufficient revenue meant inadequate social
the low taxable capacity of the people.
the only way to broaden was to attract
and license taxes upon their output.
there were roads and railways to
the construction of public works became the
structure of medical, education, and
the spectacular economic develop-
the creation of a massive social services. They are
the most and heaviest taxes imposed on mining and
and other export taxes and the import duties.

[illegible]

...the rural problem...The improvement of rural...
...there is no one key to its solution. During the...
...the Department of Agriculture, the...
...the Co-operative Credit Societies, with...
...considering the very great difficulties...

.....the Malays are expected to have their part to play, since the Malay
.....the Malays are expected to have their part to play, since the Malay
.....the Malays are expected to have their part to play, since the Malay

...the department has been ... in the last twenty years. A strong ... education, for the British, like the ... in the year ... for the uneducated ... in the Chinese language....."

... in Malaya, are privately owned, and in
... and then very valuable, although this
... 1955...

[illegible]

..... The native standard of living is still exceedingly low if judged by Western standards, but economic conditions are so different that comparison is difficult. The economic situation in the densely overpopulated parts of India is that in that in the better cultivated and undeveloped regions like Madaya. Low as the standard of living is in Indian eyes they seem like an El Dorado to the Tamil or the Chinese. The surplus of labor is now ready to press into them, and as

the suppression of lawlessness and piracy
the continuous increase in the wealth of the country;
the development of social services;
the advance towards self-administration, despite the difficulties
of the "plural" character of the population.

100

They desire a maintenance of their position, for all have prospered and gained permanence. The newly introduced system of Government to continue for, when our divisions "at the top" is resumed, they will be provided with administrative positions, money and honour, for only Malays will be in such positions. The people of the small holdings of the fishing villages will miss their British services they provided, but they will not be greatly affected by the removal of the British. The Malays have shown little consciousness of their position in Malaya larger than their own State.

There is no reason to be satisfied with Malaya, for it offers no business opportunities to make money. With his money, he could return to his birthplace in China, there to make a fortune if he even the savings of a coolie, when translated into dollars, is sufficient to make him a rich man in his native land. He can also go to Hong Kong and bring up his family. His sons would be educated in England, provided by Government, and they would be able to travel to the Settlements, have dual nationality - Chinese and British - and then to travel without restriction or hindrance between Singapore and China.

interested in civic rights in the European sense.

...of Chiang Kai-shek, they will
...the surface. They will miss
...not allow them to send money to
...which is acceptable to them, they will be
...family is of extreme importance to the
...future glory of their family; any tampering
...disgrace. The official open and
...will continue to keep the Malayan
...in this they say be of great
...the winning the Japanese.

...the ... is the sole requirement of the Trade ... which also represent money. ... and a house; under the British system of ... increasing opportunities ... the prosperity of the community ... in Malaga and good ... the Bikhu, and if they wished to retire ... opportunities for further

The Eurasians.

The Eurasians in general want a position that places them above native labour and enables them to preserve their self-respect.

NOTE: EFFECTS OF JAPANESE OCCUPATION.

The Japanese policy will be to win co-operation but the local Japanese officials will be unwilling or unable to carry it out. The usual Japanese egoism, coupled with their inability to understand or gauge the reactions of others, will ensure their eventual unpopularity. The different sections of the population will react differently against the Japanese; all will object to Japanese prying and bustling methods. The Malays will object to physical exploitation, and to lowered wages; they will soon discover that Emperor Worship and Islam are poles apart. The Chinese will suffer from the competition of the ruthless Japanese small traders, the fallow in the wake of Japanese armies and who bully and blackmail under military cover; they will resent Japanese military currency and miss rice. They will resent propaganda by road checking, especially if the Chiang Kai-shek regime collapses. The Indians will resent being cut off from India, being unable to remit money to their families and will also miss their accustomed rice; they are the most likely to give up and to co-operate and may need outside stimulus to prevent this. There is already evidence to show that the Eurasians are the hardest hit of any section of the community in Malaya; they are not subject to Japanese humiliations as Asiatics, and it will be hard for them to "take it" as Europeans, though many undoubtedly will. A few may be induced to co-operate under pressure. Attempts should be made to bolster their self-esteem and to make them feel that they are a valued section of the community and that the United Nations count on their help. The Japanese will certainly make every effort to bring down the prestige of the whites; they will probably subject them to harsh and humiliating treatment and force them to live at very low native standards of living.

The recent formation in Tokyo of the Greater East Asia Ministry should give an advantage to our propaganda: it is to be run by a greedy army machine bent on immediate gains and prepared to stick at nothing to attain its ends. In fact the Japanese character, given time, is likely to excite greater animosity among the conquered people than we can expect to achieve even by the most active propaganda: the Japanese will assist largely in their own undoing.

WIRELESS BROADCASTS. CHANGING.

The Japanese broadcast from Tokyo to the whole of the Far East in every language, including Malayan. These broadcasts are monitored in New Delhi and the U.S.S.R.

In Malaya especially, Bangkok, Penang, Singapore, Saigon all broadcast in their own languages; the Singapore short-wave transmitter was put into service recently and gives constant service.

Radio is heard in Australia and makes a feature of messages of prisoners of war from the Axis.

Chinese broadcasts in Malay, Mandarin, English and Dutch.

Radio. The Germans use Liverpool for Malay broadcasts, while Rome and Berlin broadcast in Hindustani. The chief concern of the European end of the Axis is with the U.S.A. and East-China.

WIRELESS BROADCASTS. CONTINUED.

Our knowledge is based entirely on monitoring reports from New Delhi. Malay items come in at irregular intervals and do not extend beyond a few lines. Some are routine local announcements and others are straight items of world-news. The evidence for the whole period since the Japanese occupation, is obviously not sufficient in bulk to be in any sense representative. But in so far as this routine has reached us, it may be arranged under the following headings:-

-11-

_____ : (1) Administration: All posts open to all nations;

(2) Education: All schools, self-contained open to 'all
races and creeds.'

(3) Religion: All religions permitted. For example, British sailors
and other British troops.

_____ : (4) Religion: All religions permitted. Complete religious

freedom. (5) Economy: All other parts of the "Gandhian" system
applied to the economy; particularly Java.

_____ : (6) Economy: All other parts of the "Gandhian" system
applied to the economy; particularly Java.

_____ : (7) Economy: All other parts of the "Gandhian" system
applied to the economy; particularly Java.

_____ : (8) Economy: All other parts of the "Gandhian" system
applied to the economy; particularly Java.

_____ : (9) Economy: All other parts of the "Gandhian" system
applied to the economy; particularly Java. (Note:
the above is a summary of the "Gandhian" system, which
is a system of self-help and self-reliance. It is probable that similar material
will be found in the "Gandhian" system.)

JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN GENERAL POLICY OUTLINE FOR JAPAN
AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORY.

POLITICAL WARFARE (JAPAN) COMMITTEE

OVERSEAS PLANNING COMMITTEE
PACIFIC EAST SUB-COMMITTEE.

ACTION PLAN I

(To be followed until the issue of Action Plan 2)

ON BEHALF OF THE JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN GENERAL POLICY
OUTLINE FOR JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Rolls of green
to indicate the edges of
concrete field

Even No. rolls

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JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN GENERAL POLICY OUTLINE FOR
JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

ORIGINAL VERSION (JAN 42)
SECRET

25.XI.42.

VERBODEN PLENNING COMMITTEE
- F. L. EAST SUB-COMMITTEE -

1. ACTION PLAN NO. 1.

to be followed until the issue of Action Plan 2.)

JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN GENERAL POLICY OUTLINE FOR
JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose.

The Joint Anglo-American General Policy Outline for Japan and Japanese Occupied Territories is the basis of this document and the foundation for all subsequent action. The strategic situation together with the channels available dictate what action can be taken to implement the aims and objectives of the General Policy Outline. As the strategic situation develops and more channels become available, a greater variety of arguments may become appropriate.

It was therefore thought advisable to issue 'Basic Directives' stage by stage, rather than a complete plan involving frequent and misleading re-issuance. The first of such 'Basic Directives' was the paper 'Guidance for Action on Air War of the British and American Forces for a Limited War against Japan' (i.e. 'Guidance for Action on Air War of the Joint Anglo-American General Policy Outline for Japan and Japanese Occupied Territories').

Since the issue of that paper on June 30th, 1942, the strategic situation for us in Japan is concerned has not altered appreciably; there has been, however, some alteration of balance between Japanese capacity to attack us and our own.

This together with recent allied successes warrants the introduction of a new 'Basic Directive', and, to lend the document the authority of a plan this second edition of it is renamed "ACTION PLAN NO. 1"; it is to be followed until the issue of "Action Plan No. 2".

SECRET
F. L. EAST
SUB-COMMITTEE

The Joint Anglo-American General Policy Outline for Japan and Japanese Occupied Territories stands as follows: "To weaken the functioning of the Japanese war machine - military, economic, political and psychological - wherever and however we can attack them".

It is desirable to use all the arguments at our disposal at one time, irrespective of the strategic and psychological background.

(a) It is important to fix a basic idea in the minds of the Japanese to whom we are doing propaganda, so that they may relate the later stages of our campaign to this basic idea.

(b) The present moment, when the Japanese public is still elated by successes, is not the time to indulge in complex and subtle arguments which might at a later stage prove extremely effective.

At any time, the channels of propaganda are at the present stage extremely limited, and we should therefore concentrate our propaganda material so that it will have the greatest possible effect in the circumstances.

R 1739
7

-2-

- III. It is therefore suggested that at this stage we should confine ourselves to implanting in the Japanese mind a simple basic idea: THE JAPANESE CANNOT WIN, so that as our propaganda develops it may be related by them to this theme.

DIRECTIVE.

Action. The following points are to be considered as a basic directive for this stage:-

I. ATTEMPT TO BRING THE TRUTH OF THE JAPANESE IN THEIR GOVERNMENT SHOWING THE IMPERIAL AND SHORTSIGHTED NATURE OF JAPANESE LEADERSHIP.

- (a) Japanese methods of starting the war, irrespective of their dishonourable nature, do not pay: stress that some Japanese are beginning to realise this.
- (b) Show that the Japanese failed in their attempt to get away with a short war, on which they staked everything; they are now faced with the prospect of a long war they cannot win.
- (c) Japanese statesmen having made the erroneous decision to attack Britain should have done so in 1940 after the fall of France; even given the unfair advantage they derived from the treacherous method of attack, 1941 was too late; to attack the United States as well was added folly.
- (d) The enduring of physical hardships is a national characteristic of the Japanese, but no amount of endurance will avail against disguised statesmanship and bad leadership.
- (e) Japanese leaders dare not tell their public the extent of Japanese defeats; now admissions on this score in the Japanese mind.
- (f) The Japanese Government (like the German Government) was contemptible Allied air power and potential.

II. BRING HOME TO THE JAPANESE THE FACTS THAT THEY ARE BEING DEFEATED BY ALLIES.

- (a) The Japanese cannot win friends in any circumstances; they do not know the game of give and take.
- (b) The policy of a great conquering people is that they make friends with the people they conquer; the Japanese have never been able to do this, therefore they will never make permanent conquests or run others effectively.
- (c) The Japanese inspire such hatred that they must hold down others by brute force, and brute force can only be a temporary expedient.

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III. STRESS THE EXCELLENCE OF BRITISH MORALE.

- (a) Stress that the British realised in the past that the extended nature of their fronts would prevent them from achieving sufficient strength at every point in the preliminary stages of the war, and therefore that to achieve the main strategic aim tactical reverses had to be accepted.
- (b) The characteristics of the British civilian population are such that the tactical defeat of their armed forces has spurred them on to greater efforts for an ultimate strategic victory - e.g. the Battle of Britain.
- (c) For three years the British had to fight, building up war production with the left hand and parrying the enemy with the right; now with added American help they are more sure of victory than ever.
- (d) Stress the solidarity that exists between the component parts of the British Empire; it is symbolised in their loyalty to the Throne.
- (e) Show that initial British weakness was due to a mistaken confidence in the international decency of those whom she is now fighting, and not to a desire to evade sacrifices and substitute diplomatic manoeuvring.
- (f) State where appropriate that Britain is willing to take risks, that she jeopardised her safety with her eyes open, since she was convinced - until her enemies showed her her mistake - that her existence and wellbeing were best attained through co-operation with the rest of the world.
- (g) Ascribe British successes to the hard work of a virile and self-disciplined people faced by danger, rather than to the virtue of democracy.

The following points are to be considered as guidance in the presentation of day-to-day news:-

I. PRESENTATION OF GOOD NEWS.

- (a) The facts should be reiterated simply and without exaggeration.
- (b) On no account should a minor or local success be presented as an event likely to win the war or one that has caused "the tide to turn" etc.
- (c) Major strategic successes should be exploited to the limit of instructions.
- (d) Having put across good news accurately and repeatedly, pick upon and ridicule Japanese distortions of the facts.

II. TREATMENT OF BAD NEWS.

- (a) Present reverses factually and with dignity; do not try to explain away by references to terrain, weather, etc.
- (b) Avoid obvious attempts to distract attention from bad news by calling attention to trivial events.
- (c) Avoid answering back; even bad news, unless it is continuous, loses its news value after a time. Careful judgment is required to select a suitable moment for counter attack, which should aim at an enemy weakness, and not be related to our own reverse.

III. REVERBERATIONS OF THE WAR IN JAPAN.

- (a) In all news concerning the Japanese war take every opportunity to stress the danger of operations conducted at long distances from Japanese bases.
- (b) Pose the question: can the Japanese navy continue both to suffer losses at the present rate and conduct operations over long distances?
- (c) The war at sea insofar as Japan is NOT involved is only likely to attract Japanese attention when it is spectacular (e.g. Africa: a long range 'Blitz' carried by our navy).

IV. TREATMENT OF THE WAR IN THE AIR.

- (a) Indicate the importance of Allied air superiority not only in Europe but on more distant fronts; suggest to the Japanese that the full weight of the Allied air arm will some day be in action against them.
- (b) Use the Battle of Egypt to show the value of air superiority.

V. TREATMENT OF THE LAND WAR.

- (a) Successes in the land war should be quoted soberly as an example of what we can do.
- (b) Concentrate on the training and equipment of our new armies to suggest that the Japanese will meet something far tougher and more formidable than anything they have seen before.

VI. THE STATE OF JAPAN.

- (a) Never over a machine formula of future production, and concentrate on what is being produced now.
- (b) Present where possible the magnitude of Allied production capacity as compared to that of Japan, in order to induce the idea that, whatever her efforts, Japan cannot win the long-run contest.
- (c) Exact quantity of production, not costs.

VII. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION.

- (a) Consider Shinto the resurrection for political ends of the primitive tribal cult of Japan; stress its primitive and tribal aspects. Use Appendix I., "The Invention of 'Imperial Religion', to Chamberlain's 'Things Japanese'."
- (b) State that the rulers of Japan have in the past four decades deliberately whipped up a moribund cult, incapable of satisfying the higher aspirations or thoughts of any decent people, for aggressive reasons; everything possible has been done to equate Imperialism, Shinto and national glory in the Japanese popular mind.
- (c) Stress in every occasion the Tribalism theme, pointing out the Japanese conception of themselves as a Horrenvolk nation. It is impossible for them to rule others with success; this goes with German views and consequent troubles in Europe.
- (d) Stress that under the State Shinto system (as under the old system) higher religions are only tolerated as long as they toe the line - they are permissible as long as they do not interfere with Shinto which is the national backbone of life.
- (e) Acknowledgment of the person of the Emperor, though serious discussion of his position relative to the state ideology is permissible.

VIII. DEPARTMENT OF JAPANESE STUDIES.

- (a) Never use the Japanese phrase "Co-Prosperity Sphere" as a proper label expression; refer to occupied territories by name, and to the "Puppet Governments" of Manchuria, occupied China and Siam. In any, of course, be used tentatively.
- (b) Never use the expression "Manchukuo"; call it Manchuria in English, the "Three Eastern Provinces" to Chinese speakers, and "Manchu" in Japanese.
- (c) "Hoko Tokei" is a stupid Japanese slogan of very recent origin. (The latest phrase was taken from the Hingyi - book of chronicles of the Japanese race). While the phrase is that it is "all the world living as one family and as one (Japanese) race", it is actually a slogan of racial discrimination by Japan, and should reportedly be avoided.

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- (1) "Koko" (the son of the emperor) is a slogan invented by the Japanese to give philo-sophic justification for their aggression. Explain it as such. (For the benefit of those dealing with China, Koko = Chinese Kung-tao = Confucius; Koko = Chinese, Kung-tao = with which, it has no real points of resemblance; those with sufficient education should bring out repeatedly the futility of Koko by contrast with the Confucian principle.)

II. PROPAGANDA PRINCIPLES.

Don't play up atrocities, unless instructed to do so from above. When instructed to do so, be guided by regional propaganda needs, but stress retribution rather than the atrocities themselves.

All propaganda is of permanent application at this stage, except where provided in pursuit of Aim 1.

- I. Always attempt to induce in the Japanese a feeling of self-pity; agree with them in their plight (e.g. that they are fighting in 1941 and not in 1940, etc.)
- II. Don't play up (superstition, credulity, etc.)
- III. Be liberating, but don't play up self-laceration, which is not the aim of the propaganda.
- IV. Don't play up propaganda functions; let them have their heads.
- V. Don't play up propaganda at this stage.
- VI. Don't play up the reality of Japanese equipment at this stage.

ANNEX I
TO
ACTION PLAN I

IN REPLY OF THE JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN GENERAL
POLICY OUTLINE FOR JAPANESE AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

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late in edges of
very fine*

Even Mr. rolls

1/2 up to 15 @ f.6.3

... for the balance of those who do not know the
... the use of British officials at home and abroad,
... to handle or comment on news matter

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

FORN AFFAIRS DIVISION.

Control of News from and about Japan.

1. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA.

Control of News.

- 1. News from Japan is strictly controlled.
- 2. News from Japanese, Axis or neutral sources is therefore meaningless.
- 3. Japanese newspapers are obliged to pass their messages to their papers through Japanese sources, local or local Japanese officials, which are in transit, while in Japan there is censorship.
- 4. Therefore all news from Japanese sources is tainted and distorted, such, whether put out by Japanese sources (Domei) or by Axis or neutral sources.
- 5. All news from Japanese sources is related to certain basic points which are set forth below.

Propaganda Themes.

- 1. The Japanese propaganda is the delusion (artificial) that Japan has a mission to rule the world, and that it is divinely created and led to that end.
- 2. The Japanese propaganda is in language understandable to the masses, and is designed to present their actions as necessary for their "great security."
- 3. The Japanese propaganda is designed to implant in the foreign mind by means of a certain line, intention to lead a respectable life, and to weaken resistance.
- 4. The Japanese propaganda is accepted and reported by others, in a way which is not correct.
- 5. The Japanese propaganda is therefore to be interpreted correctly, without any bias, of these slogans. Every effort must be made to remove the "slogan content" from each news item, as set forth in the list below.

CONFIDENTIAL.

NOT TO BE QUOTED.

This document is for the guidance of those who do not know the Japanese at first hand.

It is designed for the use of British officials at home and abroad, and of all publicists called upon to handle or comment on news matter from or about Japan.

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION.

FOREIGN DIVISION.

Confidential Guidance. Treatment of News from and about Japan.

I. JAPANESE PROPAGANDA.

A. Japanese Control of News.

1. All news coming to and issued from Japan is strictly controlled, whether it emanates from Japanese, Axis or neutral sources. Even neutral datelines are therefore meaningless.
2. News agents abroad of Japanese newspapers are obliged to transmit their messages to their papers through Japanese official sources, Dantai or local Japanese officials, which alter them at will in transit, while in Japan there is further censorship.
3. Therefore all news from Japanese sources is tainted and should be treated as such, whether put out by Japanese official sources (Dantai) or by Axis or neutral sources.
4. All news from Japanese sources is related to certain basic Japanese propaganda themes set forth below.

B. Japanese Propaganda Themes.

1. The justification of Japanese aggression is the delusion (artificially induced) that the Japanese race has a mission to rule the world, and that it is divinely created and led to that end.
2. In order to reach the above in language understandable to others, Japanese militarists represent their actions as necessary to achieve "strategic security."
3. To assist in attaining the above end, Japanese propaganda has for years aimed at implanting in the foreign mind by means of slogans certain ideas destined to lend a respectable air to Japanese aggressive intentions and to weaken resistance by others.
4. Once these slogans have been accepted and reported by others, news items put out by official Japanese sources are angled in relation to them.
5. So Japanese news can therefore be interpreted correctly without some awareness of these slogans. Every effort must be made to remove the 'slogan content' from each news item before quotation (see II A below).

- 2 -

8. The slogans which colour all Japanese news divide themselves into two parts:- (a) those concerning the origins of the war in the Pacific and which constitute the Japanese 'case', and (b) those concerning the aims and objects of Japan in this war.

(a) Slogans giving the Japanese case for starting the war and Japanese attempts at building up the role of protector of Asia and those most usually directed by the Japanese against Europe and America; they ought by now to have been discredited, but they still seem to be believed and echoed by allied sources. An excellent example of this is "Bushido", now generally accepted as the traditional Japanese code of chivalry. The very word appeared in no dictionary, Japanese or otherwise, before the year 1900; as an institution or code of rules it has never existed! Other examples are:-

i. The over-population myth. Pressure of population within the Japanese islands was such that the Japanese had to expand; Japanese lebensraum, etc.....

ii. The emigration myth. Pressure of population forced the Japanese to migrate; no other nation could have them, therefore something had to be done about it.....

iii. The military encirclement myth. Britain and America were trying to encircle Japan by a ring of naval bases.....

iv. The economic encirclement myth. Japan could not get access to raw materials, nor could she sell her finished goods; Britain and America raised tariff barriers against Japanese goods.....

v. The plutocracy myth. Plutocracy and the Jews try to ruin the world; the Jews run democracy.....

vi. The Solidarity of the Axis myth. Japan is in a firm agreement with her European allies, and aims to erect a new order in East Asia similar to the Nazi new order in Europe.....

vii. The Virility myth. The Japanese and the Germans are virile, the democracies decadent.....

viii. The Link between East and West myth. Japan and all oriental nations has mastered Western civilization and conserved Eastern wisdom. She is therefore the natural stabilising factor in (East) Asia.....

ix. The Pro-Christian myth. Japan is not anti-Christian, viz. her excellent relations with the Catholic Church.....

slogans concerning the aims and objects of Japan in this war are more dangerous than the above, and are those addressed more usually to Asiatics. They are:-

- i. The Asia for the Asiatics, down with Western Oppression, myth.
- ii. The Co-Prosperity Sphere and Greater (East) Asia myth. This is a corollary of the above, which it completes with economic arguments. Let (East) Asia be self-supporting, let it run itself and not be exploited by the West.
- iii. The 'Modern Japan' myth. Japan has acquired the techniques of the West; she has beaten the West at its own game; she will now use her acquired knowledge, harnessed to her superior Asiatic views on life, for the benefit of Asiatics.
- iv. The Respect for Asiatic Culture myth. Japan has the greatest respect for the ancient civilisations of Asia; she alone has kept alive Asiatic civilisation; the others have all been vitiated by contact with the West. Japan will lead them back to their former paths and restore them to their former glory.
- v. The Religious myth. Japan shares religions with China and India; she reveres Confucius and the ancient sages of China; she practises Buddhism, which is itself an offshoot of Hinduism. She reveres Islam.
- vi. The Way of the Emperor myth. Kodo, the Way of the Emperor, is the Way of Japan and the true Way for Asiatics.
- vii. The Hakko Ichiu myth. Hakko Ichiu, all the world under one roof, is the correct principle for all Asiatics; it stands for the intuitive, emotional view of life, as opposed to the heartless, legalistic attitude of the West.
- viii. The Cultural myth. While the West exploited the East, Japan brings cultural blessings. Japan is 'spiritual', the West is 'material'; Japan is interested in ends, the West only in means.
- ix. The Antique Virtues myth. Japan stands for the family system and the antique virtues as against the family destroying individualism of the West.

II. TREATMENT OF JAPANESE PROPAGANDA.

A. ~~General~~ Introduction.

1. This following book is generally undesirable, exposure of the Japanese intention in presenting news in a certain way will serve to destroy the not inconsiderable value Japanese slogans have.
2. The following are not intended as direct answers to the Japanese slogans tabulated above, but rather as lines of thought which should be in the minds of those handling material from all over Japan.

(c) Slogans giving the Japanese case for starting the war:-

i. The over-population myth. The population of Japan was not great enough to cause the Japanese to populate fully their own Northern Island (Hokkaido); further, they have never willingly migrated to Manchuria, but only when forced by semi-military methods. As with Germany and Italy, the campaign to raise the birthrate in Japan gives the case away.

ii. The emigration myth. The Japanese do not like leaving Japan, and migrate only to countries where they can undercut others who have a higher standard of living (e.g. California and South America). They made themselves so unpopular by their personal habits and behaviour, and by the fact that their Government for political reasons enabled them to do competition to an uneconomic level, that the countries to which they migrated had to protect themselves against them.

iii. The military encirclement myth. Had the Japanese not clearly revealed their aggressive intentions, Britain and America would not have been obliged to take defensive precautions. British and American bases were not equipped for an offensive against Japan.

iv. The economic encirclement myth. Japan could get all the raw materials she wanted so long as she used them for pacific purposes (viz. cotton, wool, etc.). When her imports were patently for aggressive ends, and when her aggression extended to Indo-China, Britain and America were finally forced to protect themselves by withholding supplies destined to be used against them.

v. The plutocracy myth. This they have merely copied from Germany; It should be countered as such. It has no real meaning for the Japanese.

vi. The Solidarity of the Axis myth. Were the Axis to win the war, the German and Japanese robbers would be bound to fall out over the spoils.

vii. The Virility myth. Quote instances of British offensive spirit.

viii. The link between East and West myth. A Japanese statesman said of the Japanese that they are unable to think like Westerners and have ceased to think like Japanese. They understand neither East nor West except superficially. They have never produced a thinker of note; they do not really understand, nor have they ever lived up to, the philosophy of China, nor have they mastered the metaphysical speculations of India. Craftsmanship and mechanical technique alone they have acquired from China and the West respectively. The Chinese on the other hand really do understand the subtleties of Western thought. As a "stabilizing factor" in (East) Asia, Japan has a) caused 3 wars in 50 years; b) deliberately fomented civil war in China; c) introduced the sale and smuggling of opium and other drugs; d) caused complete economic disruption in the countries she has occupied; and e) invented the modern technique of "undeclared war", the Japanese for which is "incident" (e.g. Port Arthur, 1904; Pearl Harbour is in the tradition).

ix. The Pre-Christian myth. Far from being pro-Christian, the Japanese only tolerate any religion for political reasons and as long as it does not interfere with their own tribal cult of Shinto.

(b) Slogans concerning the aims and objects of Japan in this war.

i. The Asia for the Asiatics myth means "Asia for the Japanese". The behaviour of the Japanese to the Chinese and to their own colonial populations shows how insincere is their profession of regard for Asiatics. Their tribal outlook makes them the least tolerant of masters.

ii. The Co-Prosperity Sphere myth. The economic control by the Japanese of large areas in Eastern Asia may well be of some benefit to Japan for war purposes, but for the inhabitants of these areas it must entail a disastrous lowering of standards of living resulting from the loss of the British and American markets essential to them.

iii. The "Modern Japan myth." Japan has acquired only a veneer of modernity. She can copy the gadgets, but the real meaning of what she copies remains foreign to her.

iv. The Respect for Asiatic culture myth. See how the Japanese respect the culture of China. They have systematically closed all schools and universities in all the territory they have occupied. They set out deliberately to destroy the culture of others and to impose their own.

v. The Religious myth. The Japanese use all religions for political ends; in their own country they tolerate nothing that is not subservient to Shinto. (see Appendix T. Invention of a New Religion).

vi. The Way of the Emperor myth. This is a slogan invented by the Japanese militarists to give philosophic justification for military aggression, because of the resemblance of the term to the Kingly Way of Confucius.

vii. The Hakko Ichiu myth. This stupid phrase means: "All the world living as one family under one (Japanese) roof" - in which family the Japanese would treat all others as poor relations! It is a slogan of world domination by Japan, and should repeatedly be exposed as such.


viii. The Cultural myth. See iv above. Far from being spiritual, no nation is more material than the Japanese. They have no conception of universal moral values. They are interested only in the gain of their own tribe, and are bound by a narrow tribal outlook long since discarded by others.

ix. The anti-virtues myth. Far from being the mainstay of anti-virtues, the Japanese have set out to undermine and destroy them in all the territories they have conquered. See the behaviour of the officers and men of the Japanese army whom they are exploiting occupied territories for their personal financial benefit.

- 6 -

3. Cautionary Tailpieces.

1. Don't accept Japanese news at its face value, from whatever Japanese, enemy or neutral source it may come.
2. Don't repeat Japanese news as though it were true; always treat it in inverted commas.
3. Whenever possible, separate the 'slogan content' from the news item, and explain the 'slogan content' in order to discredit it.
4. Don't mis-spell Japanese names; if you cannot verify them, omit them.
5. Lay off the Emperor at the present stage.
6. Don't repeat Japanese stories about the Chinese; the Japanese trade on Western ignorance of China by announcing, for instance, the defection of some General from Chungking, when as likely as not the General is of no significance, and never had dealings with Chungking. Such news items are cheerfully repeated by Allied sources with no good result.
7. Don't play up atrocities unless given the lead officially by London. When given the lead, treat them according to regional requirements and stress retribution rather than the atrocities themselves.
8. Don't answer back.
9. Always expose the real Japanese intention (see I. B., 1, above).



SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

7999-

August 21, 1942

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan
From: Edmund L. Taylor

I am attaching two of three copies of
the Joint Anglo-American Psychological Warfare
Plan against Japan which David Bowes-Lyon has
sent me. This is the original joint plan as
worked out last spring, not a revision.

COPY NO.

17MAY, 1942.SECRET

JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN OUTLINE PLAN
FOR JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

The aims of political warfare against Japan are:-

1. To weaken the foundations of the Japanese war machine, military, economic, political and psychological - wherever and however we can attack them.
2. To encourage continued resistance in all territories occupied or threatened by Japan.
3. To decrease co-operation and increase friction between Germany and Japan.

Objectives: (Military) to Aim 1.

- A. To depress and confuse Japanese armed forces wherever they are, and to create friction between Army and Navy, different loyalties, different armies, different cliques and different ranks.
- B. To maintain, stimulate and direct passive and active resistance on the part of our Allies, occupied people and irregular forces at suitable times.
- C. To encourage and assist agitation and revolt in Korea, Manchuria and parts of Japanese Empire.
- D. To create conditions real or feigned which will force the Japanese to maintain and increase the present dispersed condition of their forces. Note. This objective can only be pursued as and when directed by military authorities.
- E. To create conditions real or feigned which will increase administrative strain on occupying forces.

Note. To objectives B and C: timing method and division of and responsibility for such operations are to be decided by continuing consultation.

Objectives: (Economic) to Aim 1.

- A. To increase difficulties of exploitation, by Japan of resources acquired by conquest.
- B. To increase the strain on Japan's external and internal communications and transportation.
- C. To increase losses from hoarding, dispersion and wastage of Japan's resources.
- D. To reduce production in and for Japan.
- E. To discourage non-Japanese workers from going to or working for Japan.

2.

F. To confuse and depress Japanese monetary and credit system at home and in occupied countries.

G. To hamper or destroy Japan's economic relations with her allies and neutrals (e.g. Latin America).

H. To provoke or exploit commercial rivalry between Germany, Italy and Japan in the Far East.

2. Objectives: (Political) to AIM 1.

Important to decide, while no disagreement on matters of principle is foreseen in this group of objectives, they have to be handled in joint consultation so as to avoid taking conflicting lines. On the other hand any such divergences may sometimes be desirable.

A. To create amongst the people of Japan a feeling of distrust of their present regime by calling attention to its usurpation of power and its departure from "Imperial W. y".

B. To create fanatical opposition by individuals and by secret groups.

Note to A. and B.: this theme is as delicate as it is important and requires very careful handling by methods to be determined in advance. All attacks upon the Imperial family must be avoided.

C. To create divisions and conflicts amongst the ruling classes and different types and grades of legislative, administrative and police bodies, and within the regime in general.

D. To create similar conditions between Central and local Governments in Japan, her possessions and occupied territories.

E. To create similar conditions within each local Government; or alternatively, to consolidate and strengthen it when by so doing we will further the objective D.

F. To align popular economic and military power behind divisions aimed at in objectives C, D, and E.

G. To enlist other Allies and help remainder against Japan.

H. To hamper or destroy Japan's political relations with her allies and neutrals (e.g. Latin America).

I. To increase the burden on administrative machinery at home and abroad.

3. Objectives: (Psychological) to AIM 1.

A. To create general dependency and even terror.

B. To create doubt about principles which guide and sustain Japan (see Political objectives A. and note to it).

C. To create doubt and fears about the future.

/ Objective:

- 3 -

Objectives to Aim 2.

(a) With specific reference to China: important: the following objectives in their present form must be modified in discussions with China.

A. To reassure China of continued and substantial aid by all possible routes. This, with due consideration for Soviet relations with Japan, should stress Russia's importance as a member of united nations and as a supply route to China.

B. To convince the Chinese of the certainty of victory of united nations.

C. To convince Chinese that Japan will be defeated within a reasonable time.

D. To convince Chinese that a compromise with Japan would be disastrous to China and that British and Allies on their part will never compromise.

E. To convince the Chinese that Britain and America realize as well as they do the menace of Japan.

F. To give immediate and practical evidence of British and American recognition of proper status of China and of her fullest equality as an Ally.

Note: This raises such high political issues as:

Abolition of extra-territoriality, the Chinese exclusion act in the United States and similar legislation in British Dominions, and more immediately, the treatment of Chinese nationals in our respective countries. Proper consultations within and between the two Governments must precede any implementation of F. The urgency for some implementation to F. is obvious.

G. To convince the Chinese people that Britain and America recognize the military achievements of China.

Objectives: 12 Aim 2.

(a) Referring to occupied peoples of Asia in general:

A. To explain Japanese tribalism as a force which rules out interests of any other people.

B. To explain shintoism and show how greatly at variance it is with religious practices in other parts of the Far East.

C. To instruct occupied peoples in the best techniques of resistance, sabotage and revolt and to prepare them to revolt at the proper time in conjunction with an Allied military offensive.

D. To convince occupied peoples that Japan will be decisively defeated within a reasonable time.

/ Objectives

- 4 -

Objectives: to Aim 3.

- A. By keeping to the fore and making tangible present and eventual conflict of interests between Japan and Germany.
- B. By creating conflict and friction over opposing racial theories and ideologies of the two peoples.
- C. By stressing all evidence of German intentions to sell-out Japan.

SECRET

JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN OUTLINE PLAN
FOR JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

The aims of political warfare against Japan are:-

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- C. To encourage and assist agitation and revolt in Korea, Manchuria and parts of Japanese Empire.
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- E. To create conditions real or feigned which will increase administrative strain on occupying forces.

Note. To Objectives B and C: timing method and division of and responsibility for such operations are to be decided by continuing consultations.

Objectives: (Economic) to Aim 1.

- A. To increase difficulties of exploitation, by Japan of resources acquired by conquest.
- B. To increase the strain on Japan's external and internal communications and transportation.
- C. To increase consumption hoarding, dispersion and wastage of Japan's resources.
- D. To reduce production in and for Japan.
- E. To discourage non-Japanese workers from going to or working for Japan.

/ 7.

F. To confuse and depress Japanese monetary and credit system at home and in occupied countries.

G. To hamper or destroy Japan's economic relations with her allies and neutrals (e.g. Latin America).

H. To provoke or exploit commercial rivalry between Germany, Italy and Japan in the Far East.

2. Objectives: (Political) to Aim 1.

Important to decide, while no disagreement on matters of principle is foreseen in this group of objectives, they have to be handled in joint consultation so as to avoid taking conflicting lines. On the other hand any such divergencies may sometimes be desirable.

A. To create amongst the people of Japan a feeling of distrust of their present regime by calling attention to its usurpation of power and its departure from "Imperial Way".

B. To create fanatical opposition by individuals and by secret groups.

Note to A. and B.: this theme is as delicate as it is important and requires very careful handling by methods to be determined in advance. All attacks upon the Imperial family must be avoided.

C. To create divisions and conflicts amongst the ruling classes and different types and grades of legislative, administrative and police bodies, and within the regime in general.

D. To create similar conditions between Central and local Governments in Japan, her possessions and occupied territories.

E. To create similar conditions within each local Government; or alternatively, to consolidate and strengthen it when by so doing we will further the objective D.

F. To align popular economic and military power behind divisions aimed at in objectives C, D, and E.

G. To enlist other Allies and help remainder against Japan.

H. To hamper or destroy Japan's political relations with her allies and neutrals (e.g. Latin America).

I. To increase the burden on administrative machinery at home and abroad.

Objectives: (Psychological) to Aim 1.

A. To create general despondency and even terror.

B. To create doubt about principles which guide and sustain Japan (see Political objectives A. and note to it).

C. To create doubt and fears about the future.

/ Objectives:

- 5 -

Objectives to...in 2.

(a) With specific reference to China: important: the following objectives in their present form must be modified in discussions with China.

A. To reassure China of continued and substantial aid by all possible routes. This, with due consideration for Soviet relations with Japan, should stress Russia's importance as a member of United Nations and as a supply route to China.

B. To convince the Chinese of the certainty of victory of United Nations.

C. To convince Chinese that Japan will be defeated within a reasonable time.

D. To convince Chinese that a compromise with Japan would be disastrous to China and that British and Allies on their part will never compromise.

E. To convince the Chinese that Britain and America realize as well as they do the menace of Japan.

F. To give immediate and practical evidence of British and American recognition of proper status of China and of her fullest equality as an Ally.

Note: This raises such high political issues as:

Abolition of extra-territoriality, the Chinese exclusion act in the United States and similar legislation in British Dominions, and more immediately, the treatment of Chinese nationals in our respective countries. Proper consultations within and between the two Governments must precede any implementation of F. The urgency for some implementation to F. is obvious.

G. To convince the Chinese people that Britain and America recognize the military achievements of China.

Objectives: Main 2.

(b) Referring to occupied peoples of Asia in general:

A. To explain Japanese tribalism as a force which rules out interests of any other people.

B. To explain shintoism and show how greatly at variance it is with religious practices in other parts of the Far East.

C. To instruct occupied peoples in the best techniques of resistance, sabotage and revolt and to prepare them to revolt at the proper time in conjunction with an Allied military offensive.

D. To convince occupied peoples that Japan will be decisively defeated within a reasonable time.

/ Objectives

- 4 -

Objectives: to Aim 3.

- A. By keeping to the fore and making tangible present and eventual conflict of interests between Japan and Germany.
- B. By creating conflict and friction over opposing racial theories and ideologies of the two peoples.
- C. By stressing all evidence of German intentions to sell-out Japan.

x Education
x Barrows
x California

August 19, 1942

Mr. David Prescott Barrows,
Office of Strategic Services,
San Francisco, California.

My dear Mr. Barrows:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter of
August 13, together with the enclosed memorandum. Thank
you for sending this material to me.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

August

Colonel William J. Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
25th & E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Donovan:

I think I should apprise you of a research undertaking on the evacuation and resettlement of Japanese of this west coast. The investigation is being made by a faculty group of the University of California and is being financed by an original grant from the Rockefeller Foundation and other sources of aid. It is under the direction of Dr. Dorothy Swayne Thomas, wife of Professor Thomas of the University of Chicago, now retired.

The enclosed memorandum was prepared at my request by Mr. Martin Grodzins, and describes the effort briefly and well.

Sincerely yours,

David Prescott Barrows

DPB:HP
Encl.

////////////////////
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

July 30, 1942

Honorable Sumner Welles
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Welles:

Thank you very much for your letter of July 27,
enclosing a number of memoranda on subjects relating
to Japan. This is very useful material for our psy-
chological warfare work and I appreciate your making
it available to us.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

✓
Material sent to Ed Taylor.

KEY-

A. Bonin Islands X *Japan*

B. Chichijima X "

C. Goo X "

D. SSE X "

E. Port Lloyd X "

~~A. Date Grand Canyon~~

Outside edges of green
dots indicate the edges of
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A STUDY

of

A Project to Seize the A as a Base for the
Air Assault of the Japanese Mainland.

(Bonin Islands
Base
Air Assault)

I. MISSION. (a) To seize the island of B in the A group and establish there an air base, thoroughly protected by fighter aviation and anti-aircraft installations, whereby the mainland of Japan will be within range of medium and heavy U. S. bombers.

(b) To draw into combat and destroy the Japanese Navy.

II. THE SITUATION AND POSSIBLE LINES OF ACTION.

(a) Considerations Affecting Our Lines of Action.

(1) The Japanese successes to date have caused the loss or evacuation of all air bases within air bombardment range of Japanese nerve centers. While it is realized that air bombardment will not of itself win this war, positive offensive action must be initiated, not only to create damage to Japan proper, but also to draw Japanese forces into contact with ours and destroy them.

(2) Offensive action may be initiated in the Netherlands East Indies area using Australia as a base, recovering lost territory, using re-captured islands as stepping stones. This also requires considerable time for execution and involves long lines of communication subject to interdiction by enemy forces operating from Japanese mandated islands lying across or near lines of communication.

(3) Similar offensive action may be launched against the enemy, starting at the Marshall Islands and operating westwardly through the Japanese mandated islands. This plan also will require excessive time for execution.

(4) The enemy may be attacked via the Aleutian Islands, assaulting the Japanese mainland directly from a base at Dutch Harbor or from bases on the Kamchatka Peninsula. This latter alternative requires or will precipitate a war between Japan and Russia which would place an additional burden on Russia now heavily involved on the German front. As to a direct assault via the Aleutians, the weather in this area permits flying operations but two months out of a year.

SECRET

(5) Plans listed in Pars. 2, 3, and 4 are not to be discarded but priority should be given to a plan which will in the shortest possible time carry the war to the Japanese mainland and at the same time draw air and naval forces into contact with ours whereby they may be destroyed.

(6) The most profitable plan is to seize a base within shorter range of the industrial center of Japan, the lines of communication to which are not subject to air interdiction by land-based air. The approach of an expedition to such a base will undoubtedly be detected and will draw the main naval forces of Japan into contact with our own.

(7) The island of E of the A group fits the requirements of Par. 5 above. It is the most developed of the A group of volcanic islands lying 6 miles N of Tokio. The terrain is extremely rugged and rough according to information presently at hand. At E on the western coast, there is indicated a naval base, a seaplane anchorage and a land air base constructed along the eastern shore of the harbor, of piling and hydraulic cranes. This airbase is reported to be 1500' x 5000', the long axis N-S. The rugged terrain of the A group indicates the unlikelihood of any air bases except on E. There is indicated a road net around the harbor of E. The island of E is approximately 3 x 5 miles in size, the long axis N-S. The necessity of accurate information requires immediate aerial reconnaissance of these islands and a revision of this estimate based on information thereby attained. Such reconnaissance flight will be made from Dutch Harbor, will pass over the Japanese Mainland dropping a small bomb load as a counter intelligence measure, escaping towards the A, and map- ping then en route to Midway Island. This flight is 5,000 miles and can be accomplished by a B-24, specially equipped.

(b) (1) The basic line of action contemplates a balanced task force of air, ground and sea elements, strongly protected by air and naval components en route to the objective.

(2) The transport and cargo section of the expedition will be outfitted and loaded on the Pacific Coast of the U.S.A. It will rendezvous with the naval escort at Pearl Harbor. The entire expedition will re-fuel at Midway Island for the final approach to the objective which will then be 2150 miles distant.

(3) The naval escort will be an air and surface balanced force of sufficient strength to meet and defeat any Japanese naval force that can be brought against it.

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(4) Army Air Forces will consist of 25 fighter squadrons carried on 25 cargo ships fitted with flying off decks, sloping forward to assist the take-off. Each cargo ship, so used, will carry a complete squadron including enlisted personnel, aircraft, and supplies of all classes. Pilots and aircraft of each squadron will be dispersed among the 25 cargo vessels so that aircraft of each fighter squadron may take off simultaneously. The naval aviation force will consist of a balanced force of carrier-based aviation and sufficient patrol boats to provide reconnaissance during the approach and to transport the paratroops during the landing operations.

(5) Ground force strength will be based on a G-2 estimate of enemy strength. Generally, it will consist of paratroops and a landing force, U.S.M.C., aviation engineer, anti-aircraft, medical, signal and ordnance units, U.S.A.

(c) Detailed Line of Action.

(1) The force will proceed from Midway to a debarking point on the east coast of B opposite E and will effect a landing on the east coast which will be completed by dawn on D day. The force will capture the island defenses.

(2) A portion of the unloaded cargo vessels and transports, supported by a naval force will appear off E at dawn to present the threat of a landing and to attack and reduce the defenses of E.

(3) Timed to arrive over the air base at E at dawn, three army fighter squadrons will be launched from carrying cargo ships and will attack the airbase with bombs and machine gun fire, starting enemy aviation to the ground and destroying it.

(4) At dawn, plus 1 hour, paratroops will be dropped from heavy patrol boats on the air base, seizing it and clearing the landing area for landing the fighter squadrons at the end of their mission. The patrol boats will be flown to the debarkation point near-stop from Midway and will arrive at dawn. One hour is allowed for loading paratroops.

(5) The fighter squadron carrying cargo vessels will stand by prepared to launch additional fighter squadrons as the circumstances may require. Carrier based fighters will set up a fighter umbrella over the operation and naval air patrol boats will furnish reconnaissance over an area within a circle of 50 miles radius of E.

-3-

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... The ... of the ... and the air base have ... the six ... will be landed at ... An Army fighter squadron will be landed at ... maintained continuously in air alert over E ... with two additional squadrons on ... will be continuous.

...thereafter be forced in
...the Japanese mainland will be con-

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

(1) It must be assumed that, through fifth column sources operating in the Philippines, the enemy will learn of the attack on the Japanese base at Pearl Harbor.

(c) The execution of the expedition with naval forces, air force and amphibious, during the approach to the objective.

...the expedition comes

... the attack on expedition during the landing opera-
... directly directed on the ground, with air, surface
... the force.

(3) Air can continuously attack the air base at F after the base is affected with air and surface forces.

(c) He can assault the U. S. and with an expedition of vir-
tually unlimited strength at any time of his own choosing.

(a) 2nd Air Force. No consideration is given to but one aircraft carrier, viz., to attract into combat the main naval force of the enemy, to destroy them, and to set up an air base on the island of Japan.

THE PLAN OF ACTION

(1) The success of the expedition will no doubt lead to attacks on the fleet and by land based aircraft from the rear. If and when the expedition comes within range, the fleet will therefore be escorted by a balanced naval force of intercepting the available Japanese naval force.

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Working will be more desirable than a full out engagement with the Japanese fleet. The route to the objective will be chosen to avoid the expenditure out of range of land based aircraft.

(2) The Navy will maintain continuous air reconnaissance in the vicinity of the expedition, paying particular attention to the area within torpedo range of the expedition. Fighter and dive bomber aviation will be maintained on constant alert during daylight continuously, prepared to attack submarines sighted by a reconnaissance. Normal anti-submarine operations will be followed.

(3) During landing operations, a continuous army and navy fighter control will render close protection against attack by enemy fighters. The carrier battle group aviation has been ordered to be positioned within the duration of the initially landing fighter formation. After dropping paratroops, naval fighters will pick up fuel, oil and ammunition to be carried back to base at sea. It will be possible to maintain a constant flow of fuel, oil, ammunition and supplies to the air base which is directly adjacent to the landing area. Fifty per cent of the landed fighter force will be always adjacent to the base. Three squadrons will be maintained in the air in a one defense of the air base, and the balance on ground alert, dispersed in revetments adjacent to the expedition in knocked down form. Navy fighters will maintain continuous air patrol in a circle of 100 miles radius from E.

(4) As security against continuing enemy air attacks, the existing fighter controls will be supplemented by heavy anti-aircraft defenses with a preponderance of automatic weapons. The defenses, designed to protect the air base as well as the expedition, will include anti-air defenses, including searchlights, which will be maintained continuously. Aircraft radio locators will be installed immediately and maintained continuously.

(5) As security against surface attack the naval escort will maintain the main Japanese fleet has been drawn

-5-

SECRET

into the sea and destroyed. The fighter support available from the carrier sources will provide security from an air attack against the surface fleet during its stay at E.

(10) Should weather conditions prevent the arrival or take off of the initial boats with paratroopers, the initial wave of three fighter squadrons will land in the sea adjacent to the landing point after having been relieved by a second wave of three fighter squadrons which will assist the advance of the Marine landing force by bombing and strafing enemy resistance wherever it is encountered. The landing force will capture the airbase within four hours, permitting the second and subsequent waves of fighters to land.

17. Reconnaissance

(1) To dispatch a reconnaissance mission from Dutch Harbor to fly over the Japanese mainland and drop 500 lbs. of incendiary bombs to give the impression of a long range bombing attack. The mission will then head for A, photographing the string of islands between Yokohama and the A group as well as the islands of the A group. The mission will return to Midway Island for servicing, thence to the West Coast via Hawaii. If its range is insufficient, it will rendezvous with surface craft, land in the sea and be picked up.

(2) Based on information obtained from this reconnaissance the estimate will be revised and a plan prepared which will provide for a powerful and aggressive force to seize an air base on the coast of the Japanese mainland which force will, at the same time, draw the main force of the Japanese Navy into contact with ours, and destroy it.

W. D. Tipton
Lieut. Colonel, Air Corps

SECRET

John Edgar Hoover, U.S.N.

It is not your "Estimate of the Situation" which is classified by this entire problem as confidentially secret -- that the very lowest level of security is possible to cognizant even of the fact (not to mention details).

The period of dance flight of not less than
one hour should be undertaken at the earliest
possible opportunity. The condition receives considera-
ble is vital.

"I am not saying any sound superfluous but
clear. If the enemy has any inkling of its under-
standing, the only thing that could be expected will be only a
preparation for the attack. Unless we are very
careful, we must be prepared to be seriously
attacked during the attack.

C. F. Moore
Commander, U.S.N.

SECRET

Comments by Colonel Paul J. McDonnell

1. The entire U.S. Fleet would be required to operate as security.

2. The Japs would certainly know of the operation.

3. What about convoy protection in the other oceans and coastwise traffic (by planes and ships other than air liner).

4. Our navy isn't powerful enough at present to take care of 3 and 1 during 1942.


5. It's a reach of a plan in 1943 but too big for our "sea legs" at present.

6. If successful, another convoy lane across the Pacific would have to be maintained.

7. Note: The Axis "creeping" along the shorelines of Europe and Asia and always utilizing air, land and their limited sea power.

Paul J. McDonnell
Colonel, Infantry, U.S.A.

SECRET



COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO,

FROM: *W. J. Casey* *ESM*
TO: *William J. Donovan*
SUBJECT:

DATE June 19, 1942

Japanese - 6997
x Air Force -
x J. I. C.
x Liaison
C
File

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum
from the Japanese Air
Force, which was submitted through this office
to the J. I. C. for use in the Daily Summary.

The Present Position of the Japanese Air Force**SECRET**

1. Within reasonable limits estimates of Japanese aircraft production and estimates of current first-line strength can be tested by reference to known combat losses. For the five months ending April 30, 1942, the various Pacific Commands reported 1,310 Japanese aircraft losses in combat, including 233 planes destroyed by the A.V.G., as follows:

| | |
|----------------|--------------|
| December, 1941 | 309 |
| January, 1942 | 380 |
| February, 1942 | 271 |
| March, 1942 | 182 |
| April, 1942 | 168 |
| | <u>1,310</u> |

2. U.S.A.F. experience has provided a basis for determining the approximate relationship between known losses in combat and other types of losses. The Japanese Air Force has, of course, operated under different conditions than the U.S.A.F. Nevertheless, making rough adjustments for differing conditions, a reasonable estimate of total Japanese aircraft losses can be calculated, as follows:

Japanese Aircraft Losses

| Destroyed
in Battle | Damaged
in Battle | Destroyed in
Non-Combat
Circumstances | Damaged in
Non-Combat
Circumstances |
|------------------------|----------------------|---|---|
| 1,310 est. | 1,310 est. | 635 est. | 635 |

Total Destroyed: 1,945

Total Damaged: 1,945

Under Japanese conditions 70% of damaged planes are repaired. The frequency of plane operations in the Pacific, however, and the uncertain character of communications, make it unlikely that more

SECRET

that 50% of damaged planes will be repaired. Total losses
thus average 519 per month.

3. The further drains on current output exist. European experience indicates that to maintain constant pilot strength trainer planes equivalent to about one third of the monthly output of combat planes must be produced; and, in addition, about 30% of combat types must be allotted to advanced training. Assuming that total Japanese production was sufficient to meet losses over the five month period, trainer production would have had to be at a level of 280 per month, while 253 combat planes per month would have been diverted to advanced training.
4. Assuming, in the absence of direct information, that Japanese transport types, like German, constitute 3% of total production, 59 transports per month would be produced, if Japanese production fully covered all losses.
5. To cover all tactical, training, and combat losses suffered through April, monthly total production would then have had to consist of the following:

Combat Types -

| | |
|-----------------------|------------|
| For tactical use | 209 |
| For advanced training | 253 |
| Trainers | 280 |
| Transports | 59 |
| | 798 |

At the reported rate of combat losses in April alone (146 planes, as against a five month average of 219) a monthly production of 798 planes

-3-

SECRET

- would be required to maintain constant strength.
6. Japanese first line strength, at the outbreak of the present war, is estimated to have been 2,600 planes, with roughly 100% reserves, totalling approximately 5,200 combat planes.
 7. Independent estimates of Japanese monthly production range from 200 to 1,300 per month. Of these the most authoritative center about a figure of 750, and this is the production level that seems most consistent with the known facts. At this rate, approximately 365 combat planes are produced each month (70% of 750), of which about 160 must be allotted to advanced training. Thus 365 combat planes were available to meet the average monthly loss rate of 349 through April. The net drain on reserves would have been 1,120 for the five months.
 8. Due to the dispersion of operations, and related difficulties, it is likely that the average period of repair is as much as four months, as opposed to two months under European conditions. Under this assumption some 400 reserve planes would be under repair, and the actual reserve of combat planes held in a first line establishment of 2,600 would have consisted of 1,040 planes, at the end of April. Perhaps half of these planes were in transit.
 9. Japanese aircraft losses in May and June have probably been on a scale still further to reduce the reserve position of the Japanese Air Force.
 10. In general, this series of calculations suggests the conclusion

SECRET

- (1) that Japanese air strength may have been weakened to a point where offensive air commitments will not be undertaken until resources have been rebuilt or old commitments liquidated; and
- (2) that a scale of effort corresponding to a battle loss rate of at least 140 planes a month must be imposed on the Japanese if they are to be prevented from regaining strength; and a higher loss rate is required if the Japanese position is to be further weakened.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

Serial
088900A/CFM

June 15, 1942

~~SECRET~~ **SECRET**

My dear Bill:

I am returning herewith your memorandum of June 8 dealing with that suggested broadcast to Japan.

I am very much intrigued by the suggestion and I do hope it can be worked out. Viewed from every possible angle, the effect would be good if it were successful.

Sincerely yours,

Frank

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D. C.

Enclosure



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

26312

June 8, 1942

Honorable Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Frank:

The attached memorandum is sent to you personally and not officially and after you read it, I wish you would send it back. The suggestion was made to me and I think it may be worth examining. Before taking it up with the Psychological Committee of the Chiefs of Staff, I would like to get your views.

Sincerely,

Bill
William J. Donovan

COPY

PLAN: Half hour broadcast in Japanese in hysterical fashion, using same wordage Doolittle caught Jap announcer using relative the bombing raid, stating another huge air raid over several sections thickly populated cities and military objectives....this to go out on exact wave length used by Jap domestic radio picking up immediately following their signoff.....broadcast to be created here on platter, and transmitted from two or three submarines surrounding the islands simultaneously....this to eliminate possibility any tracing of signal.

PURPOSE: Remembering what happened within the US on the "invasion from Mars" broadcast, and we were at peace, think of panic this would cause in Japan, particularly since Japanese are susceptible to panic, are superstitious, and since Doolittle raid know a vast destructive force could come again.

BUYER: full explanation attached.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

San Francisco, Calif.

Memorandum

TO: Mr. Murray Brophy

FROM: J. J. Burke

SUBJECT: Psychological Blow Against Japan

If the NY can secure the cooperation of the Navy Department, a blow of tremendous importance might be delivered against Japan by means of a program, the details of which are herewith transmitted.

Let us prepare on transcriptions of fifteen minutes each at least a half-hour broadcast in Japanese designed to give the impression that it is being released from Tokyo. In this program, the Tokyo announcer would appear to be giving an eye-witness description of an American invasion with ground troops, parachute troops, navy landing operations, about a thousand planes, etc. Such things as "it is rumored the Emperor has fled to the summer palace at Kyoto" -- "fleeing Japanese citizens are hampering the movement of Imperial troops by crowding into the Tokkido" -- "bombs have made the city an inferno" -- "we don't know how long we shall be able to stay in the air but we shall do our duty until the last" -- etc., etc., a vivid word picture of death raining from the skies and chaos and confusion in the Imperial city.

We remember what happened within the United States during the "Invasion from Mars" broadcasts. We were then at peace. Yet panic was quite a real thing among some portions of the American population.

The Japanese people are known to be even more impressionable.

The program, after being made on transcriptions could be given to at least two American submarines. These submarines would rendezvous off the coast of Japan at a given time. The time would be after dark when the submarines would be able to surface for transmission. The time would also be just a few minutes before the end of the day's normal broadcasting by the Japanese radio network.

About five minutes before the close of the Japanese network's broadcasting schedule, the transcriptions aboard the submarines would be played through their long-wave transmitter equipment on a wave-length edging in on the Japanese wave-length. Thus the audience of the Japanese network would be held after the network signed off.

Murry Brophy

-2-

May 22, 1942

In order to prevent the immediate location by direction-finding equipment of the submarines' positions, it is recommended that one submarine surface off the coast south of Cape Inubo or else in the Sea of Kasima Nada; that another submarine surface off the coast of the Sea of Kumano Nada, both of which are on the eastern side of Japan; and that another submarine surface--unless the hazards are too great--off the western coast of Japan somewhere in the Japan Sea. Each submarine would have a duplicate set of transcriptions. Figuratively speaking, the ball could be passed from the submarine in the east to the submarine in the west and from the submarine in the west to the submarine in the southeast either at pre-arranged intervals or else at the fifteen minute break. This ought to confuse Japanese aviation and Japanese radio technicians, because the American signals would first come from the northeast, then from the west, and then from the southeast. Even if the Home Defense awakened in time to make a serious attempt to locate the source of the program, they would be unable to accurately spot such locations. Since none of the submarines would be broadcasting more than fifteen minutes at any one time, the chances appear good that each submarine in turn could complete its mission and slip away without being spotted.

A program of this kind might conceivably cause chaos and confusion and actual deaths among the population equivalent to an actual landing by a small number of troops. It should achieve, first, actual damage caused by the panic of the population; second, deterioration of morale inside Japan; third, establishment of a state of nerves on the part of the militarists; fourth, loss of prestige of the armed forces of Japan in the eyes of the people; and fifth, loss of face by Japan in the eyes of the world--particularly Germany and Italy. It might establish a precedent which could be effectively repeated as a weapon for a propaganda "war of nerves."

It is suggested that at least one of the men in the squadron of Jimmy Doolittle who heard the frenzied Japanese account over the radio of their bombing operations be made available to us in order to give us an accurate picture of how the Tokyo announcer talked -- expressions he used -- how far he went with his verbal pictures of death and destruction, etc. If we could obtain the same general tone in our transcriptions, Japanese listeners to our program could not doubt its "authenticity" because it would sound much the same as a broadcast which they had heard before.

We can get this broadcast together without delay.

-0-

6717

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFFICE MEMORANDUM

DATE: June 5, 1942

To: Mr. James Murphy
From: Harry Brophy / H.B.
Subject:

The attached memo from Jean Burke makes a lot of sense, and if Colonel Donovan can present it personally to Secretary Knox, I think we can accomplish an important feat.

Outside edges of green
card indicate the edges of
the camera field

Even No. rolls

Exposure is $\frac{1}{25}$ @ f. 6.3

x Suserid
x Stefansson

June 5, 1942

Honorable John J. McCloy,
Assistant Secretary of War,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack:

Here is a letter dated June 4 from Stefansson
which you might be interested in reading.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

Japan 22 March 6/16.
x Siberia
x Alaska
x Slespuss.

June 5, 1942

Mr. Vilhjalmur Stefansson,
67 Morton Street,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Doctor:

Thank you very much for your letter of June 4,
which I find most interesting. I am sending it on to
the War Department.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON
67 MORTON STREET
NEW YORK

June 4, 1942

JAPAN-ALASKA-SIBERIA

Dear Colonel Donovan:

Attached is the letter I read to you on the telephone,
which you asked me to send along. I have added two para-
graphs, the last two, and call them specially to your attention.

[Handwritten signature]

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON
67 MORTON STREET
NEW YORK

June 4, 1942

JAPAN-ALASKA-SIBERIA

Clarifying Telephone Conversation of June 4

Dear Colonel Donovan:

When you telephoned just now I am afraid I did not express what I meant about probabilities of Japanese attack. I now try to.

The Alaska-Japan situation cannot be divorced from that of Siberia-Japan, particularly not in the Japanese mind; for the Soviets may join us in counter-attack.

My view has been that if the Soviets chose the time for a war with Japan they would start in October; that if the Japanese chose the time they would start in May. My reasons for this follow:

The Japanese, I believe, understand cold weather conditions of warfare less well than any other great power; correspondingly they probably over-estimate the superiority of the Soviet Army in winter equipment and winter methods, as compared with those of summer. Therefore they almost necessarily attack in the early spring, so as to have ahead of them the longest possible span of that weather to which they believe their own equipment and methods best suited in a war that will cover the Amur front and the Siberian coastline towards Bering Strait.

If facing a situation where they believed the Soviets would come to our aid, the Japanese would move just as soon as they considered the ice conditions favorable in the Okhotsk Sea and up along northeastward. This would be late May or early June. They would start with an attempt to knock out Dutch Harbor, since this is our most effective base for naval and air cooperation with the Soviets; then they would try to knock out the Soviet installations at Providene Bay, Anadyr, Karkovo, Komandorski, Petropavlovsk, and the Okhotsk Sea, Nagaevo, Komsomolsk, Vladivostok. Their plan would be to win on the described front, and on the Manchurian front, before the coming of those northeast Siberian winter conditions which they dread and which start in October.

If the Japanese were sure that the Soviets would not join in the war then I see no reason why they might not attack Alaska at any season. What they dread with the Soviet Union is a power which comes at them from the interior, from the north.

If Alaska were the whole picture I believe the Japanese might attack, irrespective of season, for we have little strength in the interior; if they can knock out Dutch Harbor, Kodiak and Anchorage they will have, temporarily at least, effective control of all of Alaska.

You remember, this was practically what you and I discussed with the Vice President in relation to an oil pipeline from Norman to pour fuel into the Yukon River, and a road from the Mackenzie basin at Norman to the Yukon. To fight the Japs effectively we must apply our strength from the interior, as the Soviets do, rather than having our main strength coastal and thus dependent on the outcome of a naval warfare.

It now seems to me doubly urgent to speed up the production and refining of petroleum at Norman. As you know, the plans to that end, upon which I have been working under your direction, are now being carried out. The only fly in the ointment is that, in my opinion, the work is being done the hard way. I do not worry about what seems to me an unnecessary expenditure of millions; but I do worry that while we are spending the extra millions we are also losing a lot of time.

W. J. Donovan

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

VILHJALMUR STEFANSSON
87 MORTON STREET
NEW YORK

June 4, 1942

JAPAN-ALASKA-SIBERIA

Dear Colonel Denevan:

Attached is the letter I read to you on the telephone,
which you asked me to send along. I have added two para-
graphs, the last two, and call them ~~Revised~~ to your attention.

Colonel William J. Denevan,
Coordinator of Information,
Washington, D.C.

June 1, 1942

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you for your letter of May 30th,
together with the following enclosures:

1. Handbooks of Schools, Colleges
and Universities in Japan.
2. Cultural Nippon
3. China
4. The Japan Young Men's Associations.
5. Is Japan to Blame?
6. Japanese Handbook.

We are very glad to have these and I am
grateful for your sending them to me. They will be
very useful, and if you need any of them at any time,
please let me know.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
SD 140,001 Pacific War/2305

June 6, 1942

*Copy to
Flores
F. Butler*

My dear Colonel Donovan:

The Department has received your letter of May 1, 1942 in which you refer to discussion among representatives of the Department and your office, as well as of the Army and Navy, with regard to the possibility of taking diplomatic action in connection with short-wave radio propaganda exchanges between Japanese and American broadcasting stations concerning threats made by Japanese radio commentators against the crews of American bombing planes.

As you know, shortly after the declaration of war against Japan this Government, through the Swiss Government, reached an agreement with the Japanese Government that Japan, although not a party to the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 1929, would apply the provisions of that Convention to American prisoners of war captured by the Japanese. Since obtaining the agreement of the Japanese Government to comply with the provisions of the Geneva Convention, this Government has been making every possible effort through representatives of the Swiss Government to confirm and to insure Japanese observance of the provisions of the Convention. From information received by the Department from representatives of the Swiss Government, as well as from the International Red Cross Committee delegate in Tokyo, the Department has the impression that the Japanese Government intends to abide by its undertaking with regard to the Geneva Convention. In accordance with the provisions of the Convention and in conformity with the international usage covering the activities of representatives of protecting Powers and of the International Red Cross Committee, Swiss and Red Cross Committee representatives

are



Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
Twenty-fifth and E,
Administration Building,
Washington, D. C.


-2-

are visiting the places of detention of American prisoners of war in Japan and are forwarding to this Government confidential reports on their visits. They are also under a standing request to forward to the Department, through the Swiss Government and the International Red Cross Committee at Geneva, any information obtained by them with regard to Japanese treatment of Americans in Japanese hands whether they be prisoners of war, civilian internees or civilians at large under parole or otherwise.

In view of the Japanese Government's apparent intention to fulfill its undertaking to abide by the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War and Red Cross Conventions of 1929, it appears to me that it would be better not to make a propaganda threat the basis of diplomatic action. I understand that the original Japanese threat was not made as a statement of the official position of the Japanese Government or Japanese military authorities and it would seem not to be advisable for this Government to protest officially through the Swiss Government a non-official statement even though that non-official statement may have been permitted by the Japanese authorities.

The Department is, therefore, taking up with the War and Navy Departments the possibility of some alternative action.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Cordell Hull". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Cordell Hull".

*Treatment of
Prisoners
State*

May 1, 1942

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

In discussions among representatives of your Department and this office, as well as of the Army and the Navy, it was felt that a situation existed in regard to Japan which should be called to your attention. I am doing so because I think it would be a matter of interest to you.

The Japanese, in reply to American broadcasts commenting on Japanese threats against our bombing crews and parachutists, are warning the United States over their short wave that

"There can be no mercy for those pilots and their navigators who would subject the innocent and helpless to their raids over Japan".

The Japanese commentator says that

"Dishida is not a thing to be taken advantage of".

-2-

It seemed to me that your Department
might find, through its special diplomatic experience,
a means of so handling this situation in order to
bring about a restraining influence upon the Japanese.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

JWD:ja

April 27, 1942

Commander A. H. McCollum
Chief, Far Eastern Section
Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Commander McCollum:

Enclosed is a memorandum received from Dr. Ramet, which I am asking Commander Moore to take down to you this morning. We are prepared to undertake further examination of this Japanese source if it seems advisable.

With best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

James F. Baxter, 3d
Deputy Coordinator

Enclosure
JFB:PMH
4-27-42

April 25, 1942

9. Various miscellaneous craft:
- (a) Tugs, Kaiyo #1 and #2 (classification not entirely certain)
 - (b) Transports, Kashima and Irako
 - (c) Cable layers, Hashima, Tsuneshima, Tateishi, and Otachi
 - (d) Survey ship, Tsukushi
 - (e) "Special service" ships, Munetani, Nara, Washizaki, Kotaka, and Midori

In the third place, there are differences between the information in the Nippon Korei Zensho and that in O.N.I. #49 in such matters as place and date of construction, category, and present status; that is, active or decommissioned.

SECRET

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

MAY 22 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
2000 ... Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

Reference is made to your letter dated
May 11, 1942 in which you request to know whether
the Japanese year book from which the material
replied to you by my letter of April 24, 1942 was
obtained is in the possession of this Bureau. Please
be advised that this book was not appropriated from
Kazuo Kato, a Japanese national who is presently
interned at the Greenbrier Hotel, White Sulphur
Springs, West Virginia, awaiting repatriation to
Japan, but is still in his possession.

Such items as this book do not fall
within the category of articles prohibited to the
internees and will not be appropriated.

Sincerely yours,

Edgar Hoover

15 copies to ...

Thompson Station
- T. I.

May 13, 1942

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Edgar:

Thank you for sending me the memorandum which came with your letter of April 24, containing information which was obtained from a Japanese year book belonging to Masuo Kato, a representative of the Domei News Agency, presently detained at the Greenbrier Hotel.

Our people in the Far Eastern Section state that it appears that the source of the information contained in the memorandum is the Jiji Nenkan (Jiji year book) for 1941, a copy of which, owned by the Library of Congress, is now in our possession. If the source of this material is the year book just mentioned, we

-2-

we should like very much to obtain it for our use. I do not know whether this would be possible, but it occurred to me that your office might have appropriated it, and if so we should greatly appreciate having it for the use of our Far Eastern Section.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: *APB*

DATE May 9, 1949

TO:

SUBJECT:

Reference is made to the attached memorandum from the Library of Congress, dated May 4, 1949, to the effect that the copy of the book mentioned in the attached memorandum, known as the "Jiji" book for 1941, is now on loan.

It is noted that if the source of this book is the "Jiji" book for 1941, the fact that it is now on loan to the Library of Congress, of course, does not mean that the Library of Congress is not in receipt of the copy of the book, and that the book is now on loan.

The attached memorandum containing information referred to above is being filed in our files.

M E M O R A N D U M

To : Dr. F. R. Hayden
From : G. F. Nemer *C.F.R.*
Subject : Data from Japanese Year Book

May 6, 1942

The Far Eastern Section has checked the information contained in the attached memorandum, which you forwarded to me on May 1, 1942. It appears that the source of the information is the Jiji Nenkan (Jiji Yearbook) for 1941, a yearbook owned by the Library of Congress and now in the possession of the Far Eastern Section. We would like to know if the yearbook mentioned in the first paragraph of the attached letter is the Jiji Nenkan for 1941; if so, we would like to obtain this other copy for use by the Far Eastern Section.

Attachment

Handwritten:
N. 1
1941

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER
DIRECTOR



**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

APR 24 1947

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
20th and E Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

As of possible interest to you, there is attached hereto a copy of a memorandum which sets out information which was obtained from a Japanese Year book belonging to Masuo Kato, a representative of the Home News Agency who is presently detained at the Greenbrier Hotel, White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, awaiting repatriation to his native land.

This information was made available to me by a confidential source close to the Japanese Legation which is presently detained at the Greenbrier. The information set out in the memorandum is said to consist of statistics relative to armaments, ships, military and naval installations and production in Japan as of the year 1940.

Sincerely yours,

Attachment

WILLIAM A. RIMMEL

APRIL 29 1942

MR. MILLER and MR. FAME

I send you herewith attached letter received from
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover indicating their willingness to cooperate
with you in your efforts to find material of value on the
West Coast. You will note that they suggest that you get in
touch with the House Property Department in San Francisco as
a possible additional source of assistance in this field.

A. W. A. K.

Attachment

cc: Colonel Demovos ✓

**Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.**

APR 28 1947

RE CORRESPONDENCE

**PERSONAL AND
CONFIDENTIAL**

Mr. William A. Ebbell
Office of Coordination of Information
South Building
27th and F Streets, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Ebbell:

Reference is made to your letter dated April 25, 1947, concerning the possible release of Japanese and Chinese prisoners held by enemy forces on the West Coast, and also relating to certain of your representatives who will arrive in San Francisco in the near future for the purpose of considering the interests of your organization in this matter.

The content of your letter is being brought to the attention of the San Francisco Field Division of this Bureau and it is suggested that your Mr. Lawrence Miller and Mr. Charles E. Smith contact our San Francisco Field Office upon their arrival. I am sure my office will grant every assistance possible. I also suggest that the representatives of your office leave word to the Bureau Property Department, Bureau Avenue, San Francisco, California, as such assistance possibly can be given that this Bureau is aware of the fact that the Property Department has taken charge and custody of the property of alien enemies who have been interned.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director



COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: William A. Kimbel

DATE April 21, 1942

TO: Colonel Donovan

SUBJECT:

The attached paraphrase of memorandum was recently sent to Major Harold Jones in our San Francisco office. Major Jones advises that in addition to the material mentioned, there is other material of considerable value obtainable from the same sources. General Barrows is cooperating in that area.

There may be reason to communicate with Major Jones re material of particular interest.

Mr. Lawrence Beller and Mr. Fahn are going to the West Coast to investigate the extent of our interest in this material and to secure what may be considered essential to our needs.

W.A.K.
W.A.K.

CC: Major Bruce
Mr. Langer
Mr. Richards

Attachments (2)

PARADISE

We are advised that many of the Japanese being evacuated from the West Coast have material of considerable value which they are attempting to dispose of. This includes material both physical and informational in commercial organizations owned by Japanese. The F. B. I. and the Treasury Department have been advised.

THE FUTURE OF THE FUTURE

x *Little*
x *Jones, Harold*

April 21, 1942

Mr. Samuel Hays
Office of the General Counsel
Treasury Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hays:

Pursuant to our recent correspondence concerning the possible seizure of Japanese and Chinese securities owned by enemy aliens in the East Coast, Mr. Lawrence Miller will arrive in San Francisco in the course of the next few days for the purpose of conducting the statements of our representatives in this and other possible material obtainable from the same sources. Mr. Miller will be of our office in, therefore, going to San Francisco to conduct this matter.

We would appreciate any assistance which could be given this by your representatives in this matter.

It is requested that you be advised in the event of any change in the date of Mr. Miller's arrival in San Francisco so that we may be able to make the necessary arrangements for his stay.

Very truly yours,
[Signature]



✓ Jones
Juli
April 15 1942

Major Harold A. Jones
c/o Coordinator of Information
300 Montgomery Street
San Francisco, California

Dear Harold:

I am sending you herewith copy of an exchange of comments covering the recently issued Japanese position. As these are presently in the hostile area, would it be possible for you to take action to secure them for the use of the G.I. In such a case you are dealing with the Treasury Department because they have jurisdiction for dealing with alien property of this type. I shall greatly appreciate it if you could take action in this or direct it to the proper authority in the San Francisco office so that the desired result may be obtained.

I have also enclosed regarding the American situation and as you are a business man, this afternoon, Mr. Hill has been interviewed, and would suggest I be advised that the matter has been referred to the President, as the only authority that could authorize Mr. Hill's position and personal situation.

Sincerely yours,

William A. Jones
William A. Jones

Enclosure (2)

cc - General Jones ✓

FROM: WILLIAM A. KIMBEL
TO: MR. ED STANLEY

APRIL 13 1942

THE FOLLOWING LETTER PERTAINS TO THE CHINESE MATRICES
ABOUT WHICH WE HAVE HAD CORRESPONDENCE:

"I have just heard from the proprietor of a local printing establishment that the Japanese printers here in Seattle, in anticipation of evacuation, are selling their type as junk material. He tells me that one Japanese establishment has about 25,000 matrices for Japanese and, of course, Chinese type. The owner of this also plans to sell it for junk, in order to finance his evacuation. It has occurred to me that this equipment is largely irreplaceable and that some means should be found to save it. We have no funds here at the University available for such a purpose, and I refer the matter to you for your advice. I am going to get in touch with the owners of the matrices to try to persuade them to wait until someone can make them an offer. If these things are to be bought, they must be purchased at once, since these people have to liquidate their property as soon as possible."

PLEASE INQUIRE IF YOU ARE INTERESTED IN THE ABOVE MATTER.

W. A. K.

* The above letter was written by Mr. E. B. Schultheis, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington.

FROM: ED STANLEY
TO: MR. KIMMEL

APRIL 15 1942

WE ARE GREATLY INTERESTED IN SEATTLE
JAPANESE TYPE. WHAT DO WE HAVE TO DO TO
OBTAIN IT?

X 6 12

56116

jeu

April 18th 1942

Mr. Lowell Mallott
Director
Executive Office of the President
Office of Government Reports
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Mallott:

General Duvon passed along to me
your memorandum on the Japanese type in Seattle.
We are after it. Thank you for thinking of us.

I should say that our shirt tails,
when fully extended, will cover the world and
not just a few acres.

Very truly,

Edward Stanley
Chief, Publications Division

c.c. J. E. Murphy



Japan Character Structure
x Gorer
x Council for Human Relations
x Com. Nat. Morale

April 20, 1942

Mr. Gregory Batson
Council on Human Relations
15 West 77th Street
New York City

Dear Mr. Batson:

Thank you very much for sending me the
memorandum of Japanese Character Structure
prepared by Mr. Geoffrey Gorer. This is a very
interesting and helpful study and we are very
glad to have it for our work.

Yours very truly,

William J. Donovan

SECRET

*Specified in
X distribution*

Wm

March 14th, 1942

Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
War Department,
Executive Bldg.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General:

Any information (from a
reliable source) given Japanese divisions
as to the way we are trying to get distribution
of these divisions.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

SECRET

1 Pacific Coast 4677
W. R. Remy

MEMORANDUM

To: General David P. Barrow

March 27, 1942

From: William J. Donovan

Our Far Eastern Section greatly desires an opportunity to examine whatever Japanese printed materials, maps, charts, and pictures may have been discovered during the arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese nationals from the Pacific coast. It is our hope that such materials can be brought together at one or a small number of centers and that the Coordinator's Office may be permitted to receive for its use the materials which, upon examination, prove to be of value.

The first step would seem to be the securing of information as to whether such material in the Japanese language has actually been found, as to its nature and amount, and as to its location.

Would you please ascertain the most effective and convenient manner for carrying out the plan to examine and collect the materials? We are anxious to collect the Japanese materials in this country and feel that our Far Eastern Section can make prompt use of them.

It is requested that you forward as soon as possible whatever you may be able to obtain.

William J. Donovan

Respectfully

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

x Pacific Coast
x Dr. Remer.

M E M O R A N D U M

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

From: C. F. Remer *C.F.R.*

Subject: Japanese Materials on the Pacific Coast.

March 26, 1942

our

The Far Eastern Section greatly desires an opportunity to examine whatever Japanese printed materials, maps, charts, and pictures may have been discovered during the arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese nationals from the Pacific coast. It is our hope that such materials can be brought together at one or a small number of centers and that the Coordinator's Office may be permitted to receive for its use the materials which, upon examination, prove to be of value.

The first step would seem to be the securing of information as to whether such material in the Japanese language has actually been found, as to its nature and amount, and as to its location. *X* (It is accordingly proposed that representatives of the C.O.I. on the Pacific coast be requested to forward such relevant information as they may be able to secure.

It is believed that this request should go to Dr. David P. Barrows and Colonel Frank K. Ross. Colonel Buxton, who is to visit the Pacific coast in the near future, ought to receive a copy of any communication on this subject.

The advice of Dr. Barrows and of Colonel Ross is sought concerning the most effective and convenient arrangements for carrying out the plan to examine and select materials. The Far Eastern Section has spent both time and money on the attempt to collect Japanese materials in this country and we wish to emphasize the great importance of making such materials as are in this country available to those who can make prompt use of them.

cc Mr. Hunter
Mr. Langer

April 18, 1942

Memorandum JRM

From: GEB

Mr. Remer called me this afternoon concerning a teletype which I received from General Barrows and Harold Jones from San Francisco on Japanese material available on the Pacific Coast in the hands of various junk dealers as well as the Treasury Department. Dr. Remer talked Harold Jones and is satisfied that this material is very valuable to Research and Analysis and that it included many pictures as well as economic and military information.

When I was in San Francisco Colonel Donovan sent me a memorandum on this subject asking me to urge General Barrows to obtain such material. Therefore, I have authorized Dr. Remer to send his Japanese experts Mr. Fahr at once to San Francisco to examine this material and to telephone us as to its value and his recommendations.

INTEROFFICE MEMO

File

FROM: Edward S. Mason

DATE March 10, 1942

TO: Col. William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Japanese Lack of Self-Sealing Gasoline Tanks

Mr. Fred Kied, Technical Representative of the Goodrich Rubber Company at the Yokohama Rubber Company, came back to this country in August, 1941. He had been employed at the Yokohama Rubber Company for 22 months. He reports that during that time there was no production at the Yokohama Company of self-sealing equipment for gasoline tanks nor had such production in any of the other rubber companies come to his attention.

This may explain in part the reported high losses of Japanese planes in combat.

E. S. M.



COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

x Carlos

x Vladislav K. allard

7.11.12

December 29, 1942

Mr. Tolson, W.D. Bascom

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover

The enclosed report from Commander Vanderbilt suggests
the desirability of placing this Government on record in
regard to this in order to let out for a Pearl Harbor in
the future.

WDS:PC

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

278 MADISON AVENUE

NEW YORK

January 28, 1942

To: Colonel Burton

From: Commander Wandersbill

Subject: MR. CURTIS

Subject recently returned from Japan, where he was in charge of the Japanese Branch of the National City Bank.

Mr. Curtis is now employed by Colonel Sharp's office here in New York as an economic expert on Japan. He has spent the last nine years in Japan, and some years before that in Manchuria. He says that he frankly avoided any attempt to gather information during his stay in Japan, because he felt that any such activity might reflect on his bank. He does, of course, know general conditions in Japan very well, and he told me that Colonel Sharp's office is now compiling all possible information regarding Japan, both from a military and economic point of view. As this is compiled, it will, of course, be forwarded to N.I.D. in Washington, and I would suggest that our office there get those reports from N.I.D. In view of this it did not seem necessary to go into any great detail with Mr. Curtis, though he did give me some general information.

He said that there was no doubt that Japan had been saving up on all kinds of strategic material and equipment, at least for a year and probably longer. Japan is, and has been for some time, making an all out war effort. In other words, every individual citizen realizes, and is willing and anxious to give up his personal comfort in the interest of his Government. No gasoline is used in Japan except for absolutely essential Government purposes. There were formerly twenty-two thousand tank-cars; there are now about ten thousand, all of which have been used. There also have been no strikes. Mr. Curtis feels that Japan is entirely united, that they are willing to make any necessary sacrifice, and there is no grumbling. There are no labor unions and no strikes.

Mr. Curtis feels that the hope of starving Japan out is useless. He said there was ample rice when he left, and their crop comes in in late November and December, so they now have plenty to go on with. They are exporting a great deal from Indo-China and Thailand.

(COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION**270 MADISON AVENUE****NEW YORK****Col. Barton****2.****January 28, 1942**

In 1937 the Japanese claimed they could put 2,000,000 men under arms. Mr. Curtis estimates that the killed, wounded, missing, etc., since then amounts to probably 2,000,000. On the other hand no classes have been called up and it is probable that their potential strength is now about 7,000,000 men. Of these, Mr. Curtis estimates 2,200,000 would be available for use outside of Japan. He feels that if we can hold the Japanese for six months we will then start to gain ground, but that if the Russians should crack, and Germany should be able to send help to Japan, and perhaps get into Suez and India the situation would be extremely serious and the outcome of the war doubtful. Mr. Curtis feels that sooner or later Japan will attack Vladivostok, and according to his information they would be able to cut off the Peninsula, so that even though Vladivostok itself could not be captured, it would be isolated. The Japanese people are very much worried about the proximity of Vladivostok and possible bombing. And sooner or later, if they last, he believes they will take this city.

Mr. Curtis gave me the name of an Englishman, Mr. Ernest James, who has lived in Japan for some thirty years, and has a great deal of valuable economic information. I am going to get in touch with Mr. James.

W.H.V.

W.H.V.

